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Abstract 
Through an analysis of critical reviews and other commentaries on the 
annual Turner Prize shortlist exhibitions, I examine a philosophical problem 
which has put into question the rational basis for evaluation in art criticism: 
the lack of any agreed criteria for the evaluation of artworks. This problem 
has been most often addressed within philosophical aesthetics through two 
contrasting approaches: the attempt to formulate evaluative criteria, and 
the denial that such criteria are either possible or necessary. My response 
to this meta-critical issue is an interdisciplinary study, in the form of an 
analysis of published commentaries on the Turner Prize, that examines 
theories of critical evaluation against an empirical investigation of actual 
critical practice.  
 
The Turner Prize has a number of advantages as a case study. Extensive 
media coverage of the competition means that it is possible to study a wide 
range of sources intended for the art-going public, that contain a large body of 
examples of comparative critical evaluation, and as an annual event it offers 
the opportunity for both synchronic and diachronic analyses.  Moreover, the 
regular presence of artists whose work has been characterised as 
‘conceptual, ensures that many of the commentaries focus on an area of art 
that presents a particular challenge to aesthetic theory and critical practice. In 
order to develop a critique of criteria based approaches, the contrasting 
approaches to art criticism taken by Noel Carroll and Frank Sibley are 
explored within an analysis of the critical reasons given to justify evaluations 
of Turner Prize exhibits.  Suggestions are offered for ways of developing 
alternative approaches, drawing upon theories of the aesthetic developed by 
Suzanne Langer and Kendall Walton. 
Contents 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: the Turner Prize and the problem of evaluation          1 
 
2. But is it Art?                   16  
            
3. Tomma Abts: form and value      51 
 
4. Noel Carroll and the art of the pratfall     76 
 
5. But what does it mean?                  107 
   
6. Martin Creed: ideas in an empty room                135 
 
7. Ideal critics and the uses of reason                     157     
 
Bibliography                                                                         
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
My thanks to my supervisors, Brian Rosebury, Peter 
Herissone-Kelly and Paul Humble, for their excellent advice 
and guidance. My thanks also to Jennifer Hartshorn for all her 
support and encouragement. 
  
 
1.  The Turner Prize and the Problem of Evaluation 
 
The Problem of Evaluation 
 
Each year when the Turner Prize is awarded, the Tate Gallery issues a short 
statement to explain why the winner’s artworks were chosen as the best.  In 
the weeks leading up to the announcement of the winner, the work of all the 
nominees will have been reviewed and appraised many times in the press and 
those critics too will have given explanations for the judgements they have 
made.  When critics pass judgements on works of art, there is an assumption 
that they are not simply offering their own opinions or confiding their personal 
tastes.  Their statements are read as normative and they seem to offer 
reasons for their judgements.  Since reasons are given to support 
judgements, it might seem safe to assume that those justifications are based 
on general principles: that some kind of agreed criteria are applied.  
 
However, the controversial nature of the Prize and the avant gardism of many 
of the nominees have prompted some to wonder what criteria are actually 
being applied, both by the Turner Prize jury and by the professional art critics 
whose published verdicts are often at odds with that of the jury and also often 
at odds with each other.  These questions about the criteria by which 
excellence in art is judged are not confined to debates about the Turner Prize.  
They have been a very longstanding feature of debates within the field of 
philosophical aesthetics; current academic papers on the subject regularly 
address issues raised in the writings of Hume and Kant. 
 
If the Turner Prize jury wanted to find assessment criteria to use in their work, 
there is no shortage of possible criteria on offer: beauty, skill, didactic value, 
emotional expressiveness and originality are among the many that have been 
suggested by writers on the subject.  Monroe Beardsley1 proposed 
1 Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism 1958 
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coherence, unity and intensity as the three criteria; for Clive Bell it was what 
he called significant form. 2 
However, it would not be a straightforward matter to decide which of these 
criteria are the correct ones to apply to The Turner Prize; indeed it is not a 
straightforward matter to decide which of these criteria are the correct ones to 
apply to art in general.  The problem is not that there are no criteria, but that 
there are too many.  Not all the criteria that have been proposed are 
compatible with each other; different suggested criteria often reflect different 
views about the nature of art and its purpose.  There is no one set of (what 
have been called) aesthetic3 principles that commands unanimous approval.   
One problem that dogs any attempt to formulate such principles is that it is 
often found that their application seems to inevitably throw up exceptional 
cases or yield results that seem perverse.  As Sydney Hook describes the 
problem:  
 
Just as soon as anyone offers a criterion or rule for a judgement of 
excellence, someone else will show that in fact we make 
judgements of excellence, which are widely shared by competent 
critics, independently of the criterion, or that some work of art to 
which the criterion or rule clearly applied was not uniformly judged 
excellent by competent critics.4  
 
This has led some to be sceptical about the possibility of formulating any 
universally agreed criteria and to deny the need for such aesthetic principles.   
Frank Sibley5 was one of those who took that view, and we will consider some 
aspects of his approach to the role of the critic within this study.  
 
If there is a problem with the reasons critics offer in support of their 
judgements, then that has significant implications.  If the relationship between 
critics’ judgements and the reasons they give for those judgements is 
questionable, then it might be said that the very reasonableness of criticism as 
an activity must also be in question.  If the task of those who claim that 
2 Art 1913 
3 I use the term ‘aesthetic’, here and throughout, as defined by Sibley in Aesthetic Concepts ,ie, 
denoting a quality that requires ‘taste’, sensitivity or perceptiveness in order to be discerned, rather than 
a quality that is readily discernible to anyone who has normal vision.  
4 Hook (ed.) Art & Philosophy: a symposium. Introduction p49 
5 Approach to Aesthetics 2001 
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evaluation is impossible, unless based on critical criteria, has been to 
formulate those criteria or explain their absence, the task of those who deny 
the possibility of general criteria has been to explain how critical evaluation 
can nonetheless claim to be a rational activity.  
 
Of course, for the professional critic, one possible way of dissolving the 
problem might be to conclude that evaluation is no more than expression of 
preference and has no place in critical practice.  Indeed, there is evidence of 
the extent to which non-evaluative critical practices have taken hold in the 
field of professional art criticism.  In 2003 a survey conducted in the United 
States found that three quarters of professional art critics believed that the 
evaluation of artworks was the least important aspect of their work.6  
 
In 2009 Noel Carroll published On Criticism7, partly in an attempt to counter 
this apparent ambivalence on the part of professional art critics about the 
importance of evaluation.  While the survey appeared to show that most 
professional art critics considered the evaluation of artworks to be peripheral 
or irrelevant to their work, Carroll argued that evaluation is the central and 
essential purpose of criticism.  In his view, the downgrading of evaluation 
would amount to a dereliction of duty on the part of the critic.  Carroll places 
the blame for this retreat from critical evaluation on the emergence of 
philosophical positions and critical fashions that have led critics to feel that, 
‘there is something counter-productive, suspect, illegitimate, or even 
impossible about regarding criticism as essentially evaluative.’8  
In the course of his argument for evaluation he challenges a number of the 
anti-evaluative arguments and assumptions that have emerged from a range 
of twentieth-century philosophical tendencies and ideas, ranging from anti-
intentionalism to post-modernist critical theory.  
 
Carroll also attempts to counter the arguments of those who would downgrade 
critical evaluation on the grounds that, if there are no agreed standards 
6 Rubinstein 
7 Carroll 2009 
8 Carroll p19 
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against which the artwork can be measured, any evaluation given by a critic 
must be purely subjective.  In response to that argument, Carroll denies that it 
is impossible to formulate appropriate criteria against which an artwork can be 
evaluated.  He offers a model of criteria-based evaluation, arguing that it 
represents a version of the approach that is not vulnerable to the difficulties 
that have beset earlier attempts to formulate critical principles.  We will 
examine how that model might work in the context of the Turner Prize. 
 
Sibley took a quite different view on this question.  Like Carroll, he saw 
evaluation as an important part of the role of the critic, but he did not believe 
that the formulation of aesthetic principles was possible, nor did he see the 
necessity for it.  He emphasised the critical importance of basing evaluations 
on perceptual judgements of individual artworks.  The skill of the critic lies in 
the ability to perceive the aesthetic qualities of an artwork and then the skill to 
communicate those qualities to others, aiming to open people’s eyes to 
significant features of the work.  In the absence of general criteria, the critic’s 
role is to expose the particular aesthetic qualities of each individual artwork, 
drawing the viewers’ attention to those qualities through description, gesture, 
analysis, the use of metaphors and so on, in order that the viewers are moved 
to see those qualities for themselves.  
 
However, the difficulty for those who deny that art can be judged against 
criteria is to show how, in the absence of criteria providing a logical 
connection between critical judgements and the reasons given to support 
those judgements, the critic’s evaluation, however well expressed, can be 
regarded as anything other than a statement of subjective personal opinion.  
Moreover, for the critics covering the Turner Prize there is a requirement for 
the critics to do more than perceive and communicate the aesthetic qualities 
of individual artworks in isolation.  They are also required to make explicit 
comparative evaluations of the work of the different shortlisted artists.  
Sibley’s picture of the critic does not suggest an obvious methodology; the 
critic’s ability to perceive and communicate the aesthetic merits of the work 
does not in itself provide a basis for arriving at comparative evaluations. 
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As I have said, the question of on what basis we can justify a claim that an 
artwork is beautiful, or that it is moving, or that one artwork is better than 
another, is a longstanding issue within aesthetics.  This study will enquire into 
some aspects of that issue, but the approach taken will not be to do so solely 
by engaging with philosophical debates relevant to the issue, but also by 
looking at how this issue is dealt with in practice by experienced professional 
art critics.  For that purpose I have looked to the commentaries surrounding 
the Turner Prize as a source of evidence. 
 
Why the Turner Prize? 
 
My approach to this problem is to explore the perspectives provided by 
different theories of critical evaluation by placing them in dialogue with an 
empirical examination of actual critical practice in the visual arts.  Critical 
evaluation of the visual arts has provided many of the classic examples used 
by key figures in the philosophical debate and it offers rich scope for 
comparative studies of critical evaluations across time and between well-
defined critical schools.  The Turner Prize provides an excellent source of 
critical writing for this study.  I will briefly sketch in the background to the Prize 
in order to explain why this is so. 
 
The Prize was originally set up in 1984 with the ambition of promoting interest 
in contemporary British art, in the same way that the Booker Prize raised 
public awareness of contemporary English fiction writing.  It was named after 
J M W Turner who had left a bequest to the Royal Academy in his will, on 
condition they presented a cash prize for ‘the best Landscape every two 
years’9.  Though the Royal Academy had taken Turner’s bequest, they never 
honoured that condition of his will.  The establishment of the Prize was 
presented partly as a way of making good on that commitment, but the use of 
Turner’s name was controversial at the time and has remained so since.  
When the current director of the Tate, Nicholas Serota was appointed in1988, 
the future of the exhibition was placed in some doubt, and the survival of the 
9 Button p18 
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prize was further jeopardised in 1990, when the Wall Street investment 
banking firm who had been the major sponsor went spectacularly bankrupt. 
The Prize was suspended for a year and by the time it was re-instituted in 
1991, having found media sponsorship from Channel Four television, there 
had been a reconsideration of its role and purpose.  New criteria were laid out 
and a format put in place that better exploited the potential of the higher public 
profile offered by the new media partnership.  It is in this second and current 
period of the Prize that it has established a position as a forum for annual 
national debate about the value of art, and it is this period that provides the 
evidence used within this study.  
 
The format that was put in place in 1991 has not substantially changed since 
then.  The Prize is awarded to ‘a British artist under fifty for an outstanding 
exhibition or other presentation of their work in the twelve months 
preceding’.10  The jury changes annually, but it is always chaired by the 
Director of the Tate, Nicholas Serota.  The shortlist of four artists is chosen 
from a long list of nominees.  Initially, nominations mainly came from those 
who might be considered art world insiders, but over time, and at least partly 
in response to press criticism, the process has been opened out to encourage 
more members of the general public to make nominations.  The names of the 
four selected artists are announced in May, and each of them exhibits work in 
a joint shortlist exhibition, which takes place in the autumn.  The show is 
usually mounted at Tate Britain, but occasionally in recent years it has been 
held at other museums outside London. 
 
One important point that is sometimes lost in the commentaries is that the four 
nominees are not judged on the work they show in the shortlist exhibition, but 
on the work for which they were nominated, normally an exhibition that they 
have mounted in the previous year.  The winner is announced in a televised 
event at the beginning of December each year.  The media sponsorship and 
keen public interest in the Turner Prize ensures good coverage in the press, 
10 Button p19 
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with discussion of the Prize not only in the arts reviews but also in the national 
news pages, in editorials and in opinion pieces by regular columnists.  
Over the past three decades, the annual competition has produced a vast 
resource of critical writing.  The format of the prize offers arts correspondents 
several opportunities to discuss the work.  When the shortlist is announced in 
May, the newspapers publish profiles of the artists who have been nominated; 
there are reviews of the autumn exhibition and further coverage when the 
winner is announced in December.  As the same person often writes these 
three published pieces, this sometimes gives us the opportunity to follow the 
critic’s views as they develop over time.  
 
The Turner Prize shortlist leads to a small number of pieces being very widely 
reviewed, so offering an excellent opportunity to compare a range of reviews 
of the same piece.  As an annual exhibition, covered by leading professional 
critics, the Prize offers the chance of studying the evaluation arguments of a 
particular critic over a number of years.  Moreover, the notoriety of the event 
encourages intensive media coverage of the exhibition, providing an 
opportunity to make structural comparisons of evaluative arguments from 
reviews in a wide range of publications, from daily newspapers to specialised 
journals of criticism. 
 
The competitive nature of the event ensures that arguments in support of 
evaluative judgements tend to be more central to critical reviews than they are 
in general art reviewing.  The Turner Prize has the effect of bringing questions 
about the value of artworks out from the review sections and on to the news 
pages.  The perennial controversies surrounding the Turner Prize encourage 
critics to make their arguments in support of evaluative judgements explicit.  
There is one caveat to bear in mind when we compare and contrast the 
reviews of different critics: that is it is not always possible to know to what 
extent reviews are influenced by each other.  We cannot be certain whether 
different commentators have used similar language because they have 
independently come to the same conclusions about a work or whether they 
have been consciously or unconsciously influenced by each other’s writings. 
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The strong showing of conceptual artists in the shortlists ensures that many 
reviews focus on an area of art that has, over the years, provided many key 
examples and counter examples discussed in recent theories of aesthetic 
value.  The dominance of conceptualism reflected in the Tate shortlists has 
been one of the causes of the controversies that have followed the Prize over 
the years.  In 2002 Ivan Massow was forced to resign as chairman of the 
Institute of Contemporary Arts after writing an article in the New Statesman 
attacking conceptual art as ‘pretentious, self-indulgent, craftless tat’.11  Later 
the same year, the junior culture minister Kim Howells received a great deal of 
media attention for publicly criticising the work on show at the Turner Prize 
shortlist exhibition.  On the feedback card provided by the Tate to collect 
comments from the public, he wrote, ‘If this is the best British artists can 
produce then British art is lost.  It is cold, mechanical, conceptual bullshit.’  In 
a post-script, he extended his critique beyond the work itself, on to the 
supporting commentary of artists and curators:  ‘PS The attempts at 
contextualisation are particularly pathetic and symptomatic of a lack of 
conviction.’12  This condemnation by a government minister, of work being 
shown in a leading publicly funded institution, is an indication of the 
temperature of the debate around conceptual art.  The amount of prominent 
coverage Howell’s remarks received in the press indicates a strong public 
interest in the issues. 
 
The challenge to both art-critical practice and meta-critical theory offered by 
what has been called conceptual art is clearly evident within published 
commentaries on the Turner Prize.  The origins of conceptualism arguably lie 
in Dadaism, that early twentieth century challenge to the values of art and the 
then prevailing ideas of aesthetics, and, in particular, in the Dadaist invention 
of the kind of artwork known as the ready-made.  The ready-made is an object 
or artifact that was not originally intended to be an artwork, that has been 
selected by the artist and presented, often with little or no alteration, as an art 
object within the context of a museum, gallery or other art exhibition.  First 
11 “Why I hate our official art” New Statesman 21 January 2002 
12 Guardian 1 November 2002 
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exhibited in 1917, Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain, a piece consisting of a mass-
produced urinal is the probably the best known example of the ready-made.   
 
If Fountain was a provocation intended to subvert and challenge notions of 
artistic value, it was an intervention of a kind that is still exercising critics 
nearly a century later.  The nature of the challenge was dramatized in an 
exchange between the art critic Jonathan Jones and former Tate Media 
spokesman Simon Wilson in October 2007.  Reviewing the Turner Prize 
retrospective exhibition, Jones states, ‘The truth is that after 23 years of this 
we still don't have any lucid way of saying why one ready-made is better than 
another.’13  Jones’ mention of 23 years was a reference to the history of the 
Prize, but this issue has dogged critical theory and practice at least since the 
‘making’ of Fountain.  Jones points out that none of the traditional criteria are 
available to the critic when confronted with such work: ‘when you get rid of 
technical achievement, get rid of excellence in painting or sculpting as 
standards of comparison, you are left with a messianic belief in the inspired 
artist’.  The implication of Jones’ remarks is that, denied the possibility of 
basing their judgements on criteria such as (what I will call) craft skills, the 
explanations given by critics, curators and the judges descend into 
mystification.  In lieu of such criteria, Jones argues, ‘what the Turner keeps 
falling back on instead is the oldest of all western ideas about art: the belief in 
God-given genius.’14 
 
This review drew an irritable response from Simon Wilson, a former Tate 
Media spokesman.  Denying the charge that there can be no criteria for 
judging such work, he defended the way in which evaluative criteria were 
applied within the short-listing and judging process, arguing that ‘the common 
basis of judgment is an assessment of the quality of the ideas and vision of 
the artist, and of the success with which these have been given physical 
form’.15  This response may fall some way short of being a precise set of 
general criteria, but the formulation is highly revealing.  Simon Wilson offers a 
13 Guardian   2 October, 2007 
14 Jones 2 October 2007 
15 “No Genius Required” Simon Wilson Guardian letters 4 October 2007 
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dualistic model of the artwork consisting on the one hand of ‘ideas and vision’ 
and on the other hand existing in a ‘physical form’.  Clearly, this model seems 
to him to be so obvious as to need no supporting argument, but his short 
phrase is packed with assumptions relating to the interpretation, evaluation 
and ontology of artworks.  The construction of the sentence seems to imply a 
sequence: that the idea or vision precedes the physical form of the artwork.  
Arguably, it also carries the implication of a relationship between ‘ideas and 
vision’, and ‘physical form’ that is hierarchical as well as sequential.  The 
centrality of ‘ideas’ to the formulation is significant, underlining a key theme in 
this study, the importance of ‘meaning’ in the evaluation of artworks.  Perhaps 
it is unsurprising that the former spokesperson for an institution that has often 
been accused of bias towards ‘conceptual’ art should work from such 
assumptions, but the assumption that one of the reasons why we value 
artworks is for the ‘ideas’ they convey, communicate, denote or embody is a 
common assumption underlying the majority of published critiques of the 
Prize.  
 
Wilson defends the Turner Prize jury against the charge that its evaluative 
judgments are not criteria based, but it is far from clear that Jones actually 
considers this lack of criteria to be at all problematic.  Though he mocks the 
idea of the Turner Prize jury searching for the ineffable quality of ‘genius’, in a 
later paragraph he clearly endorses the concept, saying of the work of former 
prize-winner Damien Hirst displayed in the exhibition, ‘Hirst's art cannot be 
called "good" but it can be called great… You want genius? He's a genius.  To 
find one in 24 years is actually not bad going.’16  Arguably, Jones is playing 
upon the inconsistencies within his own evaluative comments, partly for comic 
effect, but the review is also a quite explicit rejection of the need for evaluative 
criteria when appraising this kind of artwork.  
 
Simon Wilson shows his impatience with this approach, concluding his 
letter, ‘if Mr Jones is really as baffled by contemporary art as he claims 
to be, one wonders how he can do his job as a Guardian art critic.’17  
16 Jones 2 October 2007 
17 Guardian letters 4 October 2007 
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The charge that Wilson levels against Jones is one that goes to the heart 
of the debate.  Wilson claims that there are indeed criteria for evaluating 
contemporary art of this sort, and that those are the criteria that are 
applied by the Turner Prize jury when making their decision.  If Jones is 
claiming to be unaware of any criteria then, in Wilson’s view, he is 
admitting that he is unfit to do his job.  The admission that his appraisals 
of such work are made without reference to any objective standards of 
excellence reduces the status of the critical evaluations he has put 
forward in his reviews to the level of expressions of personal taste.  As 
far as Wilson is concerned, if Jones is not applying criteria when he 
makes judgements about artworks, then that undermines his credibility 
as a critic.  
 
On the other hand, one might take from the exchange a quite different 
implication about the role and status of the critic.  If evaluation of the kind 
of artwork produced by Hirst cannot be based on criteria, then we must 
trust that what the critic possesses in lieu of criteria amounts to another 
kind of a ‘god-given genius’: the special ability to perceive the ‘genius’ of 
the artists like Hirst.  
 
It is an indication of the richness of the source materials generated by 
the Turner Prize that, within even this brief exchange of views, we find a 
treasure house of issues, not just to do with evaluation and criteria for 
judgments of excellence in the arts, but also with the role of the critic and 
the question of meaning.  Despite the difficulty in proposing criteria for 
the evaluation of a ready-made, and all the problems attendant upon 
theories of evaluation that require the existence of general principles, I 
will not be arguing for the god-given genius of the art critic. 
 
Though the exchange between Jones and Wilson may not qualify as any 
great contribution to aesthetic theory, the process of uncovering the 
structures of the arguments critics actually use to support their 
evaluative judgements casts light both on critical judgement as it is 
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practised and on the competing theories that offer to provide a basis for 
critical evaluation. 
 
The role of the art critic is therefore at the heart of this study.  In many 
ways both Sibley and Carroll are seeking to define the characteristics of 
what Hume calls the ‘ideal critic’.  In the reviews of the Turner Prize, we 
see the work of actual critics, who in this context are often required to 
appraise work of very different kinds, work that that employs innovative 
approaches or is underpinned by obscure theoretical ideas.  The critics 
must then justify their appraisals in a way that entertains and informs 
their readers, and produce that copy, often to meet a tight deadline.  I 
have selected the examples of reviews of Turner Prize artists in order to 
examine a range of the different challenges faced by the critics and to 
look at the different approaches they take to producing an evaluative 
commentary on the work.  I have also chosen to use those particular 
sets of critical appraisals, because they touch on topics in several 
different areas, so that by returning to them we can more readily knit 
together different threads of discussion. 
 
Many of the works on which I have focussed have divided critical 
opinion, so we are able to look at reviews in which a work has been 
highly praised, but also examples of reviews where the same work has 
received harsh criticism.  Amongst the latter group of reviews there are 
critiques so hostile to the work on show that their authors have gone as 
far as to deny that the work is in fact really art at all.  We will look at 
some of those critiques in chapter two.  The published attacks on 
particular exhibits, and on the Prize as a whole, which we will look at in 
that chapter will be mostly drawn from what are sometimes called 
“serious” papers.  In the process of choosing which commentaries to use 
in this discussion, I have tended to bias my selection towards those 
publications that are likely to inform and reflect the views of the general 
art-going public, such as broadsheet newspapers, art review 
supplements, plus monthly and quarterly cultural magazines and 
journals.  I have tended to exclude tabloid newspapers, as they tend to 
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use the Turner Prize only as an occasion for ridiculing the pretensions of 
the art-world, or as a pretext for moral panic.  Although these 
manoeuvres are interesting from a sociological perspective, they do not 
provide a very useful body of source materials for a study of critical 
reasons. 
 
After this initial discussion of the disputed art status of Turner Prize exhibits, 
the following chapters, three to six, will focus on issues concerning the 
evaluation of artworks by focussing on relevant topics in conjunction with sets 
of reviews of Turner Prize art.  We take quite a circuitous path and there are 
some slight apparent detours, one into Victorian art criticism and one into 
slapstick comedy.  I hope to draw together some of these different topics and 
themes in the final chapter seven, but it may be useful now to provide a rough 
map of the route.  
 
In the third chapter, we will look at reviews of the work of the painter 
Tomma Abts, which provide a good opportunity to examine the ways in 
which critics seek to support their evaluations of the formal qualities of 
her paintings.  The analysis of those reviews is informed by Sibley’s 
distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic terms, and by his 
observation that the use of metaphor is a tool that the critic can employ 
in order to communicate aesthetic qualities that she has perceived in an 
artwork.  The reviews of Abt’s painting offer many examples of the use of 
metaphor and we will look at how that writing works within the structure 
of the art reviews and to what extent it offers support to their evaluative 
judgements. 
 
The fourth chapter is an examination of the criteria-based approach to 
evaluation proposed by Noel Carroll in On Criticism.  I look at a number 
of possible objections to his approach and consider it in relation to 
reviews of the work of the video artist and filmmaker Steve McQueen, 
who won the Prize in 1999.  There is also consideration of Kendall 
Walton’s alternative approach to classification, and I will refer back to the 
paintings of Tomma Abts in the light of Walton’s ideas. 
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 Chapter five deals with the question of to what extent, and under what 
circumstances the meaning of an artwork is relevant to an appraisal of its 
artistic quality.  I will point to the importance critics place on questions of the 
meaning in the work of Turner Prize nominees such as artists Chris Ofili, 
Simon Starling and Tomoko Takahashi, and argue that the meaning of 
artworks is sometimes neglected in theoretical discussions about critical 
evaluation.  I will also touch on the ideas of Susanne Langer18 and Frank 
Sibley.19  Langer’s approach offers an account of meaning in music, in which 
it is inseparable from those elements of the work that might more usually be 
described as aesthetic properties.  Frank Sibley’s discussion of beauty offers 
insights into the relationship between meaning and aesthetic value.  The 
penultimate chapter six further explores the issues of classification, 
interpretation and value, through a study of the commentaries on Martin 
Creed’s Turner Prize exhibition of 2001.  This exhibition presented an 
interesting challenge to the critics, and highlighted the issue discussed in the 
Wilson / Jones exchange, that of how evaluations of conceptual art can be 
justified and validated. 
 
In the final chapter I will pull together some of these threads in a more 
extended discussion, which makes use of the examples of reviews and 
commentaries that have been introduced and discussed in the earlier 
chapters.  As well as revisiting a number of the issues that are raised in those 
earlier discussions, I also want to make a larger point about what the reviews 
reveal about the Turner Prize as a whole and its role as an arena for 
judgements about art. 
 
In placing discussion of theoretical ideas about the evaluation of artworks 
alongside evidence about the practice of criticism, as evidenced in reviews of 
the Turner Prize, the intention is not to judge the work of the critics against the 
standards set by philosophers of the arts.  It is to bring together theories about 
critical evaluation and an analysis of critical evaluation in practice, so that 
18 Langer Philosophy in a New Key  
19 Sibley Approach to Aesthetics 
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those two elements can exist in dialogue with each other.  In fact, one reason 
for doing so is that the use of published critical writing generated by the 
Turner Prize shortlist exhibitions provides a kind of testing ground for meta-
critical theory, indeed one that parallels an important test of any theory of 
criteria-based critical evaluation.  As Hook pointed out, one might be inclined 
to doubt any critical system that led to evaluative judgements that we would 
regard as perverse.  An example might be Tolstoy’s late critical principles, 
which led him to condemn most of world literature, including his own novels, 
as valueless20.  I would argue that the perverse judgements that arise as a 
result of applying Tolstoy’s criteria rightly lead us to doubt his critical theories.  
By the same token, we are equally entitled to doubt a meta-critical theory that 
leads us to condemn examples of art criticism that we would otherwise judge 
as good, or praise examples of art criticism that we would otherwise judge as 
bad.  
 
The Turner Prize is an event that not only provides a huge pool of examples 
of evaluative writing; it also provides a steady stream of discussions in the 
media about the evaluation of artworks, the criteria used by judges, and the 
subjectivity or objectivity of critical judgements.  On the evidence of their 
commentaries on the Turner Prize reviews, most critics do not take their role 
lightly.  In many cases, their reviews provide examples of philosophical 
questions about the arts being explored within discussions of individual 
artworks. 
20 What is Art? 1896 
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2.  But is it Art? 
 
In the search for a rational basis for the critical evaluation of artworks, it might 
seem logical to begin with a definition of what an artwork actually is.  
However, to do so is to enter problematic territory; within the history of 
philosophical aesthetics, the problems surrounding the evaluation of artworks 
have often been engaged in a dance with the problems surrounding the 
definition of art.  There are good reasons why it might be thought permissible 
to sidestep the problem within this study.  It could be argued that, as the 
central issue is evaluation rather than definition, to adjudicate between 
competing definitions of art in order to decide whether an artwork should be 
considered as part of the case study is to pre-empt the discussion, as many 
definitions of art involve an evaluative element. 
 
Nevertheless, this issue does need to be addressed for the reasons I will set 
out in the first part of this chapter.  
 
There are many different approaches to the problem of definition and they can 
be broadly grouped into different categories or kinds of definition; some define 
artworks in terms of their possessing particular characteristics, or producing 
certain effects on the viewer, others in terms of art as a sociological 
phenomenon.  One kind of definition, which I will call criteria-based definition, 
tends to define an artwork as an artifact possessing a certain characteristic or 
set of characteristics.  One example of that kind of definition was set out by 
Clive Bell in his book Art.21  Bell argued that what he called ‘significant form’ 
was the essential defining characteristic of art.  His term ‘significant form’ 
referred to relationships of line and colour within the artwork that are in 
themselves aesthetically or emotionally moving to the viewer.  
 
Leaving aside any question of the merits of Bell’s argument, there would be a 
problem in adopting his definition for this study: a problem that, to a greater or 
lesser extent, would arise with the application of any criteria-based definition.  
21 Bell, Clive Art 1913 
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The problem reveals itself in one of the examples Bell used in his discussion, 
William Powers Frith’s22 painting The Railway Station (which Bell refers to as 
‘Paddington Station’) 
 
Few pictures are better known or liked than Frith’s Paddington 
Station; certainly I should be the last to grudge it its popularity. 
Many a weary forty minutes have I whiled away disentangling its 
fascinating incidents and forging for each an imaginary past and an 
improbable future. But certain though it is that Frith’s masterpiece, 
or engravings of it, have provided thousands with half-hours of 
curious and fanciful pleasure, it is not less certain that no one has 
experienced before it one half-second of aesthetic rapture — and 
this, although the picture contains several pretty passages of 
colour, and is by no means badly painted. Paddington Station is not 
a work of art; it is an interesting and amusing document. In it line 
and colour are used to recount anecdotes, suggest ideas, and 
indicate the manners and customs of an age; they are not used to 
provoke aesthetic emotion.23    
 
So, if this study had centred on reviews of the Royal Academy exhibition of 
1858, when Frith first showed The Railway Station, we might have faced a 
dilemma: do we include reviews of Frith’s painting, which was one of the most 
popular that year, or do we exclude them on the grounds that the subject of 
the reviews does not meet Bell’s definition of an artwork?  Frith was a Royal 
Academician and one of the most successful painters of his day, with a 
professional career that lasted half a century; the risk of applying any criteria-
based definition is that we may end up excluding work commonly agreed to be 
artworks.   
 
Perhaps we should be relaxed about finding a definition of art; perhaps, as W 
E Kennick argues, no defining set of criteria of art can be found, nor is one 
needed. 24  Instead, we should rely on the common usage of the word by a 
competent speaker of English.  The thought experiment he uses to argue for 
that position is this: he asks the reader to imagine a warehouse that is full of a 
great variety of objects, some of them works of art and some not.  Kennick 
argued that, if given the task of going into the warehouse to bring out all the 
22 Bills & Knight 2007  
23 Art 1913 
24 Kennick 1958  
17
objects that were works of art, any competent speaker of English who was of 
normal intelligence would be able to complete the task, even if they had no 
defining theory of art.  Furthermore, he argues that if, instead, one gave that 
person a defining theory of art and asked them to select on that basis they 
would be less able to complete the task. 
 
Now imagine the same person sent into the warehouse to bring out 
all objects with Significant Form, or all objects of Expression.  He 
would rightly be baffled; he knows a work of art when he sees one, 
but he has little or no idea what to look for when he is told to bring 
an object that possesses Significant Form.25 
 
Kennick’s thought experiment underlines the difficulty in using a set of 
criteria in order to decide whether something is or is not an artwork.  
Even if there existed a set of criteria that was universally agreed (and 
there does not), the task of interpreting those criteria and applying them 
to a range of possible candidates for the status of artworks is one that 
would be fraught with difficulty.  Armed only with the criteria, it is likely 
that fewer objects would be retrieved and that objects that we would 
commonly refer to as artworks would be excluded from the selection.  
Kennick accepted that there might be some articles in the warehouse 
that might need discussion (for him this simply reflected the fact that our 
concepts of art are indeed vague), but, importantly, the problems 
caused, he argued, would be much fewer than in the case of the person 
sent to retrieve items that possessed significant form.  
 
However, let us consider a particular warehouse in east London in 2004.  
This warehouse contained artworks belonging to Charles Saatchi, the 
champion and most prominent collector of the work of the group of 
artists who had become known collectively as the Young British Artists 
or YBA:  Hirst, Emin, Sarah Lucas, the Chapman Brothers and others 
who often used everyday non-art objects in the creation of their 
installations.  On the night of 25 May 2000, the warehouse caught fire 
25 Kennick p37 
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and many of the artworks were destroyed. 26  There was no warning of 
the fire and the warehouse was well ablaze by the time the fire service 
arrived.  But had things been different, if there had been some warning 
and an opportunity to rescue some of the collection from the flames, I 
am not sure that it would have been be wise to put Kennick in charge of 
directing that task.  Unless those evacuating the artworks had 
exceptionally good knowledge of contemporary art and recognised 
particular artworks, they would face very difficult judgements and 
perhaps fail to rescue a large number of valuable pieces.  Those items 
that might not be recognised as artworks (and those where the question 
was debatable) would not represent a marginal sub-set; they might well 
comprise the majority of cases.  Although Kennick’s argument works 
when thinking of traditional artworks such as paintings, drawings and 
sculpture, it runs into difficulty when faced with objects like Duchamp’s 
Fountain.  The application of his warehouse test would not have been a 
good way to salvage works from Saatchi’s warehouse.  As a great many 
Turner Prize nominees make installation art of this kind, applying the 
warehouse test to Turner Prize shortlist exhibits would be equally 
problematic.  
 
So, if the adoption of a criteria-based definition of art (such as the one 
proposed by Clive Bell) might lead to the exclusion of some works from 
this study, we can see that Kennick’s approach has little to offer as an 
alternative.  The application of either theory to this study would introduce 
a selective approach to the materials and thus risk skewing our analysis.  
Perhaps then I could abandon theory at this point; I might feel that I have 
solid grounds to assume that the cases I am examining do not present 
any problem of definition as they have all been nominated for a major art 
prize.  If a work has been produced by a trained professional artist, 
handled by an art dealer, exhibited in an art gallery or art museum, then 
nominated and shortlisted for the Turner Prize, exhibited in the Tate 
26 “Fire destroys Saatchi's art” Daily Mail 26 May 2004 
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Gallery and reviewed by art critics, then its status as a work of art should 
not be in question.  
 
However, there are two problems with that approach.  The first is that it could 
be argued that the decision to focus on commentaries on the Turner Prize 
shortlist exhibitions in itself implies acceptance of one definition of art, George 
Dickie’s institutional theory.  Dickie defines an artwork in the following way: 
 
A work of art in the classificatory sense is 1) an artifact 2) upon 
which some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social 
institution (the artworld) has conferred the status of candidate for 
appreciation.27 
 
Dickie makes clear that he is defining ‘work of art’ as a classificatory term, 
rather than an evaluative appraisal, but what is notable about this definition is 
that it does not seek in any way to identify the essential inherent features of 
an artwork; instead, the artwork is defined in sociological terms.  It would be 
wrong to simply adopt this definition as uncontroversial.  It has been widely 
held that the definition of the term ‘work of art’ necessarily carries with it an 
evaluative element; for example, R G Collingwood, in The Principles of Art 28 
distinguishes between ‘art proper’ and ‘art falsely so called’.  (Although, later 
in the book, he also argues that every human gesture and utterance is a work 
of art, thereby opening up a third and even broader sense of the term.)  There 
have been many critiques of Dickie’s institutional definition over the last four 
decades.  Using Marcel Duchamp’s Dadaist ready-made Fountain as an 
example, Ted Cohen29 took issue with Dickie, arguing that, although an 
artifact such as a urinal might be presented in a way that met Dickie’s 
requirement, it might nonetheless lack the qualities that would make it a 
‘candidate for appreciation’.  Ben Tilghman30 also criticised Dickie for 
supposing that a purely classificatory sense of the term ‘artwork’ can ever be 
wholly disentangled from an evaluative sense of an object being a work of art. 
 
27 Dickie 1971 p101 
28 OUP 1938 
29 Cohen Jan 1973 p69-82 
30 Tilghman 1984 
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The second problem is that the artwork status of objects exhibited in the 
shortlist exhibitions is itself a matter of debate within commentaries on the 
Turner Prize.  Over the years, the reviews and commentaries contain, as a 
recurring theme, the questioning of the artistic status of objects on display.  
Specifically, the question of whether an object is an artwork because of its 
intrinsic qualities, or because it has received institutional conferral of artistic 
status is, in the case of the Turner Prize, far from being an abstract matter of 
theory.  Commentators frequently not only challenge the validity of the 
judgements made by the Tate directorship and the Turner jury, but also the 
very notion that those institutions can confer art status.  It would be wrong to 
imagine that this theme is confined to the tabloid press; on the contrary, it 
surfaces regularly in the broadsheets and in the commentaries of professional 
art critics31 and, on many occasions, the writers’ arguments have echoed the 
views of Cohen and Tilghman.  We must accept that, within the commentaries 
on the Turner Prize, there exists a strand of criticism that challenges the claim 
that certain exhibited pieces are in fact art objects.  If exhibits such as Tracey 
Emin’s My Bed or Martin Creed’s Work 227:  The lights going on and off32 are 
in fact, as some critics have claimed, not truly works of art, then they would 
stand as counter-examples to Dickie’s definition. 
 
We can see this questioning of the status of Turner shortlisted pieces as valid 
artworks in the commentary around the work of 1999 prizewinner Steve 
McQueen.  McQueen’s winning exhibition included Deadpan, a video 
installation in which he recreates a famous stunt originally used in Buster 
Keaton’s slapstick comedy Steamboat Bill Junior.33  
 
David Lee, editor of Art Review questions whether McQueen’s video work can 
be considered art.  
 
Is it art?  It might be but it does not look like it to me because 
McQueen's work is so visually unexacting and fails to add up to 
more than the sum of its parts, which surely always plays a 
31 See for example Rachel Campbell Johnston, ‘The Turner Prize - is it art?’ Times 1 October 2008, Lee 
D. and R.Cork, ‘Turner Prize - is it art?’ BBC News online 2 December 1999  
32 Turner Prize 2001 
33 United Artists 1928 
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prominent part in good art.  It is in no sense visually alluring, 
beautiful or memorable…34 
 
In listing the qualities Lee sees as lacking in Deadpan, he identifies some of 
those which in his view are necessary for an artifact to be considered a work 
of visual art: beauty; visual allure or being visually exacting; memorability; and 
being more than the sum of its parts.  If we accept Dickie’s definition, then the 
lack of these qualities is not an issue; Deadpan is simply an artwork that 
(according to Lee’s evaluation) lacks those qualities.  We might, as a result, 
conclude that it is a very poor artwork, but it is nonetheless an artwork.  
 
However, Cohen argues that the lack of any such qualities would disqualify 
Deadpan from being an artwork: for how could Deadpan be, as Dickie calls it, 
a ‘candidate for appreciation’ if (as Lee claims) it has no qualities to be 
appreciated?  This throws into question the separation of the classificatory 
and the evaluative that underpins the institutional definition.  Dickie addresses 
this issue in a later refinement of the formulation that is, if anything, even more 
starkly anti-essentialist than his definition of 1971: by the time he published 
The Art Circle in 1984 the reference to ‘appreciation’ had vanished: 
 
A work of art in the classificatory sense is an artifact of a kind 
created to be presented to an artworld public.35 
 
In attempting to remove the evaluative dimension from the definition of art, 
Dickie removes the classificatory difficulty caused by competing or opposing 
evaluative judgements.  Many critics strongly disagreed with Lee’s evaluation, 
as did the Turner Prize jury that year.  In Frieze, Andrew Gellatly called 
Deadpan ‘multi-layered, fascinating and complex’36, while Adrian Searle, in 
the Guardian, described it as ‘lyrical’ and ‘undeniably beautiful’37.  If such 
judgements about the presence or absence of aesthetic qualities such as 
‘beauty’ and ‘visual allure’ may vary widely between individuals, it might be 
thought that, when looking at some other aspects of the piece, finding 
34 Cork R. and D. Lee 1999 
35 Dickie 1988 
36 Frieze , Issue 46 May 1999 
37 Searle Guardian 1999 
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agreement amongst critics should be more straightforward.  Lee makes two 
claims to support his contention that McQueen’s films do not constitute art: 
that his work lacks originality and technical skill.  In fact, on the first charge 
Lee goes further than simply saying that Deadpan lacks originality: 
 
His much discussed and praised piece based on Buster Keaton is 
as flagrant an example of plagiarism as you will find in any art 
gallery and succeeds only in polluting the memory of a comic 
masterpiece.38 
 
Notwithstanding the obvious adoption of Buster Keaton’s original idea in 
McQueen’s film, other critics did not see this as plagiarism.  Victoria Button 
argues that, in the use of a stunt from a slapstick comedy shorn of its narrative 
context, McQueen, ‘has taken a moment of silliness, a cinematic cliché, and 
given it powerful resonance’39.  In a similar vein, art historian John-Paul 
Stonard, writing on the Tate website, describes Deadpan as ‘transforming a 
slapstick motif into a visually rich exploration of cinematic conventions’40. 
 
There is a similar lack of agreement on the level of McQueen’s technical skills.  
While Lee describes his work as ‘unwatchable for those raised on the efforts 
of professional filmmakers’41, Adrian Searle in the Guardian describes them 
as ‘impeccably shot and edited’42. 
 
Clearly, to try to decide whether to include works such as Deadpan in this 
study on the basis of its possession or otherwise of certain qualities deemed 
to be defining qualities of artworks is beset with difficulty.  However, it might 
be argued that, no matter how difficult it might be to put into in practice, it 
should still be attempted.  If we wish to establish on what basis evaluative 
judgements of artworks are made, then polluting our evidence base with 
reviews of ‘art falsely so called’ might run the risk of perverting or obscuring 
our analysis.  Although Lee and Searle may disagree about this specific 
38 Cork R. and D. Lee 
39 Button 2007 p156 
40 Stonard 2001 
41 Cork R. and D. Lee 
42 Searle Guardian 20 October 1999 
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artwork, clearly, for Searle as much as for Lee, the appraisal of technical 
expertise forms part of the evaluation of the artist’s work. 
 
In the reactions to the Turner Prize shortlist exhibition that year, McQueen 
was not the only nominee to be accused of exhibiting work that failed to be art 
because of a lack of technical skill, nor was he the most notorious.  The great 
art scandal of 1999 was Tracey Emin’s My Bed.  Marjorie Millar in her Los 
Angeles Times article referred to the issue of technical skill in her report on 
the controversy:  
 
Anyone who has ever looked at the deceptively simple brush 
strokes of a modern painting and thought, "I could do that," would 
certainly have a similar response to Tracey Emin's "My Bed" 
installation at the Tate Gallery. Emin is one of the contenders for 
Britain's coveted Turner Prize for contemporary art. Her "My Bed" 
is a double mattress heaped with stained and dishevelled sheets, 
surrounded by the debris of indulgence--discarded stockings, 
empty vodka bottles, cigarette butts, a used condom and 
menstrual-stained underwear. Seems easy enough to amass. The 
question is, would you want to? 
Or, as the critics and some of the public flocking to an exhibition of 
the four finalists for the Turner Prize have been asking: When is an 
unmade bed a work of art and when is it an unmade bed?43  
 
David Robson’s defence of Tracy Emin’s work in the Daily Express came at 
the height of this furore over the piece.  He directly challenges the claim that 
Emin’s My Bed is not art: 
 
The stupidest thing that gets said about her (by lots of sensible 
ordinary people) is that a bed isn't art. It can't be because "It's just 
an ordinary bed and I've got one like that". Oh it would have been 
art if it was a painting or if she'd carved it in marble. You know, 
shown some skill. Well it is art - it is one of her chosen ways of 
conveying a life. And it is an effective one. Emin can paint but it is 
not what she chooses to do now. She is an artist to her fingertips.44 
  
Although he defends Emin against the charge that her work is not an artwork, 
his argument implicitly accepts the importance of craft skills, as he calls to the 
aid of his argument Emin’s proficiency in a traditional artistic medium. 
43 Millar M ”Unmade Bed Exhibit Has London Tossing and Turning” L.A.Times 29 November 1999 
44 David Robson quoted in the Daily Express 2 December 1999 
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This defence of non-traditional artists on the grounds that they possess craft 
skills in a traditional artistic medium is evident in the review of the 2004 
exhibition that appeared in Craft Arts International: 
 
But if anyone felt like jumping up and down over these works and 
claiming that the concept of Fine Art was disintegrating, or that the 
artists had no skills, they would actually be mistaken. Much of the 
work by all four nominees (the Chapmans, like Gilbert & George of 
some years ago, count as one) was extremely well crafted and set 
firmly in the mould of traditional art object. The cultural forebears 
are easily found.45 
 
In defending the craft skills perceived in the exhibits, the reviewer also 
defends their places within art traditions.  In the discussion of artistic 
legitimacy, the point at issue is the value or otherwise of objects that are 
perceived as standing outside the traditional visual arts disciplines of painting, 
drawing and sculpture. 
 
Anxiety about artists’ use of non-traditional media is a common theme of 
critical reviews and this is something I will look at in depth later in this chapter.  
It is evident in the title of the article by Daily Telegraph’s art correspondent 
Nigel Reynolds on the winner of the 2005 Prize, Simon Starling and his 
installation Shed Boat Shed: ‘Forget painting. Turner Prize is awarded to an 
old boatshed’.46  Starling’s piece was indeed originally a boatshed that he had 
found on the banks of the Rhine; his piece involved dismantling the derelict 
shed and turning it into a boat, which he paddled down the river to the 
Kunstmuseum in Basel, where it was dismantled and then re-assembled as a 
shed.  
 
However, before turning to the question of media, I will look at one final issue 
raised by the question of craft or technical skills raised by Starling’s piece.  
Although some commentators were sceptical about the artistic status of Shed 
Boat Shed, few could deny the craft skills involved in the making of the piece.  
45 Weston 2004 
46 Reynolds, “Forget painting. Turner Prize is awarded to an old boatshed” Daily Telegraph 6 Dec 2005 
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In his Frieze review of the piece in the original Kunstmuseum exhibition, Mark 
Godfrey notes the centrality and visibility of the construction process.  
 
From the outset, the subject of Simon Starling’s work has been the 
labour expended to produce it. He displays the end result of 
carefully planned processes, and although the viewer only sees a 
reconstructed object, they are encouraged to consider the story 
behind its construction and transformation.47  
 
We have seen previous examples of commentaries in which the craft skill 
displayed in the making of the object is used to validate the work of art and in 
those cases, even where there is disagreement between reviewers about 
whether or not those craft skills are present, there seems to be no dispute that 
such skills would tend to help a claim of artistic status.  Craft skills are, to use 
Carroll’s term, a ‘good-making’ feature; to borrow a phrase from Sibley, ‘skilful’ 
is a positively valenced term. 
 
However, Guy Damman argues that, in the case of Simon Starling’s Shed 
Boat Shed, the craft skills involved in the making of the piece actually put in 
question the claim that it is an artwork. 
 
Prominent in our encounter with Starling's £25,000 nautical shack, 
in other words, is awareness of its craftwork - an awareness, that's 
to say, of precisely the element of artistic production and 
consumption that the conceptual art movement took it upon itself to 
excise, for better or worse. 
I'm not saying, of course, that this means Starling's stuff is no good. 
But if I'm not entirely sure whether it counts as art (and neither is 
he, I might add, on the evidence of his interview in yesterday's 
Guardian), I'm dead certain that it's not conceptual art. Then again, 
however, in just raising these questions, maybe it is.48 
 
Damman’s review lends support to Carroll’s argument that it is impossible to 
formulate common evaluative criteria for different genres of art, but it also 
underlines the difficulties this study would face if it relied upon a criteria-based 
definition to define the limits of its case study.  
 
47 Godfrey 2005 
48 Dammann Guardian 8 December 2005  
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In many commentaries that express scepticism about art status of particular 
works, the artist’s choice of medium has a bearing on that judgement.  In the 
course of his critique of Deadpan, David Lee comments:  ‘McQueen is neither 
better nor worse than many artists who try their hand at a spot of video’.49   In 
part this criticism is of dilettantism; Lee argues that the production values 
evident in McQueen’s films do not meet professional filmmaking standards.  
This critique is echoed by Richard Dorment, who commented in the Daily 
Telegraph:  ‘I’ve often noticed that people who don’t have the talent to make a 
TV commercial have no trouble passing their static black and white films off as 
high art.’50  The critique is twofold: of the artists who fail to meet professional 
standards, and of the institutions that ignore such standards when appraising 
film in an art-world context.  This is not the complaint of an art world outsider; 
Dorment had been a member of the Turner Prize jury in 1989. 
 
Lee articulates another common critique of the Prize: discontent over the 
increasing presence of non-traditional media on the shortlist.  Controversy 
over artists’ use of non-traditional media was not new; it had been a theme in 
reviews since the earliest days of the open shortlist.  Brian Sewell commented 
in 1992: 
 
No sculptures of the human body, no figurative or landscape 
painter, no one whose skills and subjects might be recognised by 
Rodin, Michelangelo or Moore, by Constable or by the very Turner 
whose name lends the prize its only distinction.51 
 
But in 1999, two factors served to amplify this particular debate.  The first was 
the fact that none of the artists on the shortlist chose to exhibit paintings, 
drawing or traditional sculptures, nor were any of them known for that kind of 
work.  In addition to McQueen and Emin, the other nominees were the video 
artists Jane and Louise Wilson, and Steven Pippin, whose installation for the 
exhibition involved photography and constructions made of launderette 
washing machines.  The second factor was the media attention given to the 
Stuckists, a group of artists who regarded such work as non-art and 
49 Cork R. and D. Lee 
50 Dorment Daily Telegraph 7 Dec 2010 
51 Evening Standard  November 1992 
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denounced the institutions that (in their view) foisted it on the public.  Founded 
in summer 1999 by painters Charles Thompson and Billy Childish, the 
Stuckists rejected what they call the ‘conceptualist’52 approach to art, which 
was seen as dominating the contemporary art scene in general, and the 
selection of Turner Prize nominees in particular.  From its very formation and 
launch, the focus of their criticism were the Young British Artists, many of 
whom had been contemporaries of theirs at Goldsmith’s College of Art in the 
1980s, and whose work was sometimes referred to as ‘Brit-art’.  Charles 
Thompson’s own account of Stuckism underlines how, even through its 
naming, the group was defining itself in opposition to the YBA and its 
approach to art; he explains that he had coined the name Stuckist from ‘an 
insult to Childish from his ex-girlfriend, Brit artist Tracey Emin, who had told 
him that his art was 'Stuck'.53  Two months after the 1999 shortlist was 
announced, the Stuckist Manifesto specifically attacked the Turner Prize for 
embracing non-traditional media. Items 4 and 5 in the manifesto read:  
 
4. Artists who don't paint aren't artists. 
5. Art that has to be in a gallery to be art isn't art.54 
 
The Stuckist manifesto both asserts the primacy of painting and criticises the 
power of curatorial practices that underpin the art of the found object or 
installation.  The second point is elaborated upon, using Emin’s work as an 
example, in the open letter written by Thompson and Childish to Tate Director 
Nicholas Serota: 
 
It should be pointed out that an everyday object eg, a bed, in its 
normal environment, ie, a bedroom, must always remain only a 
bed.  Indeed it would still be only a bed even if it were displayed in 
a department store window or thrown into a canal. Furthermore we 
assert that the hapless bed would remain no less of - yet no more 
than - only a bed if it were suspended from the top of the Eiffel 
tower or somehow landed on the moon. It seems that the said bed 
ceases to be only a bed and somehow becomes art when placed in 
the 'contextualising' space of a gallery. We deduce that the credit 
52I use the term in quotation marks to indicate that I am using it as used in the Stuckist manifesto, rather 
than making any claim that the work referred to is conceptual art. In discussing the Stuckists, I will use 
the term as they do – broadly to embrace the work of artists such as Emin and McQueen.  
53 Thompson 1999 
54 Thompson & Childish 1999 
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for this stupendous metamorphosis should therefore be credited to 
the gallery owner. In today's art world it is the gallerist who 
performs the miraculous transformation of the mundane into a work 
of genius!55 
 
The passage offers a perfect counter example to Kennick’s warehouse 
theory and its final sentence not only lampoons the art world, but serves 
as a neat burlesque of the institutional approach to the definition of art 
championed by Dickie.  If the problem with criteria-based definitions is 
that they may exclude work that we might wish to call art, the problem 
with the institutional definition is that it places no limit whatever on what 
the art world might designate an artwork.  Writing in Modern Painters, 
Giles Sutherland agreed Emin’s work could not stand on its own, but 
needed the context provided by curatorial gloss: 
 
the art of which Emin's My Bed appears representative relies on 
concepts and explanations: words are often needed to inject any 
sense into the object itself.56 
 
Different writers may disagree on whether or not My Bed is art, but clearly it is 
not self-evidently art; without the contextualization of verbal explanation or 
gallery location, it would not be easy for the person in Kennick’s warehouse to 
identify it as an artwork.  
 
The second Stuckist manifesto, produced the following year, continued 
the attack on what they call conceptual art and again asserted the 
primacy of painting.  Items 4 and 5 of that manifesto read: 
 
4. Turner did not rebuild launderettes. He did not take photographs. 
He did not make videos, nor, to our knowledge, did he pickle sheep 
or construct concrete casts of negative space. 
5. It should be pointed out that what Turner actually did was to 
paint pictures.57 
 
55 Thompson and Childish, Open Letter to Nicholas Serota 22 February 2000 
56 Sutherland 1999 
57 Childish & Thomson 1 September 2000 
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The Stuckists invoked Turner to support their claim for the primacy of painting; 
since the inception of the Prize some had argued that as it was using the 
Turner bequest and the Turner name the Prize should focus on painting.  This 
may to some extent account for the omission of any mention of drawing and 
sculpture from both the first and the second manifesto.  Drawing in particular 
is a curious omission; in art education and training it is often considered a 
fundamental skill. 
 
Item 4 refers to the work of Steven Pippin but also two previous winners of the 
Prize.  Rachel Whiteread had become celebrated and notorious in 1993 for 
House, a concrete cast of the interior space of a demolished Victorian terrace.  
When she won the Turner Prize later that year, the Daily Mail called her cast 
of a room ‘a disaster in plaster’58. 
 
However, the reference to pickled sheep identifies a still more notorious 
figure.  The preserved animal installations of Damien Hirst had been a source 
of controversy when he was first nominated in 1992 and by the time of his 
second nomination three years later he was regularly attacked or ridiculed in 
the press.  His exhibition features two of his animal pieces, Away from the 
Flock and Mother and Child Divided.  Interviewed by the Independent, Brian 
Sewell, art critic of the London Evening Standard gave his view of Damien 
Hirst’s Away from the Flock: 
 
I don't think of it as art. I don't think pickling something and putting it 
into a glass case makes it a work of art. You might as well try it with 
a tea-cosy or milk bottle. It is no more interesting than a stuffed 
pike over a pub door. Indeed there may well be more art in a 
stuffed pike than a dead sheep. I really cannot accept the idiocy 
that 'the thing is the thing is the thing', which is really the best 
argument they can produce. It's contemptible.59 
 
For Sewell the lack of ‘making’ is a problem; Hirst has not, in his view, 
represented a subject, he has merely presented an object.  In his review of 
the shortlist in the Daily Mail, Anthony O’Hear’s reaction to Mother and Child 
58 Bill Mouland “A disaster in plaster” Daily Mail 24 November 1993 p 7 
59 Independent  Friday 14 July 1995 
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Divided reflected the views of many commentators in finding the aesthetics of 
Hirst’s work most objectionable: 
 
In the Tate Hirst is showing Mother and Child Divided, which 
consists of a cow and a calf each dissected at the spine and placed 
in neighbouring tanks. Politically correct as ever, the Tate assures 
us that the animals died from natural causes before Hirst got his 
hands on them. That explanation however is hardly reassuring to 
those concerned at Hirst’s butchery of artistic taste in this country, 
or the dishonour his shortlisting does to the name of Turner, our 
greatest and most vibrant painter.60 
 
O’Hear argues that Mother and Child Divided is not ’true art’; the emergence 
of artists like Hirst is a symptom of the general decadence of art.  The piece in 
his view exemplifies the progressive abandonment of acceptable standards of 
artistic taste that has been in train from Duchamp onwards: 
 
The time has surely come for to look for a renaissance of true art. 
We must insist at the very least that art reintegrates itself with 
public taste, and once more subscribes to generally recognisable 
canons of taste and beauty. 61 
 
Skepticism about whether Hirst’s work can be considered art has continued 
throughout his subsequent career.  Writing about Hirst’s retrospective 
exhibition Julian Spalding in the Guardian said: 
 
Some people argue that Damien Hirst is a great artist. Some say 
he is an execrable artist, and others put him somewhere more 
boring in between. They are all missing the point. Damien Hirst isn't 
an artist. His works may draw huge crowds when they go on show 
in a five-month-long blockbuster retrospective at Tate Modern next 
week. But they have no artistic content and are worthless as works 
of art.62 
 
It might be worth at this point summarizing some of the arguments against 
work such as Damien Hirst’s animal pieces and Tracey Emin’s bed being 
considered artworks.  O’Hear points to deviation from traditional aesthetic 
standards.  Sewell points out that, in these kinds of pieces, objects are not 
60 O’hear 1995 
61 O’hear 1995 
62 Spalding 2012 
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being represented, merely presented.  The Stuckists point out that these 
works cannot stand on their own, but are dependent on the context supplied 
by their location within an art exhibition space or the gloss of curators.  We 
also have seen that the perceived lack of technical skill involved in creating 
these installations is often cited as the reason for denying that they are 
artworks.  
 
However, this raises a question, for we have seen that critics such as Lee and 
the Stuckists have bracketed this kind of installation work together with media 
such as film and photography in their category of ‘art falsely so called’.  In his 
review of Deadpan, the criticisms Lee makes are specific to McQueen’s work, 
but, in Artforum earlier that year, Lee had already expressed his view on the 
dominance of video, photography and installation, arguing that the jury had 
concentrated on such new media ‘at the expense of anything that can be 
called art’.63  The implication is clear: that Lee is, at the very least, more 
sceptical about assigning art-object status to works that are in non-traditional 
media than he is about assigning it to paintings, drawings or sculptures.  The 
reasons given for such scepticism about installations are various, as we have 
seen, but the reasons for placing film and photography in the same category 
are not so obvious.   
 
It is far from clear that the objections that have been levelled at the work of 
Emin and Hirst would necessarily also apply to those using photography.  
Take, for example, Hannah Collins who appeared alongside Rachel 
Whiteread on the 1993 shortlist.  The art historian Rachel Barnes described 
her work in the Guardian’s guide to the shortlist: 
 
She photographs a wide range of subject matter; landscapes, 
cityscapes, interiors, still lives and the figure. She favours black and 
white and prints her work on canvas. Her best work is very strong 
and it is clear that although she attempts to create emotional 
drama, she is also drawn to the purely aesthetic potential of 
photography.64 
 
63 Lee Artforum September 1999 p48 
64 Barnes, Guardian 21 July 1993 
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As Rachel Barnes suggests, Hannah Collins’s work shows concern for 
traditional aesthetic qualities and (in O’Hear’s phrase) ‘subscribes to generally 
recognisable canons of taste and beauty’.  As Virginia Button points out, her 
work ‘frequently refers to the themes and imagery of the great art of the 
past’.65  It would be hard to deny that Collins’ work shows considerable 
technical expertise and I would argue that her large scale black and white 
canvas prints would be likely to be selected from Kennick’s warehouse.  The 
kinds of criticisms that are frequently levelled at installation art just do not 
seem to apply Collins’s work. 
 
However, Stuckist objections to photography and video are categorical, rather 
than based on any individual judgement of technical skill or aesthetic quality.  
When, in 2000, the Prize was first won by a photographer, Wolfgang Tillman, 
Maev Kennedy reported on a Stuckist protest for the Guardian: 
 
This year's shortlist was a poor platform for Stuckist protests, with 
Glenn Brown working in oil on canvas with a technique described 
as "old masterly", and Michael Raedecker's delicate figurative 
landscapes in paint and embroidery. But Tillmans's success was a 
gift to them. "Art is art and photography is photography," snarled 
co-founder Charles Thompson, a painter.66  
 
If the particular objections often made about installation art do not necessarily 
apply directly to photographic art, the reviews offer evidence of a number of 
other possible explanations for this reluctance to assign art object status to 
the photograph.  One is that, although artists such as Collins may show 
technical skill in their work, it is, from the point of view of some commentators, 
the wrong kind of skill.  The Stuckists are keen to insist on the primacy of 
painting; for them, while mastery of the traditional skills of painting acts to 
validate the artist, a similar level of expertise in using the technology of film 
and photography does not have that validatory power.  
 
One reason for this tendency to exclude photography may be its ubiquity in an 
age when huge numbers of high definition still and moving images are shot 
65 Button 2007 
66 Guardian 29 November 2000 
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every day by untrained members of the public on mobile devices, 
photographic and video.  Art critic Jonathan Jones offers this view:  
 
Photography is not an art. It is a technology. We have no excuse to 
ignore this obvious fact in the age of digital cameras, when the 
most beguiling high-definition images and effects are available to 
millions. My iPad can take panoramic views that are gorgeous to 
look at. Does that make me an artist? No, it just makes my tablet 
one hell of a device.67 
 
Jones presents photography as mere manipulation of advanced technology.  
His Guardian colleague Sean O’Hagan, writing in response to Jones in an 
article entitled ‘Photography is art and always will be’, disagrees with him: 
 
A great photographer can make a great photograph whatever the 
camera. A bad one will still make a bad photograph on a two grand 
digital camera that does everything for you. It’s about a way of 
seeing, not technology. 68 
 
Of course traditional painting itself requires mastery of technology, knowledge 
of pigments, of solvents, of lacquers, of their different methods of application 
to a range of different materials.  But although techniques and materials have 
constantly developed, the roots of those techniques date back to an era that is 
pre-industrial, arguably even pre-historic.  That opens up another possible 
reason for the rejection of photographic work as art; the relative novelty of the 
photographic image in the art museum.  
 
In Sean O’Hagan’s reply to Jones we can see the importance he places on 
establishing the right of photography to exist within the museum, by invoking 
key examples from the art historical canon: 
 
If anything is anachronistic, it’s the “photography is not art” debate. 
Warhol’s Polaroids and Ruscha’s deadpan photography books put 
it to bed years ago.69 
 
67 Jones December 2014  
68 O'Hagan December 2014 
69 O'Hagan December 2014 
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When the 2010 shortlist was announced, the Daily Telegraph’s Alastair Sooke 
put forward a similar argument when discussing the work of one of the 
nominees, sound artist Susan Philipsz: 
 
It seems churlish to revisit the old “But is it art?” argument in the 
case of Scottish sound artist Susan Philipsz, when sound art has 
been mainstream for years now.70 
 
Sooke indicates acceptance of sound art as a valid form of artwork and the 
reason he gives for doing so implicitly acknowledges that the novelty of 
medium has a bearing on the issue, and that acceptance can come with the 
passage of time.  It is certainly true that not all of those who bemoan the 
‘death of painting’ are opposed to non-traditional media in principle.  When 
Philipsz went on to win the Prize later that year, Sooke’s Telegraph colleague 
Richard Dorment wrote a scathing review of her work, which was given the 
headline, ‘Telegraph art critic Richard Dorment reveals why this medium of art 
means nothing to him.’  Dorment had already made his opinion of Philipsz’s 
work clear when he reviewed the shortlist in October: 
 
I blame the judges. There are folk dancing societies all over 
London she is welcome to join, but please, don’t inflict this stuff on 
the rest of us.71             
 
Dorment had not changed his view when Philipsz was announced as the 
winner two months later.  However, although the sub-editor’s headline 
suggests a wholesale rejection of sound art as a medium, in truth Dorment 
seems to contradict this in the review itself: 
 
As an art critic I’m not the ideal person to comment on the quality of 
work in a medium that means nothing to me. It’s not that I don’t like 
music, or even that I don’t appreciate sound installations. One of 
my favourite works at Tate is a sound installation, Janet Cardiff and 
George Bures-Miller’s `Forty-Part Motet’ – their reworking of `Spem 
in Alium’ by Thomas Tallis. The problem is that I loathe the kind of 
think-me sensitive tuneless stuff Ms Philipsz sings.72 
 
70 Sooke 2010 
71 Dorment 4 Oct 2010 
72 Dorment 7 Dec 2010 
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Although Dorment is forthright in his evaluation of Philipsz’ work, when it 
comes to the medium there is a real confusion, one that is exacerbated by the 
sub-editors choice of headline.  Dorment talks about ‘a medium that means 
nothing to me’, but also cites a sound installation as a favourite.  The self-
contradiction within the review suggests that, as a critic, Dorment’s 
acceptance of sound art as a valid medium is not straightforward or 
uncomplicated. 
 
One other possible reason for reluctance to accept film and photography as 
art may be the common use of both media in non-art and certainly non-high-
art contexts.  Most photography that we encounter is commercial 
photography; most films are the product of the commercial film industry.  
When Tillmans won the prize in 2000, the Daily Telegraph described him as a 
‘former style and fashion photographer, whose claim to be an artist is 
challenged by some critics’.73  Clearly Tillmans’ highly successful career as a 
commercial photographer was an issue for some; he had made his reputation 
on commissions for youth, lifestyle and fashion magazines such as i-D and 
The Face.  The Observer critic Matthew Collings, wrote: 
 
I had no idea why Tillmans is supposed to be an artist. If he wins, 
the message will be that the Tate, like a youth-friendly vicar, wants 
to get down and boogie in an embarrassing way with youthful 
airheads who read The Face.74 
 
In Art Monthly, J.J. Charlesworth approved of the Turner jury’s selection of the 
photographer and argued that his style and subject matter, informed as they 
are by his commercial work, offers an artistic vision that reflects contemporary 
society: 
 
Wolfgang Tillmans' success at last year's Turner Prize emphasises 
the extent to which photography has become a dynamic medium 
between contemporary art and the preoccupations and interests of 
the broader cultural sphere. It is little surprise to find art 
photography flirting wildly with other genres and their attendant 
73 ‘Gay porn photographer snaps up Turner’ Prize Daily Telegraph 29 Nov 2000 
74 Collings November 2000  
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contexts, notably photojournalism, fashion photography and digital 
simulation.75 
 
When Tillmans was nominated, Patrick Burgoyne, editor of the Creative 
Review, a magazine that focuses on commercial art and design, celebrated 
the recognition of Tillmans’ photographic work in an editorial entitled Yes, But 
is it Art?  The article directly addresses the divide between commercial and 
fine art: 
 
The news that Wolfgang Tillmans has been shortlisted for the 
Turner Prize throws up some intriguing issues for the creative 
community at large…..In choosing to shortlist him, the Turner Prize 
press release praised the way that Tillmans "challenges the 
boundaries between art and photography" but a far greater 
challenge is made by the act of choosing Tillmans itself for, if he 
can qualify for the Turner Prize, what about all the other 
practitioners of the "communication arts" who similarly "engage 
with contemporary culture", as the Turner people put it?  …..The 
difference between what they do and what "artists" do is…..well, 
what exactly? Of course, most of the people that we write about 
create work for a paying client which would normally exclude them 
from being termed "artists", but it is also the case that most 
produce a great deal of personal, non-commissioned work. Often, 
this is the heart and soul of what they do, the client-based work 
coming afterwards as a result of someone seeing a piece and 
asking the creator to adapt it for commercial use (as many "artists" 
have). And if "art" is about ideas, there are ideas every bit as 
profound, or indeed, every bit as banal in the work of "our lot" as 
there are in the work of the YBAs et al. The "creative community", 
ie, the subject and target of this magazine, has long been treated 
as second class citizens by the "art world": perhaps that is about to 
change.76 
 
The defining feature of art, which Burgoyne identifies and questions in his 
editorial as a factor, is economic rather than intrinsic to the medium of 
photography; work that has been commissioned by and produced for a client 
is ‘normally’ disqualified from artwork status.  Burgoyne complains that, in the 
hierarchy of visual culture, it is those who produce visual imagery in the 
commercial world who have the lower status, but he, to some extent, accepts 
the central proposition that work produced for a commercial client is not art, 
75 Charlesworth 2001 
76 Burgoyne 2000 
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arguing that it is the ‘personal non-commissioned’ that is worthy of 
consideration by the art-world.  Burgoyne uses the term ‘art photography’; it is 
a medium whose status seems to need special pleading.  The term ‘art’ when 
attached to photography or film carries specific implications about the nature 
of the work, necessary in order to distinguish it from commercial work; it has 
not been necessary to coin the term ‘art painting’.  It is the success of 
photographic technology, the ubiquity of photographic images in advertising 
and journalism, which makes it necessary to identify the subcategory. 
 
As Burgoyne points out, the line between commercial and fine art is not a 
clearly drawn one and perhaps it has never been.  At the time when the notion 
of the artist, as distinct from the artisan, first emerged, the great Renaissance 
masters were producing their most famous works to satisfy the commissions 
of clients.  The modern concept of the artist as disconnected from the world of 
commerce and the demands of clients was perhaps forged in ideas about the 
19th century French Impressionist movement, but Toulouse-Lautrec’s posters 
for the Moulin Rouge are just one example of commercial art that has been 
accepted into the fine art canon.  Incorporation (or plundering) of popular 
culture goes back long before Warhol and Rauschenberg, certainly to Dada 
and early Cubism.  Likewise, the incorporation (or plundering) of ‘high art’ for 
popular culture products is also well established; Gillian Wearing, who won 
the Turner Prize in December 1997, complained that a TV commercial made 
by Charles Saatchi’s advertising agency had plagiarised one of her video 
pieces, a piece that had been bought by Saatchi himself.77  Some artists have 
been able to work successfully in high art and commercial environments; both 
McQueen and Sam Taylor-Wood, the 1998 Turner Prize nominee, have 
subsequently found success in mainstream commercial film industry.  The art 
status of the films McQueen showed in the 1999 exhibition is strongly 
questioned by David Lee, yet the films clearly tick all the boxes under Dickie’s 
institutional definition.  Lee does not offer a direct explanation for a non-art 
object being nominated for a major art prize, but his rhetoric implies one that 
is offered more explicitly by other commentators and that offers a direct 
77 Dan Glaister ‘Saatchi agency stole my idea', Guardian, 2 March 1999  
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challenge to Dickie: that ‘artworld’ institutions are foisting non-art objects on 
the public.  
 
This kind of claim is frequently made by critics of contemporary art and Lee’s 
comments highlight two associated criticisms specific to the Prize: lack of 
transparency and the use of obfuscatory language.  Lee asks what qualities 
the jury saw in McQueen’s work and criticises what he sees as a lack of 
explanation or justification given for their decision: 
 
The judges' bluster about Epoetry and the other all-purpose drivel 
they trotted out in defence of their choice is unhelpful to those of us 
who remain bewildered.  It would have been educative for the 
entire nation to have been flies on the wall of the Tate director's 
office when the judges were deliberating.  We would have learned 
the criteria used for judging such work and not have had to take on 
trust the mindless paeans uttered by those snake oil salesmen from 
the Tate's Department of Interpretation.  As it is we are none the 
wiser. 78 
 
Lee’s comments are an example of the suspicion expressed concerning the 
workings of contemporary art institutions in general, and the Turner Prize 
process in particular.  A sizable body of opinion in the editorials and on the 
letters pages held that the kind of work appearing on the Turner shortlist was 
not real art, but worthless stuff being passed off as art.  The response of US 
magazine, New Criterion to My Bed is an example: 
 
In recent years, the £20,000 prize has been given to a rogues’ 
gallery of artistic charlatans: Gilbert and George, Damien Hirst, the 
Chapman brothers, among others. This year, the chief contender is 
a woman called Tracey Emin.79 
 
Those who, like Lee, are angered or bewildered by the Turner Prize shortlists 
offer a range of possible explanations for the state of the contemporary art 
being offered for approval.  At one end of the range is what might be called 
The Emperor’s New Clothes hypothesis, in which curators, critics, and buyers 
of contemporary art are naively bamboozled by art-world tricksters (who might 
78 Cork R. and D. Lee 
79 New Criterion Dec 1999 Vol 18 Issue 4 p3  
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be the ‘artists’ themselves or in other versions, cunning dealers).  As in the 
Hans Christian Andersen story, they are too afraid to break ranks with a 
received view and so risk ridicule or being seen as undiscerning.  Lee’s 
comments however suggest he favours an explanation at the other end of the 
range, involving sophisticated collusion or conspiracy; this kind of explanation 
I will call the Ebony Tower after the novella by John Fowles80, whose title 
refers to an opaque and impenetrable academic art establishment. 
 
Julian Spalding, the former Director of the Glasgow Museum, told the Daily 
Mail that he was excluded from the private view of Damien Hirst’s exhibition at 
the Tate precisely because he had pointed out the emperor’s nakedness: 
 
I had dared to say what many of my colleagues secretly think: Con 
Art, the so-called Conceptual Art movement, is little more than a 
money-spinning con, rather like the emperor’s new clothes. That 
goes for the ‘artist’ Carl Andre who sold a stack of bricks for 
£2,297. It goes for Marcel Duchamp, whose old ‘urinal’ was bought 
by the Tate for $500,000 (about £300,000). It goes for Tracey 
Emin’s grubby old bed. And, of course, it goes for Damien Hirst.81 
 
Rachel Cooke in the Observer reviewed the 2007 shortlist.  That year 
the exhibition was held not in London but at Tate Liverpool.  The winner 
was Mark Wallinger, who showed a film Sleeper, a live piece that the 
artist had performed at the Neue Nationalgalerie in Berlin: 
 
The Turner Prize has travelled outside London for the first time in 
its 23-year history, and you can't help but notice that this daring 
excursion is making its organisers feel just a little anxious. In the 
capital, you see, there are enough pseuds on hand: types in 
architectural spectacles who are perfectly at ease ignoring the 
emperor's-new-clothes element of the competition, and who 
wouldn't be remotely embarrassed about discussing, in sombre 
tones, a film of a man in a bear suit prowling an empty art gallery. 
But what about Liverpool, soon to be European Capital of Culture? 
Won't its citizens simply laugh out loud at the 'art' that has been so 
kindly delivered to them? 
In my view, it would be to their credit if they did, but this is obviously 
not quite the reaction the Tate is after.82 
80 John Fowles 1974 
81 Spalding “It stinks” Daily Mail 9 April 2012 
82 “Who's that sniggering at the back?” Observer 21 October 2007  
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The contrast made between London and Liverpool underlines the class 
issue being raised here.  Cooke clearly identifies contemporary art as an 
elite phenomenon.  She hopes the simple honest citizens of the northern 
provinces will see through it; this ‘art’, she implies, cannot withstand 
scrutiny outside an environment in which it can rely on the support of 
metropolitan ‘pseuds’. 
 
Although The Emperors’ New Clothes and The Ebony Tower might seem to 
be mutually exclusive hypotheses, some critics of the Prize have incorporated 
elements of both.  When Tate director Nicholas Serota was reappointed in 
2008, art historian Bevis Hillier was quoted in the Independent opposing the 
appointment: 
 
I have nothing against him but he seems sincerely misguided, and 
sincerely sold on all that rubbish that the likes of Tracey Emin and 
Damien Hirst produce consisting of filthy beds and misspelt words. 
There is a conspiracy within the art world to commend this sort of 
work between artists, art dealers and critics, and I think Nicholas 
Serota stands at the top of his unspoken conspiracy.83 
 
The suggestion that Serota heads art-world conspiracy, does not, for Hillier, 
exclude the possibility that the director of the Tate promotes this kind of work 
because he genuinely holds it high regard.  
 
However, in 2002 Ivan Massow, then head of the Institute of Contemporary 
Arts, implied more sinister motives.  Describing what he called concept art as 
‘pretentious, self-indulgent, craftless tat that I wouldn't accept even as a gift’, 
Massow argued that that the conspiracy that supported the boom went wider 
that the art world: 
 
Totalitarian states have an official art, a chosen aesthetic that is 
authorised and promoted at the cost of other, competing styles. In 
the Soviet Union, the official art was socialist realism. Working in 
any other mode was considered - and treated as - an act of 
subversion. In Britain, too, we have an official art - concept art - and 
it performs an equally valuable service. It is endorsed by Downing 
83 Akbar, Arifa “Serota gets a job for life at the Tate – but how come No 10 wasn't told?”  Independent 16 
August 2008 
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Street, sponsored by big business and selected and exhibited by 
cultural tsars such as the Tate's Nicholas Serota who dominate the 
arts scene from their crystal Kremlins. Together, they conspire both 
to protect their mutual investments and to defend the intellectual 
currency they've invested in this art.84 
 
Massow emphasizes the power and influence of those who have invested in 
the work, comparing the boom in contemporary British art with the recent 
stock market bubble: 
 
The parallels between advocates of conceptual art and the dotcom 
pirates who plundered our pension funds are clear. The arts elite 
(and that includes the critics) who witnessed the conceptual 
revolution have invested so much of their reputation in defence of 
this kind of art that they find themselves unable to criticise it. 
Moreover, it is supported in so many ways and so thoroughly by the 
likes of Nicholas Serota and Charles Saatchi, as well as other, less 
high-profile investors, that those who speak out against it are 
derided as "past it".85 
 
This presents a more coercive picture than that of curators and collectors, 
naively duped into believing they see the Emperor’s clothes.  It is one in which 
those who are not in thrall to art world group-think face attacks from powerful 
interests within the Ebony Tower of a dominant elite. 
 
In his book Con Art – Why you ought to sell your Damien Hirsts while you 
can,86 Julian Spalding, like Massow, points to the investment art institutions 
made in the work of artists like Hirst.  Spalding however refers not only to the 
intellectual investment but also the financial one, and he sees the perceived 
investment value of contemporary art as a motivating factor in a conspiracy to 
promote found objects as art.  Writing in 2012 he made the comparison to a 
more recent example of the bursting of a financial bubble: 
 
Why did the idea that anything could be art catch on? Con artists, 
cashing in on Duchamp's scam, chose a few found objects and 
sold them to gullible collectors as gilt-edged investments, with the 
help of a small coterie of dealers and museum curators who 
84 Massow 2002 
85 Massow 2002 
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wanted to be at the forefront of art no matter what the public 
thought. The bubble that is Con Art blew up, like the sub-prime 
mortgage business, in the smoke-and-mirrors world of financial 
markets, where fortunes have been made on nothing. 
 
None of these explanations involving conspiracy or gullibility can be entirely 
discounted, even if they to some extent contradict each other.  The Tate has 
sought to address media and public criticisms by opening up the process; 
from 2002, nominations were invited from the general public, with nomination 
forms appearing in a national newspaper rather than in specialist art 
publications.  From 2005, there was a move to widen membership of the prize 
jury, which had been, up to that point, composed entirely of what might be 
called art world insiders: critics, curators, art historians, collectors and patrons.  
If appointing journalist Lynn Barber to the jury for the 2006 prize was intended 
to dispel any ideas of an Ebony Tower conspiracy, it was not wholly 
successful.  When the shortlist exhibition opened, Barber published an 
account of her experiences in which she describes attending the 
announcement of the 2005 prizewinner: 
 
I had confidently told all my friends that Jim Lambie was bound to win 
because he was by far the best; I almost fainted when the winner was 
announced as Simon Starling, the man who turned a shed into a boat 
into a shed. When I asked my fellow juror Andrew Renton why Starling 
had won, he said: 'Because he was by far the best.' 
That night, I wrote in my diary: 'For the first time, I find myself 
seriously wondering - is it all a fix? I loathe the idea that even by 
posing the question I am giving sustenance to the Brian Sewell 
contemporary-art-is-all-a-con-trick school of thought, but I do find it 
strange that I am halfway through my year as a juror and absolutely 
no nearer understanding what I am meant to be doing….after six 
months in the art world, I feel as adrift as on the day I started, 
thoroughly demoralised, disillusioned, and full of dark fears that I 
have been stitched up - that actually the 'art world' [whatever that 
is] has already decided who will win the 2006 Turner Prize and that 
I am brought in purely as a figleaf. '87 
 
Barber clearly felt herself to be the outsider in a group of jurors (chaired by 
Nicholas Serota) whose other member were gallery directors Margot Heller 
and Matthew Higgs, and the Director of Curating at Goldsmiths College, 
87 Barber October 2006 
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Andrew Renton.  Her account tells of her nominations being ‘brutally rejected’ 
and some of her accounts of the jury’s deliberations suggest that reasons she 
offered in support of her evaluations were at odds with the approach of the 
rest of the jury; she describes how, in arguing in favour of her nominees, she, 
‘made the mistake of saying one of them was a beautiful colourist.’  Barber 
also claimed that the Tate’s invitation to the general public to make 
nominations was a sham: 
 
Incidentally, the public is always invited to send in nominations for 
the Turner Prize. People can send them as much as they like but 
they might as well drop them straight in the bin. I kept asking when 
we could see the public nominations, thinking that if any looked 
interesting I would follow them up. I was given a bald list of names 
just a fortnight before we had to choose the shortlist, so if there had 
been any shows I needed to see, they would have been long gone. 
… It is wrong of the Tate to suggest that the public's views will be 
taken into account when they are not.88 
 
Barber’s article provoked predictably strong reactions from both supporters 
and critics of the Turner Prize.  Yet later, Barber expresses surprise and 
dismay on finding that the Stuckists had seized upon her comments as 
evidence of corruption and conspiracy: 
 
I was horrified to be greeted enthusiastically by a crowd of 
demonstrators on the steps. They were the Stuckists who always 
turn up for the Turner Prize but this time they were carrying 
placards saying 'Is it all a fix? Lynn Barber.' No! The words were 
taken completely out of context … but now I am stuck with being a 
hero of the Stuckist tendency.89 
 
Barber made an unlikely Stuckist pin-up; in the first paragraph of her article 
she refers to her friendship with Tracey Emin and her fellow YBA, Sarah 
Lucas.  She goes on to declare herself a supporter of contemporary art and 
criticises those who dismiss it: 
 
It always infuriates me when people claim to be art lovers just 
because they go to every Monet, Constable, Caravaggio exhibition 
and then make crappy jokes about unmade beds and pickled 
88 Barber October 2006 
89 Barber December 2006 
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sharks. And, unlike most people in the art world, I do warmly 
approve of the Turner Prize, the whole vulgar, crowd-pulling, 
bookie-pleasing razzmatazz of it.90 
 
Barber’s first account of the judging process makes it plain that, for her, 
considerations other than inherent quality were relevant to the selection of the 
shortlist. 
 
I also felt a mission to find a painter to nominate. I don't believe that 
painting is intrinsically 'better' than video or any other kind of art, 
but I know the majority of people think it is and I don't see why their 
wishes should be ignored, especially when the prize 
commemorates Turner. But the more paintings I saw, the more I 
came to feel it was a lost cause ... Luckily, we did find one good 
painter, Tomma Abts, to go on the shortlist, but she is a rarity.91 
 
For Barber at least, there was a sense of the Prize being in a dialogue with 
the public at large and its critics in particular. The Stuckists were not mollified 
by the presence of a painter on the list (when Abts was awarded the Prize, 
Charles Thompson called her paintings "silly little meaningless diagrams that 
make 1950s wallpaper look profound"92) but her work was not denounced as 
non-art as had been that of many a previous nominee. 
 
Barber’s support for the Prize and for contemporary art in general only added 
weight to the criticisms she voiced about the process of selection and judging.  
The fact that she published the article before the winner had been selected 
made it both more newsworthy and more damaging.  In her book Seven Days 
in the Art World, Sarah Thornton records the reactions of Barber’s fellow jury 
members: 
 
The Tate’s officials were privately furious. “Lynn’s article will make 
it more difficult for the jury to work together”, admitted Serota. “In 
the past, people have been able to speak their mind feeling pretty 
confident that what they say will not be written down and used in 
evidence against them.”93 
 
90 Barber October 2006 
91 Barber October 2006 
92 Guardian, 5 December 2006 
93 Thornton p101 
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Interviewed by Thornton, Serota dismissed Barber’s specific claims 
about public nominations for the Prize: 
 
One of Barber’s accusations was that the jury didn’t seriously 
consider nominations from the public. Serota disagreed. “The jury 
do take those nominations seriously.” He raised his eyebrows and 
chortled silently. “But not to the point of doing deep investigations 
into an artist who has shown once in Scunthorpe!”94 
 
Matthew Collings, in his review of Thornton’s book, is in no doubt that on this 
point Barber is right.  He writes of Serota ‘making it absolutely clear that the 
jury would never remotely consider taking nominations for the prize from the 
ordinary public, while somehow sounding as if he's saying the exact 
opposite.’95  Clearly, Serota’s comment can be seen as being characterized 
by a patrician distain for the views of the public.  However, Barber’s article 
does not lend support to the idea of an art world conspiracy dominated and 
controlled by the Tate’s director: 
 
The shortlist meeting was held in May, chaired by Nick Serota. 
Several people had told me I really shouldn't worry my little head 
because by some mysterious wizardry Serota would choose the 
shortlist himself. However, this wasn't what happened at the 
meeting; he barely intervened.96 
 
The other members of the jury did not rush to support the views Barber 
expressed in her column.  Thornton’s account suggests that, although this 
may in part have been because her article was seen as a breach of trust and 
confidentiality, it was also because her colleagues genuinely felt that she 
showed a lack of judgement in her nominations: 
 
The other judges were dismayed as well. One of them, Andrew 
Renton, who runs the curating programme at Goldsmiths and also 
manages a private contemporary art collection, told me, “I fear she 
has shot her load. She has sidelined herself as a judge by going 
public before we have finished the process”. Renton also said that 
Barber’s inexperience had led her to put forth nominations that the 
others felt were “beyond premature”. The Turner prize, like any 
94 Thornton p101 
95 Collings ‘”You’ve Been Framed”, Guardian, 18 October 2008 
96 Barber October 2006 
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other award that aims to stand for something coherent, needs to be 
controlled at the right time. As Renton explained, “to give the 
Turner nomination to someone who is straight out of art school is 
utterly irresponsible.97 
 
Barber herself reviewed Thornton’s book in the Daily Telegraph.  Her highly 
critical review began, ‘Sarah Thornton is a decorative Canadian with a BA in 
art history and a PhD in sociology and a seemingly limitless capacity to write 
pompous nonsense’98, and went on to claim factual inaccuracies and poor 
journalistic practice.  Thornton’s subsequent action for libel and malicious 
falsehood against Telegraph Media Group was successful.99 
 
Barber’s later article, after the announcement of the winner Tomma Abts, 
contains evidence of the fallout from her first piece, but also maintains a 
positive view of the Prize.  She gives a brief account of her own process 
selecting the winner: 
 
I must say Tomma Abts didn't appeal to me at the shortlist stage - I 
thought she was far too Anita Brookner-ish and restrained - but her 
work has grown and grown on me with every viewing. Having 
moved here from Germany 12 years ago, she must have ploughed 
a very lonely furrow, being a painter and not attached to any 
fashionable school or group. The other shortlisted artists all had 
vociferous supporters (Tracey Emin told me she would kill me if 
Rebecca Warren didn't win) but Tomma Abts came through purely 
on the strength of her work. Her Turner Prize room is truly thrilling. 
 
However, she also told her readers, ‘Nick Serota made me promise not to 
reveal the details of our deliberations so, sorry folks, the secrets of the curia 
are sealed’, before concluding, ‘nevertheless - for all my complaints - I am 
very proud to have been a Turner Prize judge.’100 
 
Barber’s articles provide evidence that can be used by both critics and 
supporters of the Prize.  While it is clear that it was difficult for an art world 
outsider to have great influence on the short-listing and selection process, her 
97 Thornton  
98 Barber Daily Telegraph 1 November 2008 
99 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group. High Court Of Justice Queen's Bench Division, 26 July 2011 
100 Barber 10 December 2006 
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account clearly falls short of providing evidence of a ‘fix’ and Barber clearly 
disavows the implication that arose from her own use of the word.  
 
Julian Stallabrass101 has written about the Brit-art scene and documented the 
promotion of artists through sophisticated public relations, the coincidences of 
interest between publicly funded institutions and private dealers or collectors.  
He also gives examples of the subtle and unsubtle pressures exerted by art 
market interests on curators and critics.  Such forces have, of course, been in 
play since the earliest development of the modern art market, but, clearly, the 
remarkable rise in contemporary art prices over the last three decades has 
heightened the commercial pressures.  As a result, the contemporary art 
world Stallabrass describes would be instantly recognisable to anyone familiar 
with the commercial film or music industries.  However, while this may provide 
a critique of the operation of the cultural industries, I would argue that none of 
it amounts to evidence of a conspiracy to pass off non-art objects as art.  
Even if we were to accept the existence of a conspiracy to promote, for 
entirely cynical reasons, the work of certain practitioners, it is not clear what 
motivation the conspirators could have for choosing to promote work that was 
not art rather than work that was art. 
 
Nevertheless, it is the nature of conspiracies to hide the true motivations of 
their instigators; what if nonetheless the art world is indeed in the grip of a 
conspiracy to foist non-art objects on the public?  Or, alternatively, what if, 
rather than being sanctioned by Ebony Tower cultural elite, these works are 
evidence of an art market bubble resulting from the collective naivety of those 
same curators, critics and dealers?  In either case I would argue that it would 
make the case for inclusion of commentaries on the disputed work stronger 
rather than weaker.  If either phenomenon is in operation, then analysing the 
reasons critics give for their evaluations of these works should provide clues 
to its nature. 
 
101 Stallabrass 1999 
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Besides, there is another problem with these various claims that parallels the 
central problem of evaluative criteria: that of getting any agreement on the 
precise nature of the conspiracy.  Massow damns the empty conceptualism of 
the Turner Prize, but in the same article describes Martin Creed as a genius; 
Brian Sewell dismisses Damien Hirst, but elsewhere praises the Chapman 
Brothers.  The use of the institutional definition is open to the criticism that it 
fails to indicate or limit the grounds on which the conferral of art status on an 
object can legitimately be made.  However, even if the selectors of the Turner 
Prize shortlist could be shown to be perversely including objects that were not 
art, there would still be value in analysing the commentaries on that work.  
Conversely, the opposite risk, of excluding artworks from the study because 
we suspect them of being ‘art-falsely-so-called’, has no upside. 
 
It must be conceded that to base this study on commentaries on the Turner 
Prize implies a de facto acceptance of Dickie’s institutional definition of art.  I 
set out my defence of that state of affairs, not by arguing for the correctness of 
Dickie’s approach but by arguing for its utility.  The adoption of Dickie’s 
approach ensures that reviews of objects that are generally recognised as 
artworks are not excluded from the study.  Moreover, the adoption of the 
institutional approach ensures that critiques of the theory itself are included in 
the case study; in a meta-critical study we should not fail to scrutinize the 
reasons given for evaluative judgement of objects whose very claim to be 
artwork is in dispute. 
 
Tilghman, Cohen and other critics of the institutional approach argue that the 
term ‘work of art’ necessarily carries with it an evaluative implication.  
However, Dickie sees the evaluative sense of the term as a different usage, 
one that is separable from the classificatory sense of the term. 
 
When using the term ‘work of art’ as a classificatory term, we might routinely 
describe paintings and sculptures (although perhaps not films, photographs or 
found objects) as works of art, regardless of their perceived quality.  Used in 
the evaluative sense we might praise a particular work as ‘truly a work of art’.  
But as Arthur Danto pointed out, ‘Any term can be normativized in this way, as 
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when pointing to a certain handsaw we say, “That’s what I call a handsaw”, 
meaning that the tool ranks high under the relevant norms.’102 
 
In examining the commentaries of those who doubt the art status of a 
particular work, it is frequently the case that the critiques primarily operate as 
evaluative criticisms of the work.  That is not to claim that such critiques are 
merely rhetorical condemnations or that their authors are not in earnest when 
they claim that a particular piece is not art, or that a certain practitioner is not 
truly an artist. In many cases where an object is condemned as non-art, this is 
simply an intensified version of condemning it as poor art. However, there is a 
real difference in the strength of the language and the fact that it comes with 
the implication of the artist acting in bad faith.  The focus is often on the 
artists’ motives in producing art objects of a kind that the writers do not 
approve of, or do not recognise as legitimate forms of art.  If the artistic 
motives for producing work of that kind seem unfathomable then, for some 
commentators, that raises the suspicion that artists are acting out of cynicism, 
or are self-deluded or are part of a conspiracy. 
 
However, aside from the implication of bad faith, the negative criticisms that 
are levelled in such cases are not very different to the kind of critiques that 
might be offered by one who did not doubt that a work is art.  To say that a 
work shows a lack of skill, originality or visual appeal is the sort of comment 
that we might make about art that is poor. As Dickie points out, allowing the 
distinction between an evaluative, and a purely classificatory or descriptive 
meaning of the term ‘art’, enables us to discuss value within the classification; 
without that distinction to speak of ‘bad art’ would be redundant.103 
 
Julian Stallabrass discussed the implications of that distinction in an anecdote 
recorded in High Art Lite: 
 
My father, looking at a picture in a Damien Hirst catalogue recently 
of some cigarette butts on a shelf, asked if such a thing could be 
art. It is a question that people in the art world tend to be impatient 
102 Danto in Carroll(ed) 2000 
103 Dickie April 2000 
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of, hearing it too often from outside (though never from inside) that 
world, because it is not a question about the definition of art but 
about the definition of quality in art; and because it is often asked 
not as a genuine question but rhetorically, as an accusation. The 
other reason, of course, that people get upset about it is because it 
is a very difficult question to answer – especially so, when as in 
many theoretical circles, the issue of quality is ruled out, for an 
obvious move in answering would be to say that we can be relaxed 
about our criteria for what is and is not art, so long as we are not 
relaxed about what counts as good art.104 
 
Critics of Dickie’s approach point to a certain emptiness or circularity in 
the institutional definition of art: art is what is presented as art by the art 
world.  For the purposes of this study, the validity or otherwise of such 
critiques is not an issue.  If we intend to study the evaluative judgements 
of art critics we must not exclude reviews of works whose status as 
artworks is in dispute.  To do so would be to skew the evidence base; 
indeed, one result would be to exclude the very commentaries that are 
most hostile to the institutional approach to the definition of art.  The 
utility of Dickie’s approach in this case is its very emptiness; its silence 
on the question of the grounds on which the art world makes its 
judgements of what is art and what is not. 
104 Stallabrass p188 
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3.  Tomma Abts:  Form and Value. 
 
This chapter looks at the way critics write about art and the ways in which 
their descriptions of the work that they are reviewing are used to convey the 
aesthetic qualities they see within it.  In particular, it examines the question of 
how the critic goes about making and justifying aesthetic judgements about 
the formal qualities of artworks.  We will consider these issues by considering 
critical and curatorial commentaries on the paintings of Tomma Abts, who won 
the Turner Prize in 2006. 
 
When the Prize was awarded to Tomma Abts, there was much press 
comment about her work standing in marked contrast to the artistic tendencies 
of the Young British Artists who had received so much exposure in the Turner 
Prize coverage in the preceding years: 
 
After years of unmade beds, pickled sheep and lightbulbs that 
switch on and off, Britain’s most prestigious art prize was won last 
night by the most unlikely kind of artist – a painter … Her win 
comes amid talk of a return to painting in the art world.105 
 
Many commentators welcomed the fact that Tomma Abts worked in the 
traditional medium of painting.  Rachel Campbell-Johnson speculated that 
even the Prize’s sternest critics might be pleased: 
 
Maybe even the Stuckists — that disconsolate band of cultural 
activists who faithfully turn out annually to harangue Turner Prize 
partygoers — might be appeased if she wins106 
 
The Stuckist leader Charles Thompson was not appeased, describing Abts’s 
paintings as, "silly little meaningless diagrams”107.  His dismissive comparison 
of Abts’ work to wallpaper serves to underline an important aspect of her 
work: that it is non-figurative.  Her work is often described as abstract painting, 
although as we shall see, some critics questioned that label. 
105 Cornell, Tim The Scotsman December 2006 
106 Times 3 October 2006 
107 Guardian 5 December 2006 
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In this section I will examine in some detail the language and structure of 
reviews of Tomma Abts’ 2006 Turner Prize exhibition and also of the 
immediately preceding exhibition for which she was nominated.  I have 
chosen to focus on Abts for reasons precisely the opposite of those that 
guided my choice of examples in the previous chapter.  Many of the works 
looked at in the last chapter were difficult cases: cases in which art status is 
denied by some commentators; cases which might be expected to confound 
critics who wished to judge the work on the grounds of aesthetics, or at least 
on the grounds of aesthetics alone; art composed of found objects; objects 
that repel or disgust; and objects that need to be explained.  Many of the 
pieces we have examined so far are works in which the formal characteristics 
are deliberately impoverished or are deemed not to be central to the work, but 
merely a means of conveying the idea or concept of the artist or generating 
concepts in the minds of the viewers.  In Abts’ work by contrast, the formal 
features of the work, colour, form, line, texture and so on, seem to be intended 
to stand on their own, to be appreciated as things in themselves rather than 
referring to a subject outside the frame of the painting. 
 
As a non-figurative painter whose work has no obvious or easily definable 
subject matter, Abts provides an opportunity to look at the way in which 
reviews of her work make that connection between the formal properties of 
the paintings and aesthetic qualities they ascribe to the work.  In this section, I 
examine the ways in which critics seek to persuade us of their aesthetic 
judgements (and to support and justify those judgements) through analysis of 
reviews of Tomma Abts by Adrian Searle in the Guardian, Matthew Collings 
and Barry Schwabsky in Modern Painters, Craig Burnett in Art Review and 
Rachel Campbell-Johnson in the Times. 
 
Non-aesthetic Description 
 
In ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, Frank Sibley discusses the different kinds of words 
that are used to describe artworks and distinguishes between aesthetic and 
non-aesthetic terminology.  A critic might say, for example, ‘that a painting 
uses pale colours, predominantly blues and greens, and has kneeling figures 
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in the foreground’108, all of which are features that can be ascertained without 
the exercise of aesthetic judgement.  Matthew Collings covers this non-
aesthetic description in the opening paragraph of his review in Modern 
Painters: 
 
Her canvases are small, the forms simple, the colour muted and 
the lines clear and sharp. In interviews she says her method is to 
start with bright acrylic colours, gradually they get toned down and 
the medium changes to oil.109 
 
He goes on to list the kinds of forms that occur in her paintings: 
 
Organic forms, geometric forms, straight lines, curved lines, 
relationships of colour, relationships between the forms and the 
outer edge of the canvas…110 
 
As Sibley pointed out, the presence of the kind of forms Collings describes 
would be apparent to anyone who had normal vision and was of average 
intelligence.  On the other hand, words such unified, graceful, delicate, 
lifeless, serene, trite or tragic, Sibley characterises as aesthetic concepts.  
They are properties that can be discerned only through the exercise of 
aesthetic judgement.  
 
Although clearly these aesthetic properties are dependent on the non-
aesthetic formal properties, that dependency is not, argues Sibley, rule-
governed: 
 
There are no sufficient conditions, no non-aesthetic features such 
that the presence of some set or number of them will beyond 
question justify or warrant the application of an aesthetic term.… 
Things may be described to us in non-aesthetic terms as fully as 
we please but we are not thereby put in the position of having to 
admit (or being unable to deny) that they are delicate or graceful or 
garish or exquisitely balanced.111 
 
108 Sibley Aesthetic Concepts p1 
109 Collings 2006 
110 Collings 2006 
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There have been challenges to this view, including one from Carroll which will 
be discussed later, but if we accept (for the moment) that this is so, then it 
raises a question as to what extent an art review can be said to be a 
contribution to a reasoned discourse.  If there is no necessary connection 
between the non-aesthetic properties that the critic describes within a painting 
and the aesthetic qualities she ascribes to that painting, then she is vulnerable 
to the accusation that she is merely asserting a personal subjective opinion.  
Sibley identifies the problem: 
 
Now the critic's talk, it is clear, frequently consists in mentioning or 
pointing out the features, including easily discernible non-aesthetic 
ones, upon which the aesthetic qualities depend. But the puzzling 
question remains how, by mentioning these features, the critic is 
thereby justifying or supporting his judgements.112 
 
Sibley is clear that there is no necessary connection between any particular 
form or colour mentioned by a reviewer and any aesthetic quality she might 
decide it possesses.  Aesthetic qualities are emergent qualities that arise out 
of those particular forms and colours within the particular artwork, but no 
individual formal feature carries the necessary implication of a corresponding 
aesthetic quality.   
 
Sibley does not see the critic as one who presents a reasoned analysis in 
order to prove the truth of the evaluations she has made.  Rather he casts the 
critic as one especially skilled in perceiving the aesthetic qualities in art, and 
as a teacher and persuader, who through a variety of methods enables the 
viewer to perceive those aesthetic qualities.  In the absence of a necessary 
connection, the critic’s role is to expose the particular aesthetic qualities of 
each individual artwork by drawing the viewers’ attention to them through 
gesture, analysis, metaphor or even rhetoric, so that the viewers are moved to 
see those qualities for themselves.  The critic can call attention to the non-
aesthetic properties that contribute to the aesthetic qualities she perceives (for 
example, ‘the muted colours create a sombre mood’) while being aware that in 
a different painting the same muted colours might have an altogether different 
112 Sibley Aesthetic Concepts p15 
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effect.  By looking at the reviews of Abts, we can start to address the question 
posed by Sibley, of how in practice the critics justify and support their 
appraisals of her work. 
 
In each of the reviews, the critic provides description of the work, formal and 
contextual analysis and an evaluation.  There are similarities of structure 
amongst all the reviews and I have grouped the elements under different 
headings: non-aesthetic description, categorisation, metaphoric description, 
characterisation, and direct aesthetic judgement.  It is important to note here 
that, in grouping sections of these reviews under these particular headings, 
my approach has been guided by the structure of this particular set of reviews, 
rather than the application of a prior set of categories.  This approach assists 
in seeing, not only what is being reported, argued or asserted within the 
reviews, but how these statements are constructed.   
 
It would be a relatively easy task to map instead the reviews against the ‘parts 
of criticism’ identified by Noel Carroll: description, classification, 
contextualization, elucidation, interpretation, analysis, and evaluation.113  
These are undoubtedly useful headings that can be applied to reviews across 
the board. However, in examining the reviews, it is useful to take, as a starting 
point, the structure of critical discourse as it actually occurs within the specific 
texts.  The headings I have chosen reflect the interests of the critics and their 
responses to Abts’ work, and to some extent the difficulty of classifying 
language in which Carroll’s ‘parts of criticism’ are so intertwined. 
 
Carroll identifies ‘description’ as one of his parts of criticism and it is one that, 
while it is an essential feature of any visual arts review, is sometimes dealt 
with only briefly.  In the reviews of Tomma Abts’ paintings however, many 
critics devote much of their reviews to descriptive writing, in one form or 
another.  In looking at the way description is handled within the reviews, it is 
useful to separate it into the sub-groups non-aesthetic and metaphoric. The 
first sub-group non-aesthetic description is exactly as Sibley defined it, simple 
113 Carroll p84 
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description of physical form requiring no aesthetic judgement.  The (larger) 
second sub-group reflects the frequent inseparability of description from 
elements of evaluative and interpretive writing.   
 
Elements of the reviews that would fall under Carroll’s headings ‘classification’ 
and ‘contextualization’ would be found under my heading categorisation. 
There is a reason why I am avoiding using Carroll’s heading ‘classification’.  In 
On Criticism, Carroll argues for a reason-based approach to evaluation that 
has classification at its heart.  The term he frequently uses to discuss 
classification is the word ‘genre’.  The term is one that he uses quite loosely, 
sometimes referring to subsets of the arts that have highly codified 
conventions, such as the horror movie or detective novel, sometimes using it 
to refer to an artistic movement or style.  There are some difficulties attached 
to Carroll’s concept of genre that will be discussed in a later chapter.  In 
contrasting Carroll’s ‘genre’ with Kendall Walton’s114 concept of artistic 
‘category’, I will be using the neutral term classification and so will avoid using 
the term here.  I will not however avoid using the term ‘genre’ and I will use it 
in a loose way, as Carroll does.  That which Carroll identifies as ‘elucidation’ 
and ‘analysis’ can largely be found, in some form, in these reviews: in the 
sections I have called metaphoric description and characterisation. 
 
One of Carroll’s parts of criticism that I have not included in my list of 
headings for this set of reviews is ‘interpretation’.  Although interpretation is an 
important (and often the largest in terms of wordage) element of the 
overwhelming majority of sets of Turner Prize reviews, it does not feature 
strongly as a discrete category within the critical writing on Abts’ work, and, in 
that respect, the reviews are untypical.  However that is not to say that 
interpretation is a part of criticism that is ignored by the critics in this case.  It 
is rather that questions about the meaning of Abts’ work are dealt with less 
directly.  The critics do talk the about the significance of Abts’ paintings but the 
subject is explored in a different, less explicit kind of discussion within the 
reviews, a point I will return to later.  
114 ‘Categories of Art’ 1970 
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One reason why it is particularly interesting to look at the reviews of Abts is 
that, without any obvious pictorial element or clear subject matter or message 
to the work, critical focus is inevitably on the formal properties and aesthetic 
qualities of the work.  In reviewing Abts’ non-figurative paintings, only one of 
the reviewers, Searle, tackled interpretation explicitly, and then only to 
apparently concede defeat: 
 
Being comprehensible isn't everything. Art is not always there to be 
understood. Who knows … what, exactly, Tomma Abts means by 
what she paints?115 
 
Searle does not supply a direct answer to his own question, but he does 
suggest that the answer lies in the visual allusions within her work, and 
perhaps also in the way in which the viewer engages with the painting: 
 
What is Abts painting, and what do her paintings allude to? Each is 
an event on a plane. You don't look at Abts's paintings, so much as 
observe them.116  
 
It is when Searle describes the forms within the paintings that he gives 
expression to the visual allusions he sees in the work.  For that reason, in 
Searle’s writing, much of what I have called metaphoric description and 
characterisation can also be considered interpretive in nature, and that 
arguably holds true in case of most of the other reviewers as well.  I will return 
to the question of how the critics interpret the paintings of Tomma Abts in 
chapter five, when we look at Susanne Langer’s concept of symbolic 
transformation. 
 
Carroll’s final ‘part of criticism’ is evaluation, that element whose role in critical 
practice Carroll is keen to defend in On Criticism.  In discussing the evaluation 
of Abts’ paintings, I make a distinction between overall critical verdicts and the 
finer grained aesthetic evaluations that contribute to them.  The latter I refer to 
as direct aesthetic judgements.   The former: the overall verdicts on a piece, 
an exhibition, or an artist, are also present in most reviews.  In reviews of 
115 Searle 3 October 2006 
116 Searle 3 October 2006 
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Turner Prize nominees, there is an understandable pressure on the critic to 
make comparative evaluations; their readers and surely their editors want 
them to pick a winner and to give reasons for their choice.  In their shortlist 
reviews, Campbell Johnson and Searle satisfied that demand.  Searle’s 
review ends, ‘Abts' quiet and disturbing paintings seem utterly right and 
unexpected.  They ought to win.’  Campbell Johnson also endorses Abts, but 
less enthusiastically.  In her review of the shortlist exhibition she emphasises 
that her overall verdict is based on her direct aesthetic judgements about the 
formal qualities of the paintings, rather than on any external factor: 
 
I hope that Abts takes the Turner Prize this year. This is not 
because, in a cultural climate that persistently trumpets the return 
of painting, it might seem appropriate to recognise it. It is because 
her paintings have a lovely sense of inner congruence.117 
 
However when Abts was announced as the winner a few months later, 
although Campbell-Johnson duly approved the jury’s choice, she made it clear 
that she felt that Abts was the best choice in a poor field: 
 
Tomma Abts was the right choice of winner for this year’s prize. 
Her obsessive little canvasses with their zig-zaggy geometries 
address the problems of painting in a post-abstract world. The only 
real problem is that there is a real problem. Painting it would seem 
has become interminably dull….The judges would have made a 
stronger statement if they had declared that they were not going to 
award the prize; that there was nothing new that merited 
attention.118  
 
Clearly, for many commentators, Tomma Abts’ nomination for the Turner 
Prize had a significance that went beyond an appraisal of the individual artist, 
providing a platform for critics to make comments on the state of painting as a 
whole.  However, it is on the finer grained aesthetic judgements of the 
particular features of the individual artworks that I intend to focus, rather than 
these overall verdicts, which merely summarise the discussion of the artwork 
that makes up the body of the reviews. 
117 Campbell-Johnson 3 October 2006 
118 Campbell-Johnson 2 December 2006 
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Sibley lists several methods used by critics, the first of which is to ‘simply 
mention or point out non-aesthetic features’119.  All the reviews give 
descriptions of non-aesthetic properties of the paintings; we have seen 
Matthew Collings cover these aspects and, in Collings’ review, the non-
aesthetic properties of Abts’ work are stated baldly without the use of 
expressive adjectives or metaphoric language.  However, in other reviews, the 
non-aesthetic elements are entangled with evaluative language and accounts 
of the effects these non-aesthetic properties have on the viewer.  This kind of 
writing I have grouped under the heading of metaphorical description.  Searle, 
Schwabsky, Burnett and Campbell-Johnson all appraise Abts’ work positively 
(Campbell-Johnson grudgingly so).  Collings is the only reviewer whose 
appraisal of Abts is almost entirely negative and his description of her work 
tends to eschew metaphor and employ non-aesthetic terminology. 
 
Categorisation 
 
The genre of Tomma Abts’ paintings is discussed by all the critics by 
reference to abstract art, although reviewers have different views about the 
nature of the relationship between her paintings and the genre.  Craig Burnett, 
in Art Review, points out that, although the paintings are abstract in the sense 
of not depicting any object, they differ from examples of early 20th century 
abstraction in that they have not emerged from a process moving from 
figuration to abstraction; abstract art is their starting point: 
 
At first glance, these are abstract paintings, though her work seems 
to elude, or transcend, the category. Not surprisingly, many bring to 
mind late Cubism. Picasso and Braque, of course, stretched 
figuration to its limit; Abts, on the other hand, seems to be taking 
abstraction to the brink of figuration.120 
 
Several critics point out this difference between Abts’ approach and the 
approach of artists such as Picasso and Braque: that, in a sense, the 
trajectory of her process moves in the opposite direction to that of modernist 
abstraction.  Rachel Campbell-Johnston makes a similar point, arguing that 
119 Sibley 2006 p18 
120 Burnett 2005 
60
Abts’ pictures ‘are not abstract because they are based on nothing in the real 
world.’121 
 
Adrian Searle also sees the relationship between Abts’ paintings and the 
traditions of modernist painting as far from clear-cut.  For him, the complex 
nature of that relationship to the abstract art of the mid twentieth century is a 
positive feature of the work: 
 
Abts' paintings are somehow being produced at the wrong time, 
and belong to an alternative parallel history of modernism. She has 
spoken of wanting to make paintings that belong in the future. 
People talk about experiencing art in the here and now: hers exists 
at a tangent to the present, in an unspecifiable there and then. 
This, in part, is what is so good about them.122 
 
Several reviewers prefer to speak of the work not primarily as abstract art, but 
rather as paintings that refer to abstract art.  Schwabsky writes, ‘it's not 
surprising that Abts' delicate, various and rather subdued paintings are easily 
and frequently viewed as a rueful commentary on the medium's contemporary 
marginality by way of a canny archaeology of the historically adrift’.   
 
Schwabsky’s discussion of the paintings locates their contextual frame of 
reference to a particular historical moment within modernist painting: 
 
The paintings of Tomma Abts are dense with allusions to the 
history of abstraction. One senses, as one looks at these works, 
that they convey a particular redolence of the 1930s and early 40s, 
a time in which abstract art was subject to profound uncertainty.…  
 
He cites some less well-known abstract painters of that period, Jean Hélion, 
Auguste Herbin, Willi Baumeister and Rolph Scarlett, who he refers to as 
‘artists whose reputations hover in a strange twilight somewhere just beneath 
the notice of the art history textbooks’.  However, he concludes that there is 
more to Abts’ work than embodying a set of references to a particular art-
historical category of art: 
121 Campbell-Johnston  3 October 2006 
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 ..the more time I spend with her paintings the more I realize that to 
look at them for what they say about the history of abstract style -- 
one might say, of abstraction as style -- is, not exactly wrong, but 
too narrow and too scholastic.123 
 
Collings locates Abts’ work in very much the same context, but where 
Schwabsky sees the reclaiming of a neglected artistic tradition, Collings 
uses unflattering language to make the reference: 
 
Abts does abstract paintings. She's currently getting a lot of 
attention. The work looks quite good in reproduction. It refers to B-
division abstraction from the time when Modernism was hot. …124 
 
Unlike Schwabsky, Collings sees Abts’ paintings as being in what he calls an 
‘ironic relationship’ with modernist abstraction.  Both Schwabsky and Collings 
speak positively about the idea of painting drawing inspiration from this period, 
but Collings sees the work as representing a post-modernist appropriation of 
modernist abstraction.  In his view, the paintings do not honour the tradition to 
which they refer:  
 
It's foolish to think that in Abts's case obscure moments of 
modernist abstraction are being genuinely rehabilitated, having 
been out in the cold. It's more that they're being satirized, the 
temperature turned down even further, in what seems to be a 
heartless exercise in chic.125 
 
Collings here seems to echo the views expressed in the Stuckist open letter to 
Nicholas Serota six years earlier: 
 
Post Modernism, our 'official avant-garde' is a cool, slick marketing 
machine where the cleverness and cynicism of an art which is 
about nothing but itself, eviscerates emotion, content and belief.126 
 
There is a clear space for debate here about how Abts’ work relates to 
modernist abstraction.  Several points are at issue; there is the question of 
123 Schwabsky 2005 
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which specific practitioners Abts work relates to, but there is also room for 
debate about the significance of those practitioners within the modernist 
tradition.  Discussion of genre also serves to highlight differences and 
similarities between the processes used by Abts in the creation of her work, 
and the processes that characterise the tradition to which they make 
reference.  It also serves to provide a basis for a discussion, within the context 
of modernist theory and the nature of abstraction as a genre, of the artistic 
intentions behind Abts’ paintings.  
 
Although, within these reviews, the critics offer some evidence in support of 
their assertions with respect to genre, they also make many unsupported 
statements, simply identifying Abts as being in a certain relationship with 
modernist abstraction.  However, this should not be surprising given the 
purpose of an art review, the need to appeal to the general reader and the 
practical restrictions on column inches.  Inevitably the critics are aware of the 
pressure to make their judgements and move on, rather than showing their 
workings in any detail. 
 
However although the reviews do contain unsupported statements, that is not 
to say that a more rigorous investigation of these questions of classification 
could not be undertaken.  Indeed, these are the kind of issues that are 
frequently debated by academic art historians, who underpin their conclusions 
with evidence gained from contextual research and from detailed analysis of 
the works themselves.  Questions relating to classification are clearly relevant 
to Collings’ appraisal of Abts’ work; he sees it as coldly satirising the tradition 
of modernist abstract painting.  Reasoned debate based on evidence might 
tend to confirm (or alternatively, refute) that analysis, and therefore affect any 
appraisal that was made on that premise. 
 
Metaphoric Description 
 
I use the term metaphoric description to identify those sections of the reviews 
where the description of the formal features of the artwork is not simply factual 
reporting, but coloured by the use of expressive adjectives, similes, metaphor; 
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one might say, by the use of poetic language.  In the reviews by critics whose 
appraisal of Abts’ work is positive, the descriptions of the formal 
characteristics of her painting are shot through with metaphor.  Sibley 
identifies this as a device intended to bring the reader to an awareness of the 
aesthetic qualities the critic sees in the work, and to thereby help enable the 
reader to perceive those qualities himself. 
 
Searle’s review begins with non-aesthetic terminology but moves quickly into 
a language that describes effect: 
 
Abts shows 11 paintings here, all identically sized, all completed in 
the past six years. Each presents something like a spatial 
conundrum, with impossible perspectives and folds, inconsistent 
shadows and highlights, baffling geometries and unreadable 
progressions.127 
 
Searle is describing the forms within the painting, but with his choice of 
adjectives – impossible, inconsistent, baffling – he is also attempting to 
convey his thoughts when trying to read those forms.  From there he 
moves to metaphorical description: 
 
… Each is a foreign country, bounded by a vertically orientated 
48x38cm canvas. Sometimes the surface is marked with canals or 
walls, or has the appearance of scored and folded papers, struggling 
to achieve three dimensions. Some are reminiscent of the kinds of 
swirls one can only ever see in polarised light, their outlines as frozen 
as metal inlay in enamel.128 
 
Here the use of similes makes the description more vivid, expressing the 
sensory impressions provoked by the marks on canvas.  As the description 
continues, the use of metaphor becomes more explicit, as Searle seems to 
imply that it is, in part, the ability of the paintings to provoke such 
metaphoric associations in the mind of the viewer that evidences the 
aesthetic quality of the work: 
 
Other paintings depict a kind of imaginary space - inside the drawer 
127 Searle 3 October2006  
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of an old desk, the folds of a patterned handkerchief in a pocket. One 
thinks of wooden marquetry, of crumpled cellophane, of targets, 
unknown semaphores and flags.129 
 
Searle’s language again underlines the ambiguity of the term abstract in 
relation to the paintings of Tomma Abts. Campbell-Johnson argues that 
they are not abstract, as they are not based on anything in the real 
world.  Searle writes about the painting depicting imaginary spaces, 
which brings the paintings back from being simply paintings; they are 
also pictures, albeit picturing worlds that exist only in the imagination of 
the viewer. 
 
Burnett’s review combines visual allusion with a description of the ‘mood’ 
of the painting, but also a physical metaphor suggesting a mode of 
involvement when viewing the work: 
 
Zeyn (2004) has a richly claustrophobic mood, with slabs of swampy 
green applied in thick layers over multiple pentimenti. Looking at the 
planes and shadows, you feel like you could climb beneath the painting's 
sharp edges.130 
 
Burnett draws attention to the way in which Abts uses colour, in ways that 
create the effect of shadows, so giving the surface of her painting the 
suggestion of a third dimension.  However, Collings does not approve of this 
aspect of Abts’ painting and is dismissive of those who are impressed by the 
technique: 
 
Abts offers a crude graphic illusionism where you get the effect of a 
solid object casting a shadow; this kind of thing often appeals to 
people who are not particularly interested in art or who don't know 
much about it.131  
 
Schwabsky, on the other hand, writes of the use of shadowed forms as a 
positive feature of the paintings, precisely because the technique distances 
her from the tradition of twentieth century abstract painting and the critical 
129 Searle 3 October 2006 
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ideas that surrounded them.  He makes specific reference to Clement 
Greenberg, whose 1955 essay American-Type Painting made the case for an 
approach to painting that embraced the flatness of the picture surface and 
eschewed the use of techniques that create an illusion of pictorial depth.  
Again underlining what he sees as the complexity of Abts’ relationship with the 
tradition of abstract painting, he admires the way in which, ‘depicted shadows 
violate the tenets of the modernism with which the paintings might otherwise 
seem to keep faith.’132  He also draws attention to the way in which the sharp 
edges within the Abts’ paintings act as evidence of the process of making the 
work.  His use of simile likens the painting to a garment or a living body: 
 
The slight ridges left by painted-over hard-edged forms function as 
something like seams or scars, signs of possibly arbitrary or 
incomplete joins in the deep structure of the painting.133 
 
What I have called metaphoric description is an element of art criticism that 
presents an easy target for parody and ridicule.  It does not contain 
statements that we could describe as a critical reason. There is no attempt to 
claim that because the artwork contains feature X it must therefore possess 
quality Y.  The writers use poetic imagery to express their responses to the 
work, not to identify causal factors.  For Sibley, this kind of writing legitimately 
serves the function of directing readers to significant features of the work, so 
that they may see those qualities for themselves.  However, the poetic use of 
language and the dramatisation of subjective impressions could be seen as 
strategies to conceal the lack of structured argument within the appraisal.  
Criticism of this kind is often made from outside the art world; in this case the 
criticism is voiced within the reviews themselves, as we will see later in this 
section.  
 
Characterisation 
 
One way in which critics talk about artworks is to characterise them, that is, to 
describe them in the ways we talk about people.  Sibley talks about everyday 
132 Schwabsky 
133 Schwabsky 
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words being ‘pressed into service’ as aesthetic terms, initially as metaphors 
then, over time, being co-opted into critical language; the characterisation of 
the paintings is one of the ways in which the reviews of Abts do this.  Lynn 
Barber provided an example of this kind of characterisation when, writing of 
her experiences as a Turner judge, she recalled initially regarding Abts’ work 
as ‘Anita Brookner-ish’.134  
 
There is general agreement amongst the critics in characterising the paintings 
in terms of a quality which I will refer to with a neutral term reticence.  
However, they take different views about whether this quality of reticence is a 
good thing.  For Searle, the reticence of the work is clearly a positive feature:  
 
Why are these paintings so memorable? I think it is because of 
their evident conviction, the restraint and reserve with which each is 
delivered. 
 
… Every painting is unmistakably by its author, each quite unlike its 
neighbour. The world Abts depicts is utterly consistent, even with 
all its anomalies and flaws.135 
 
Schwabsky talks about ‘the formal self-containment of the paintings’ and 
quotes with approval a catalogue essay describing how 'the paintings curl 
inwards, an in-growth rather than an open appearance.'136  Burnett describes 
one brightly coloured painting in the exhibition ‘an extrovert among 
introverts’137 
 
Rachel Campbell-Johnston agreed with the notion that this art is introverted in 
character, but she does not see it as a positive feature of the work, which she 
describes as ‘timid’ and ‘obsessive’.  When the shortlist was announced, she 
called Abts’ paintings: 
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hermetic little abstractions which despite her admirable 
independence and manifest dedication, work at an interface so 
specialist that only the artistic anorak can relate.138 
 
The words ‘hermetic’ and ‘anorak’ recur in her review of the shortlist 
exhibition139 and again in the article she published when Abts was announced 
as the winner140. 
 
Collings however characterises this reticence not as reserve or even timidity 
but as coldness: 
 
The overall effect was of a deliberate blankness. The emotional 
response could only be disappointment, I thought, unless you 
weren't really interested in the qualities that Abts's paintings at first 
appear to be about. When I look through articles about Abts's work, 
this characteristic blankness is either denied or else it is presumed 
to be something like a contemporary-art version of the expressive, 
morally loaded blankness for which Beckett's plays and novels are 
celebrated. In other words, blankness is presented as cleverness. 
In Beckett language is rich. His use of words is electric. There is 
nothing corresponding to that in Abts.141 
 
The overall effect that Collings describes differs from those described by the 
other reviewers, but like them he supports his argument with reference to his 
own direct aesthetic judgements of formal elements of the paintings.   
 
Direct Aesthetic Judgement 
 
Although possessing many formal similarities to the great works of modernist 
painting, Collings argues, the work of Abts lacks the kind of aesthetic qualities 
that he sees in the work of Matisse, Picasso and Pollock.  His evaluation is 
based on his own direct aesthetic judgement on the formal qualities of the 
paintings: 
 
A painting from the past or the present might have muted colour, 
but there's definitely a feeling for the way colour works -- you get a 
138 Campbell-Johnston 17 May 2006 
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colour blast. The painting might be very strongly linear, but there is 
a genuine feel for line. Here, instead, the muted colour was muddy 
and the lines were lifeless.142 
  
Where Collings describes the colours in the paintings as muddy, Burnett by 
contrast, describes in positive terms the effects that Abts produces with 
‘chocolate’, ‘varying shades of pale brown’ and ‘swampy green’. 
 
Andrew Searle is not in agreement with Collings about the use of line in the 
paintings.  He singles out one painting in particular in which use of line is a 
dominant feature: 
 
Heeso, from 2004, consists of a single continuous red line that 
meanders, coils and uncoils from corner to corner, forming a 
bounded shape that is all but impossible to read. The line never 
loses its sinuousness or surprise and agility, feeling its way from 
corner to corner and side to side of the small canvas. There's 
almost nothing to it. And there's everything to it.143  
 
As Sibley points out, to use a word such as ‘life’ or ‘movement’ when talking 
about a painting is to employ a metaphor, albeit one that has faded to the 
point where we feel that it is quite natural to use it in a description of a static 
inanimate object.  Searle writes about a line that ‘meanders, coils and uncoils’, 
he writes of its ‘agility’ and describes it as ‘feeling its way’. 
 
Burnett also writes about the movement he sees in the painting, 
describing the way that ‘bumps rise, places shimmer, shadows loom and 
forms come to life’.  He describes one painting as looking ‘like a dance of 
lightning over chocolate.  Jagged ribbons seem to rise from the 
canvas…’  In a description of another painting, he says, ‘the bottom-
most, thinnest layer of paint seems to rise to the top of the picture plane, 
as if the canvas itself were pushing beyond the surface of the painting.’ 
Summing up her work at the end of the review he writes: 
 
142 Collings 2006 
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Abts is at her best when the unlikely colours and overlapping forms 
come to life, like the gooey, molten world that appears when you 
close your eyes. 144 
 
As we have seen, Rachel Campbell-Johnson is less enthusiastic in her 
appraisal of the paintings but she nonetheless agrees with Searle, Schwabsky 
and Burnett that ‘they trap an unsettling sense of movement’145. 
 
Those critics who see movement in Abts’ work note it as a positive feature; 
Collings, who does not, criticises her paintings as ‘deliberately inert’, with lines 
that are ‘lifeless’.  It is notable that, although the critics differ in their views of 
the presence or otherwise of life and movement in Abts’ work, there seems to 
be a consensus that life and movement are (or would be) what Carroll calls 
‘good-making’ features with respect to these particular paintings.  ‘Life’ and 
‘movement’ in this context represent positively valenced terms, words that 
denote qualities that we would expect to be ‘good-making’ features of a work. 
 
As Sibley points out, the fact that we consider it fit to apply a positively 
valenced term to an artwork does not guarantee that it is a good artwork, but 
its application is unlikely to indicate a demerit in the work.  So, we might say 
that an abstract painting is good because it contains life and movement.  We 
might also say that an abstract artwork is poor, despite having life and 
movement.  However we would be unlikely to say that an abstract artwork is 
poor because it has life and movement.  It is possible this formulation might 
be used for rhetorical effect, but it would require further explanation in order 
for it to make sense.  
 
There are examples of this kind of language within the reviews of Tomma 
Abts, underlining the reversibility of these negatively or positively valenced 
terms.  Most reviews describe the paintings as having colours that are muted.  
Collings uses the negatively valenced term ‘muddy’.  However Schwabsky 
uses the similarly negative sounding term ‘murky’, but does so in the context 
of a positive appraisal: 
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 one sometimes sees through to anterior strata of paint, so that one 
notes, for instance, how the first layers are typically brighter and 
leaner -- more stainlike -- than the typically murky hues and fat 
consistency of the last coats of colour. One always feels both that 
the painting might have been something else entirely, and yet that 
the final result is somehow self-contained.146 
 
As Sibley noted, ‘there are no sure-fire mechanical rules or procedures for 
deciding which qualities are actual defects in the work; one has to judge for 
oneself’147. 
 
The Language of Art Criticism 
 
The metaphoric descriptions that occur in the reviews represent examples of 
current modes of critical language employed by both critics and curators.  It is 
a category of writing that is often parodied and is easy to lampoon.  However, 
within the reviews we can see that the use of such metaphor laden language 
functions as a pragmatic way of communicating subtle but important aspects 
of an artist’s work.  Even the terms ‘life’ and ‘movement’, which are used quite 
commonly by people who are not professional art critics to indicate aesthetic 
qualities, are themselves faded metaphors.  The use of metaphor enables the 
critic to indicate the presence or absence of these kinds of qualities.  In the 
absence of a non-metaphoric lexicon that can communicate one’s response to 
the aesthetic qualities of an artwork, there is some justification in taking up the 
tools at hand, however unsuitable they may seem to be, in order to get the job 
done. 
 
The language of art criticism is itself criticised from within in the reviews of 
Rachel Campbell-Johnson and Matthew Collings.  Johnson complains that 
Abts’ work has a strong appeal only to ‘the sort of inscrutable commentators 
that contribute to the Tate’s Turner leaflet’148.  Collings also strongly 
expresses his frustration about the curatorial commentaries provided by the 
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Tate.  He complains that they exemplify the worst characteristics of the style, 
while, at the same time, they fail to provide important contextual information: 
 
Tate Modern's promo-spiels are the language of selling not 
explaining or educating: the difference is the desperation, the 
feeling that you could be told absolutely anything at all, which really 
is powerfully disturbing149.  
 
The artworks, he argues, are not being explained, they are simply being 
hyped-up.  Collings links his critique of the language used to discuss art with 
his critique of Abts’ work.  Comparing her unfavourably to the leading artists of 
20th century modernism, he argues that when experiencing the work of artists 
such as Pollock, Picasso and Matisse: 
 
you're forced to think about how paintings are done and what 
makes them good, not the flowery things that have been said about 
them or their creators.150 
 
The review itself forms part of a larger article in which Collings repeatedly 
returns to the theme of language and the way it is used or abused in the 
service of the art world.  Later in the article he decries even his own use of 
such language earlier in the review of Abts: 
 
It's not even helpful to analyse nuances of aesthetic meaning in this 
context, as I was doing earlier, looking at the qualities of colour and 
line, and so on, because these are only words. They're for press 
promos and interviews on the Turner Prize. To take them seriously 
is to seem foolish.151 
 
Collings seems to resile from the use of such language, but if Sibley’s view of 
the function of criticism is correct then the ‘language of selling’ as Collings 
puts it, could arguably be considered an appropriate register.  The reviews of 
Tomma Abts’ work seem to conform to Sibley’s notion of the critic as 
persuader, who perceives the aesthetic qualities in a work and then uses 
language to draw the readers’ attention to those qualities.  What may be 
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called ‘reasons’ are given to support the critic’s evaluations; in drawing 
attention to formal qualities – muted colours, organic forms geometrical 
patterns – the critic indicates the contribution they make to the emergent 
aesthetic qualities she has identified in this particular case, but there is no 
basis for her to claim that any artwork that contains muted colours, organic 
forms and geometrical patterns must necessarily possess those qualities.  
Carroll sees this as a flaw in criticism; as he puts it the critic: 
 
uses beguiling language to get you to love what he loves, or to see 
it the way he sees it. He has not grounded his evaluation but rather 
has attempted to seduce his readers into concurring with him.152 
 
However I want to defend the notion that, even if we accept the impossibility 
of inferring aesthetic qualities from non-aesthetic properties, there are issues 
raised within the reviews that offer opportunities for reasoned debate that 
might provide in part some grounding for evaluation, or at least for re-
evaluation.  
 
One issue raised by the critics is the question of the relationship between 
Abts’ work and the tradition of modernist abstract painting.  If that issue were 
to be debated, arguments could be marshalled, supported by evidence both 
from within the works themselves, and from contextual sources to make the 
case for one conception of that relationship or for another.  Comparisons and 
contrasts could be made, based on analysis of formal characteristics, 
processes and methods; the influences and training of the artist could be 
considered and, through that process of research and discussion, we might 
arrive at a more securely evidenced view about the genre of the paintings and 
the artist’s relationship to abstract painting.   
 
There is clearly a great difference between seeing paintings as belonging to a 
certain artistic movement, and seeing those paintings as being about a certain 
movement.  Perhaps, in simply placing them within the genre of abstract, I did 
not do justice to the subtleties of their relationship to that tradition, or perhaps 
152 Carroll 2009 p166 
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I failed to see a satirical or parodic aspect to the work.  And if the critic were to 
persuade me, through reasoned argument and supporting evidence, that I 
had wrongly classified her paintings, then I might well also revise my view on 
the character and significance of the work and perhaps also, thereby, my 
evaluation of it.  We will return to this point when we look at Kendall Walton’s 
ideas about categories of art in the next chapter.  
 
The second area that I would argue could provide a subject for reasoned 
debate is the characterisation of the work.  There is some consensus on this 
topic, with all the reviewers referring to the reticence of the paintings.  
However, at first sight this might not seem a particularly promising avenue, 
tending to characterise the paintings in the very passages of metaphoric 
description where the prose is at its most purple.  Moreover, there is a major 
objection to the idea that we could have a reasoned debate on this issue: 
reticence terms used by the critics are terms that refer to the aesthetic 
character of the paintings and the reviewers are, as Sibley has argued, unable 
to provide evidential grounding for a claim that a painting possesses a 
characteristic such as reticence.  To simply accept the view of a critic that a 
painting is reticent would be to do so on the basis of persuasive rhetoric rather 
than evidence. 
 
Nevertheless, I will argue that an evidence based discussion of the 
characterisation of the paintings remains possible and that it may legitimately 
have a bearing on the evaluation of the work.  In this case, several critics 
identify reticence as a characteristic of a painting: what they disagree upon is 
how to interpret that reticence.  If we were to accept, as a working hypothesis, 
the view of these several critics (whose characterisations have at least some 
consensual inter-subjectivity to commend them) that the paintings are, in one 
way or another, reticent, there would be no reason why we could not then 
have an evidence based discussion of that reticence, as long as we accepted 
that the discussion was based on a provisional premise.  
 
The disagreement between reviewers on the issue of characterisation is, in 
one way, quite the opposite situation to that which obtains in the 
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disagreements about life and movement in the paintings.  In that case all the 
reviewers were in agreement that, in the particular case of Abts’ paintings, life 
and movement are (or would be) positive features, but they disagreed on 
whether or not those qualities were present in the work. In this case, all the 
reviewers see the paintings as reticent (in one way or another) but they 
disagree on how they interpret that reticence and whether it is a positive 
feature of the work.  I see no fundamental reason why it should not be 
possible that, if a number of competent critics agree that some kind of 
reticence is characteristic of the paintings, a reasoned debate could be 
conducted, perhaps again using formal analysis in dialogue with contextual 
evidence relating to genre and tradition, to cast light on the nature significance 
of the property of reticence in the paintings of Tomma Abts. 
 
But the implication of Sibley’s account of critical practice is that, although 
reasons can be given to support an evaluation, there is a point where 
reasoned argument must break down and that is the point at which that 
aesthetic property is perceived by the critic.  Collings and Searle are highly 
experienced critics, with expertise in the area of contemporary art.  Their 
reviews of the paintings of Tomma Abts suggest that they each have studied 
her paintings in detail and thought about them in some depth.  They both 
show awareness of the artistic contexts and traditions within which the works 
stands.  But if Searle sees a line which has the properties of ‘sinuousness or 
surprise and agility’, while Collings sees the use of line in the paintings as 
‘lifeless’, then there does not seem to be any way that reasoned debate could 
settle the matter.  Nor is there any obvious way the reader might judge which 
of the two critics was right.  It is not possible simply by reading the 
descriptions of non-aesthetic properties of the paintings to determine whether 
the lines in the paintings have agility or are lifeless.  The use of metaphor in 
this case only serves to convey each critic’s personal responses to paintings; 
my only way of deciding whether I agree with Collings or Searle is to view the 
paintings myself.  
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4.  Noel Carroll and the Art of the Pratfall. 
 
We have seen that in the case of the reviews of Tomma Abts’ paintings, there 
seemed to be critical consensus that the qualities of ‘life’ and ‘movement’ in 
the lines were (or would be) a good thing.  That opens up the possibility that 
for lines in artworks to have life and movement might generally be a good 
thing.  If that were found to be the case, we might decide that the life and 
movement of line could be used as part of a set of criteria for evaluating visual 
artworks.  This does not involve us in attempting to infer aesthetic qualities 
from the possession of non-aesthetic properties; as we have noted, the terms 
‘life’ and ‘movement’ are metaphors used to convey the aesthetic qualities the 
critic sees in the work.  The question is whether we argue for the general 
principle that these aesthetic qualities of ‘life’ and ‘movement’ are good things 
in artworks.   
 
Of course, there are a number of obvious objections to this suggestion, not 
least of which is that many artworks are not praised by critics for life and 
movement, but on the contrary for the very opposite qualities.  For example, 
Antony Gormley, winner of the Turner Prize in 2004, speaking of his decision 
to use lead as an art material said ‘the two qualities of sculpture that are most 
important are silence and stillness’153.  The proposal that we can derive 
principles or criteria through a process of generalising such qualities is 
inevitably vulnerable to objections based on counter examples, in much the 
same way that we have seen with criteria based definitions of art.  
Nonetheless, some writers, most notably Monroe Beardsley154, have 
attempted to formulate general critical principles, that would cover, not only 
the visual arts, but music, literature, dance and all other disciplines that might 
be called art forms.  He identified three principles, which he called the General 
Canons of aesthetic merit, as unity, complexity and intensity.  
 
153 Antony Gormley interviewed by Enrique Juncosa, Centro Galego de Arte Contemporanea, Santiago 
de Compostela, Spain 2002 
154 Beardsley 1962 
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Carroll and Sibley have both made telling objections to Beardsley’s notion of 
general aesthetic principles that apply to all artworks.  I will not rehearse their 
arguments in detail here, but I will briefly summarise some of their key 
objections.  Sibley calls Beardsley’s attempt to formulate such general 
principles as ‘heroic’, but points out the reversibility and inter-dependency of 
the principles that Beardsley proposes.155  Carroll rejects the idea of general 
principles that can be applied to all artworks, in all disciplines, of all kinds.  He 
argues that it would be absurd to try to evaluate a horror movie according to 
the same criteria as, say, an 18th century Dutch still life painting and, instead, 
proposes evaluative strategies based on specific genre-based critical 
principles, which I will discuss in detail in this chapter.   
 
Although Sibley and Carroll’s objections seriously undermine the idea of 
general aesthetic principles, Carroll’s notion of genre-specific principles, if 
correct, would potentially open up a back door to allow them to return in a 
different form.  If it were possible to formulate genre-specific criteria for each 
genre across all disciplines, then the sum total of those criteria would contain 
all of the positive features that an artwork could possibly possess.  An 
examination of those positive features would undoubtedly reveal many 
overlaps or similarities between criteria for different genres and disciplines; an 
example might be that the balancing of tension and relief is important in a 
thriller novel, but also in an orchestral symphony.  That is a case in which the 
word ‘tension’ is applicable in both disciplines, music and literature, but there 
would also be cases in which, although the language used to describe 
positive features of different genres might be very different, there is 
nonetheless an underlying similarity between the features themselves.  We 
could begin to group those similar qualities together and name each group.  
The name of each group could then be regarded as a higher order quality or 
general principle; the positive features contained within each group would be 
genre-specific articulations of that general principle.  
 
155 Sibley 1983 
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Those general principles might well end up being fairly useless as criteria for 
the evaluation of art; Sibley’s analysis of Beardsley’s principles points out the 
problems that arise if we attempt to apply big, baggy concepts to specific 
artworks.  Moreover, as the formulation of those general principles would 
depend on the totality of genre-specific criteria already being known, that in 
itself would make the formulation of general principles redundant.  There are a 
great many other objections that could be put to the argument I have made 
above, but I make it in order to show that if we accept the idea of genre-
specific principles, then the idea of general principles is not something that 
could be ruled out.  However, as I will be arguing that there are problems even 
with the notion of genre-specific criteria, the idea of trans-disciplinary and 
trans-generic criteria is not one that will be considered in detail in this study. 
 
Genre-specific Criteria 
 
But what of the narrower claim that Carroll makes in On Criticism: that criteria 
which are genre-specific can be used to evaluate art works?  Carroll’s solution 
to what he calls the ‘purported absence of critical principles’ is to abandon the 
search for all embracing general criteria and to argue instead that the 
application of genre-specific criteria to artworks can provide a basis for 
reasoned aesthetic judgements.  There are two ways we could think about 
genre-specific criteria.  The first and most limited would be to consider the 
aesthetic qualities that are shared by artworks of the same genre, for example 
that a thriller should be suspenseful.  I think that there are a number of 
objections to that limited claim that I will discuss later in this chapter.  
However, I think that Noel Carroll goes further than claiming that we can make 
evaluative judgements on the basis of an artwork possessing certain genre-
specific aesthetic qualities; he is prepared to countenance genre-specific 
arguments for the quality of artworks on the basis of their possessing 
particular non-aesthetic features.   
 
In the final chapter of On Criticism, Carroll challenges the claim by Arnold 
Isenberg, Mary Mothersill and others that there are no properties that 
universally guarantee the quality of any artwork; this is of course a view 
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shared by Sibley.  As Isenberg put it, ‘There is not in all the world's criticism a 
single purely descriptive statement concerning which one is prepared to say 
beforehand, "If it is true, I shall like that work so much the better"’156 
 
Carroll summarises Isenberg’s objection to the notion of aesthetic criteria as 
rejection of the following syllogism:   
 
1(a)   This artwork has property F. 
1(b)   Artworks that have property F are good artworks. 
2       Therefore this artwork is a good artwork157 
 
Isenberg points out the problem of identifying any plausible candidate for 
‘property F’, a property that might be agreed to be a positive feature of any 
artwork.  What may be a merit in one artwork may equally be a flaw in 
another.  As Carroll concedes, ‘Pratfalls are excellent in Harold Lloyd 
comedies, but their presence would have marred Bergman’s film Shame.’158   
 
However, Carroll argues that Isenberg’s objection to aesthetic criteria rests on 
the mistaken assumption that any such criteria must apply universally to all 
artworks in all disciplines, of all kinds and of every genre.  He agrees that it 
would be absurd to try to evaluate a horror movie according to the same 
criteria as an 18th century Dutch still life painting.  But, although Carroll rejects 
the idea of general principles that can be applied to all artworks, he argues 
that it is perfectly reasonable to believe that within each of those two very 
different genres, criteria could be established that would be specific to that 
genre.   
 
Carroll gives two examples, one real and one invented, of reasoned 
evaluation based on criteria.  The actual example comes from a review by 
Joan Acocella159 of a contemporary dance piece (Mozart Dances by the Mark 
Morris company), but I will look first at his invented illustrative example of how 
156 Isenberg (quoted in Carroll 2009) 
157 Carroll p165 
158 Carroll p164 
159 Carroll p168-169 
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genre-specific critical principles could be used to make a critical evaluation of 
a slapstick film comedy. 
 
Using the example of a Harold Lloyd film, Carroll makes the case for specific 
rather than general criteria by proposing the following modified version of the 
syllogism in a genre-specific example: 
 
1a) Harold Lloyd’s Safety Last contains (let us agree) many 
successful pratfalls. 
1b)Safety Last is a slapstick comedy. 
1c) Given the purpose or function of slapstick comedy, slapstick 
comedies that contain many successful pratfalls, all other things 
being equal, are good (pro tanto). 
2 Therefore Safety Last is good (pro tanto).160 
 
Carroll comments, “notice that there doesn’t seem to be any problem with this 
particular critical communication” 161 and, on the face of it, the argument that a 
slapstick comedy is good because it contains many successful pratfalls may 
seem like a reasonable conclusion based upon evidence.  However there are 
a number of objections to this line of argument. 
 
One possible objection to Carroll’s approach might be to say that slapstick, as 
a form of artwork conspicuously lacking in subtlety or complexity and not 
overburdened by a body of critical theory, might well be evaluated against 
easily defined criteria, but more complex art works such as literary novels, 
abstract painting or symphonic music cannot be evaluated in such a 
straightforward way.  Some might doubt that slapstick comedy can be classed 
as art at all and that, even if it is an art form in some sense, ‘high art’ is so 
different in kind to slapstick comedy that an evaluative strategy developed for 
one could not possibly be applied to the other. 
 
I do not accept this objection to Carroll’s approach.  Certainly he has chosen a 
slapstick comedy as an example precisely because it lacks the complexity and 
ambiguity of ‘high art’, but not for unworthy reasons, rather to show more 
160 Carroll p167 
161 Carroll p167 
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clearly the way in which basic elements of discipline-specific and genre-
specific criteria might be utilised within critical practice.  On the contrary, 
Carroll has chosen a slapstick comedy as an example precisely because it 
lacks the complexity and ambiguity of ‘high art’ and this is a perfectly 
respectable manoeuvre, in that it seeks to establish a principle in a relatively 
simple case which can then be applied to more complex situations.  Clearly, a 
slapstick comedy may be relatively weak in terms of its capacity to generate 
diverse and competing critical commentary and interpretation, when 
compared to (for example) King Lear; however, this difference does not in 
itself invalidate Carroll’s argument.  The difference is one of degree, not of 
kind.  Granted, the criteria for tragic drama may be more difficult to formulate 
than the criteria for slapstick comedy, but that does not mean that they could 
not be formulated. 
 
So, let us agree with Carroll that, however unsophisticated a slapstick comedy 
may appear to be, it is nonetheless an artwork, different to Lear in genre, far 
less rich and complex, but equally valid as an object of critical scrutiny.  
However, if we accept that slapstick comedy is in fact an art form, there is in 
my view a more serious problem for Carroll’s argument; the question is not 
whether Carroll is underestimating the complexity of tragedy, but whether he 
is underestimating the complexity of slapstick.  
 
Before turning to that question, it is important to note that there is some 
ambiguity about what Carroll is claiming here.  In particular, I will argue that 
there is a problem with the use of the term ‘successful’ in premise 1b) of his 
argument.  We might interpret the term ‘successful’ in two distinct ways.  In 
what I will call the conservative definition, a ‘successful’ pratfall is one which is 
takes place without technical failure; the act of pretending to lose balance, 
falling, landing on the floor or in water is undertaken and achieved.  
Competent judges might decide whether a pratfall was successful or not 
without needing to discuss the aesthetic value of the pratfalls.  This use of the 
word ‘successful’ would clearly be what Sibley would identify as a non-
aesthetic term.  In what I will call the rich definition of the word ‘successful’, a 
pratfall is successful to the extent that it fulfils its comedic function as an 
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individual; the test of this is whether it makes audiences laugh.  Although 
Carroll does not define the term ‘successful’ here, when he uses the term in 
an earlier chapter, it is in his discussion of the ‘success value’ of artworks, the 
extent to which an artwork achieves the aims of the artist. Carroll may or may 
not mean to use the term in the same way here, but whether one reads the 
term ‘successful’ as meaning that the pratfall performed in a way that is 
technically competent, or whether one interprets it as implying a richer 
definition, there is a problem with the use of the term in the premise of 
Carroll’s argument. 
 
If we assume that Carroll is using the term conservatively, then he is arguing 
that, ‘all things being equal’ (as he says), the presence of many technically 
competent pratfalls will guarantee the merit of a slapstick comedy.  The 
phrase ‘all things being equal’ is important here, in that it allows Carroll to 
avoid one possible objection to his formula: that a slapstick comedy might be 
full of technically competent pratfalls, but so poor in every other way that we 
would not wish to call it good.  But, although the phrase all things being equal 
closes the door on that objection, it opens the door to suspicion that Carroll is 
(intentionally or not) justifying a quantitative approach to critical evaluation, 
and to the objections such an approach would generate. 
 
One way of illustrating what the phrase ‘all things being equal’ might mean in 
practice, is by imagining two versions of Safety Last.  Version A is the film as 
we know it.  Version B comes about as a result of the discovery of several 
reels of footage featuring technically competent pratfalls that were shot at the 
time, but (for some reason) never used.  Version B is identical to Version A in 
every way except one: that it contains many more pratfalls.  It would then 
seem to possible to argue that as Safety Last version B contains many more 
successful pratfalls than Safety Last version A, then it must therefore be a 
better slapstick comedy. 
 
Of course the idea that Safety Last would necessarily be improved by the 
addition of more pratfalls is highly questionable and it is it hard to believe that 
Carroll, who has written extensively and with great insight on cinema over 
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many years, is in fact subscribing to such a mechanistic and quantitative 
approach to the evaluation of a film, but it does not seem to be logically 
inconsistent with his approach.  The reason why the addition of extra pratfalls 
would not guarantee a better version of Safety Last is that such features do 
not work in isolation.   Comic set pieces must be integrated into the narrative 
structure; the direction and editing must take account of the overall pace of 
the film and the balance between storytelling and clowning needs to be 
maintained.  It is certainly possible to imagine a situation in which we found 
Version B to be so overburdened with sight gags that it becomes difficult to 
engage with the story, or develop any empathy with the characters.  The 
addition of extra pratfalls might make Safety Last a better film or it might make 
it worse; we cannot predict the result merely by knowing that one version has 
many more pratfalls than the other. 
 
It could be argued that I have not played fair with my illustrative example.  The 
objection could be made that Version A and Version B do not illustrate all 
things being equal, but that the comparison is being made between a 
balanced and well constructed film and one in which the balance between 
different elements has gone awry.  That is undoubtedly the case, but my 
example does draw attention to the difficulties wrapped up in the phrase all 
things being equal.  It also needs to be noted that, although it is true to say 
that, in the case of Version A and Version B, we are not in the end comparing 
two films that are equal in all things bar one, the reason this is so is precisely 
because of the addition of features that it has been claimed are invariably 
positive. 
 
So one objection to Carroll is that, by looking at pratfalls in isolation, we fail to 
take account of their function within the structure of the film as a whole.  
Another is that, in Carroll’s formulation, all successful pratfalls are equal; he 
takes no account of the quality of the feature, he only demands that a pratfall 
has met the benchmark of being successful (however that is defined) and that 
there be many of them. 
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If we use the conservative definition of ‘successful’ to indicate technical 
competence, then we must concede that countless films were made 
containing ‘many successful pratfalls’, and countless silent comedians 
performed successful pratfalls.  It is also true to say that the majority of those 
performers are now lost in obscurity together with the films in which they 
appeared.  By contrast, Carroll’s choice of Harold Lloyd’s Safety Last162 is 
significant; it is a choice that might suggest that his use of the term 
‘successful’ is much closer to what I have called the rich definition.  It is hard 
to disagree with his conclusion that Harold Lloyd’s comedy is a good example 
of the genre.  Critics generally regard Lloyd as one of the great comedy actors 
of the silent era and Safety Last is often cited as one of his best films.  
 
Referring to one of the best known scenes from Safety Last, the critic Michael 
Brooke comments on the significance of the actor: 
 
Though the image of a man dangling many floors above street level 
while clinging to a disintegrating clock is a shorthand surrogate not 
just for silent comedy but for early cinema in general, its progenitor 
Harold Lloyd (1893-1971) has seen his grip on public 
consciousness become far less secure. Usually relegated to third 
place behind Chaplin and Keaton in the pantheon, he was in fact 
the most commercially successful at the time, and arguably more 
influential in the longer term, his thrill-rides being the direct 
ancestors of the modern action movie.163 
 
So, it seems to me, given Carroll’s choice of example, to be more appropriate 
to apply a rich definition of the term ‘successful’, one that takes account of 
much more than the technical competency with which a pratfall is performed.  
To decide whether a pratfall is successful in the rich sense of the term, we 
might wish to ask questions of the following kind:  In what way does the actor 
react; expressively or in a deadpan fashion?  Is the pratfall ‘telegraphed’ or is 
it unexpected?  Does the pratfall engage the sympathy of the audience or 
does it inspire contempt?  Is the performance of the pratfall ‘realistic’ (in the 
sense that it appears to cause the actor the level of injury and pain we might 
expect of such an incident in everyday life), or is it a ‘clowning’ pratfall of the 
162 Pathé 1923 
163 Brooke p84 
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kind familiar in cartoons (where exploding dynamite might cause little more 
than a blackened face)?  To what extent does the pratfall reveal the nature of 
the character performing it, and to what extent do the reactions of other 
players in the scene reveal the nature of those characters?  To what extent 
does the pratfall move forward or disrupt the narrative?  These are the kinds 
of questions that would need to be considered if we wished to judge the 
extent to which the pratfall achieved its comedic function. 
 
Mark Cooper’s account of the clock scene, which was referred to earlier by 
Michael Brooke, is a good example of a critic evaluating a slapstick routine as 
successful in the rich sense of the term. He describes the scene in which 
Harold Lloyd (playing a character called The Boy) attempts to climb a tall 
building with the help of a character called Bill: 
 
… The Boy’s struggles to overcome a number of unexpected 
obstacles which drive him to ever more dangerous heights. On the 
second floor, seeds dumped on The Boy’s head from out of the top 
of frame inspire a pigeon attack. Between the second and third 
floors, he reaches for a handhold and grabs an entangling net. 
Nearing the top and hanging desperately from one of the hands of 
the building’s clock, he reaches for a rope Bill has offered. Straining 
and stretching, he grabs it at last— and plummets out of frame. In 
order to prepare these gags and give them their punch, the film 
shows us what The Boy cannot see. An interior shot of a sporting 
goods store and exterior shot of a man dropping a tennis net partly 
out the window prepare the net gag, for example. And intercut 
interior shots show us, first, that the rope is not attached to 
anything and, then, that Bill has managed to evade the cop long 
enough to dive for the rope just before it disappears out the 
window. Sequences like this one generate humour as well as 
suspense by revealing the visual field to be defined by obstacles to 
enframed vision and movement. It is the trouble we see moments 
before the comedian does that gets the laugh.164 
 
Cooper points to the way the slapstick functions within the narrative structure, 
the way in which audiences’ expectations are excited and confounded, the 
use of suspense, the role of film editing techniques in providing the audience 
with a privileged viewpoint, and contrasting use of revealed pitfalls and 
unexpected obstacles.  
164 Cooper p62 
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 As well as maintaining the balance between humour and suspense, the film 
engages the audience by encouraging an empathic response to the plight of 
the central character.  Michael Brooke notes the way in which the character 
Lloyd depicts on screen engaged the audience of the day: 
 
Lloyd didn't need glasses off screen, but they became as 
recognisable a signature as Chaplin's bowler and cane. They 
accentuated the essential vulnerability of his typically ordinary-Joe 
characters (he occasionally played millionaires, but far less often), 
giving him a Woody Allen geekiness that offered his audience 
much more in the way of wish-fulfilment identification.165 
 
Brooke’s analysis seems to suggest that one element which made the 
pratfalls in Safety Last successful (in the rich sense) is that they were 
performed by Lloyd playing in character, a character that members of the 
audience might see as both vulnerable and as someone much like 
themselves.  This identification by an audience with the character played by 
Lloyd must clearly be a significant factor in the success and memorability of 
his films and the comic set pieces featured in them.  The technical success of 
the pratfall is only part of the story; it matters that what happens on screen is 
meaningful to the audience, both in terms of narrative and in terms of 
empathic response to character. 
 
If we compare Richard Cork’s response to McQueen’s Deadpan we can see 
that empathic response and implied narrative are also identified as important 
elements of the piece: 
 
McQueen uses himself as the absurd yet resilient figure who makes 
no attempt to escape from a falling house. He fills the end wall with 
Deadpan, making viewers feel that the house is descending on them 
as well. It pitches forward with frightening speed and heaviness, 
accentuated by McQueen's decision to film the event from several 
different vantages. Repeating the fall serves to increase our respect 
for the man who defies it. He knows that the blank window will save 
him, by passing neatly over his head and crashing at his feet. But his 
refusal to do anything except blink still seems laudable, and the film 
165 Brooke Sight & Sound October 2000 Vol 17 Issue 10 p84-84 
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terminates with McQueen's steady, impassive face staring out 
stoically from the screen. Without indulging in Hollywood heroics, he 
seems braced to endure adversity with calm, stubborn resolve. 166 
 
The sight gag that McQueen recreates is the famous comic moment from 
what critics agree is one of the best film comedies of the silent era, but the 
way in which McQueen has played the central role removes from it any hint of 
comedy, as Cork’s empathic response to the piece makes clear.  Nonetheless 
the stunt featured in Deadpan was a technically successful performance of a 
stunt that was a positive feature of a slapstick comedy.  However, it does not 
follow that if we incorporated the stunt from McQueen’s Deadpan into a 
version of Harold Lloyd’s Safety Last, it would be a positive feature of the film.  
The mere presence of a successful pratfall in a slapstick comedy does not 
come with the guarantee of being a positive feature, and if that pratfall works 
in a way that is at odds with the meaning and narrative context of the film, 
then is it likely to have a negative impact on the work as a whole. 
 
Carroll’s formulation of genre-specific criteria appears at first to bring simplicity 
to the problem of critical criteria, but problems begin when we start to unpack 
his term ‘successful’.  It is not entirely clear from Carroll’s argument whether 
his use of the word is intended to be understood according a conservative 
interpretation or a rich interpretation (as I have characterised them).  Either 
way there are problems. 
 
I would argue that the use of a conservative interpretation of Carroll’s term 
‘successful’ is inadequate for the task of critical evaluation.  The idea that the 
merit of an artwork can be inferred merely from the presence of a number of 
technically successful typical generic features leads to an impoverished 
account of critical evaluation. 
 
Use of the rich interpretation of the term ‘successful’ fails the test set by 
Isenberg as the phrase ‘successful pratfall’ thereby implies more than what 
Isenberg calls a ‘purely descriptive’ statement.  To label a pratfall successful 
166 BBC News online 2 December 1999 
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in the rich sense requires the exercise of judgement, as it must involve the 
evaluation of the pratfall in the context of the larger work, the film as a whole.  
The problem is that if we use the rich interpretation of the term, the judgement 
of a pratfall as successful within the context of a slapstick comedy amounts to 
critical evaluation in itself; if the rich interpretation of the term ‘successful’ is 
applied in Carroll’s formulation, then evaluative judgement exists in both the 
premise and the conclusion.  The problem of critical criteria is not solved but 
merely pushed back a step. 
 
That is not to say that we should therefore reject the notion that critical 
evaluation can be based on reasons; in fact, the writings on Lloyd quoted 
above might be considered good examples of critics using reasoned 
arguments to support their evaluative judgements.  However, while I am in 
sympathy with Carroll’s wish to establish an account of critical evaluation 
based on reasoned argument, I believe that his argument in this case falls 
short of being a solution to the problem of critical criteria.  
 
In his example based on an actual review, Carroll shows how Joan Acocella, 
through close analysis of the performance Mozart Dances, uncovers a 
suggested narrative running through the piece and uses it to support her 
positive evaluation of the work.  Here, Carroll argues, is the use of genre –
specific criteria within criticism.  The presence of a ‘suggested narrative’ within 
is not being claimed as a positive feature of every artwork but “Rather, she is 
restricting her claim to the works of modern abstract choreography…” 
However, I would argue that Acocella’s claim for the positive impact of 
suggested narrative is more restrictive still.  She is claiming no more than that 
it is a positive feature of this particular performance; it is Carroll who seeks to 
generalise her comments.  There are two problems with this attempt to create 
a critical principle that specifically applies to modern abstract choreography.  
The first is that there are examples which do not conform to this criteria; the 
work of choreographer Merce Cunningham, for example, involved deliberately 
eschewing any kind of narrative, suggested or otherwise.  His obituary in the 
New Republic noted that his dances were, ‘cerebral and abstract, rigorously 
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formal designs with no story and no ‘meaning’ other than the dance itself.’167   
Cunningham’s aim was to exclude narrative from his choreography. If a 
suggested narrative had emerged within one of his dance pieces, it would not 
be something that the artist himself would have welcomed as a positive 
feature of the work.  
 
The second problem again centres on the question of quality.  In this example 
it is clear that Carroll is talking about a feature that can be described using 
non-aesthetic terms.  It certainly requires interpretive skills to identify a 
submerged narrative within a contemporary dance performance, but 
identifying that such a narrative exists within the piece does not involve 
making an evaluative judgement.  Indeed, for Carroll there seems to be an 
absence of interest in the nature of the suggested narrative or what it might be 
saying; it appears to be enough that that a piece has such a suggested 
narrative.  The quality of the narrative, its meaning and its aptness or 
otherwise for the medium and choreography are not, for Carroll, matters that 
require consideration.  Carroll requires us to make only a binary judgement; 
suggested narrative is something that a dance either has or has not.  If we are 
to agree with Carroll that possessing a suggested narrative is in itself a 
positive characteristic of abstract contemporary dance, then it seems we are 
invited to do so regardless of the quality or meaning of that narrative.  Be it 
hackneyed, be it trite, be it crassly propagandist, predictable or banal, for 
Carroll it apparently only needs to be present to be regarded as a positive 
feature of the work. 
 
Let us examine in more detail the structure of the syllogism Carroll has 
applied to Safety Last, leaving to one side, for a moment, both the problematic 
term ‘successful’, and the difficulties that I have suggested accompany the 
phrase ‘all things being equal’.  We can see that the structure of his example 
may be put in the following terms, where A is the artwork, F is the feature it 
contains, and M an indication of magnitude (ie many, much, prominently): 
 
167 Jennifer Homans ‘Merce Cunningham (1919 – 2009)’ New Republic 31 July 2009  
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1a) A contains MF 
1b) A is an example of G 
1c) Given the purpose of G, examples of G that contain MF, all 
other things being equal, are good (pro tanto). 
2 Therefore A is good (pro tanto). 
 
There are a number of questions that arise when we strip it down in this way.  
One is to do with the significance of the term M in the premise.  In Carroll’s 
example, ‘Harold Lloyd’s Safety Last contains many successful pratfalls’, M 
stands for ‘many’.  The importance of M becomes clear if we replace the word 
with ‘few’ or ‘some’.  For Carroll’s syllogism to sound convincing, M must 
indicate that the feature F is a significant element of A.   
 
Clearly, in some cases, ‘many’ would not be the appropriate term to indicate 
the significance of F.  For example the, critics agreed that Tomma Abts made 
use of shadow to create an ambiguous illusion of shallow depth on the flat 
surface of her paintings.  In fact, one of the critics did not consider this a 
positive feature of the paintings, but let us suppose that there was unanimity 
that (let us call it) shadowed depth was a positive feature, not only of these 
particular paintings, but would be a positive feature of all non-figurative 
painting.  It would then be possible to construct a syllogism on the lines Carroll 
proposes in which G is abstract painting, and F is shadowed depth.  
 
The question then arises of what M represents in this context.  At this point 
there is a difficulty.  The word ‘many’ is clearly not appropriate, so perhaps we 
could say that much of Abts’s painting uses shadowed depth.  If so, then it 
would only be necessary to measure the paintings (easy in the case of Abts, 
as all are the same dimensions) and calculate what proportion of the surface 
area of each is painted to produce an illusion of shadowed depth.  However, 
those reviewers who praised the use of (what I have called) shadowed depth 
also indicated that it was the sparing use of the effect that contributed to their 
appraisal of it as a positive feature, that Abts only occasionally broke the 
flatness of the painting’s surface with the illusion of depth. 
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Nonetheless, the critics are agreed that shadowed depth is a significant 
feature of the work, so perhaps M could represent some phrase such as ‘is a 
significant element’ or ‘features prominently’.  The problem here is that, to 
judge that shadowed depth ‘is a significant element’ of a Tomma Abts painting 
requires more than a tape measure, it requires judgement about the 
relationship between different elements of an artwork.  The problem with the 
term M is similar to the problem with the term ‘successful’; it once again 
places evaluative judgement into the premise of Carroll’s syllogism.  I will 
return to this problem when we discuss an alternative approach to 
classification, proposed by Kendall Walton, which I will argue avoids some of 
the problems that arise from Carroll’s notion of genre. 
 
The idea of genre is central in Carroll’s approach to evaluation.  It is by virtue 
of their genre specificity that his proposed criteria for the evaluation of artwork 
are deemed to be less vulnerable to contradiction by counter example.  In 
order to correctly judge a work therefore, the critic must correctly identify to 
which genre it belongs. 
 
In the case of Tomma Abts, it seems on the face of it to be a simple matter to 
define G.  She has often been described as an abstract painter and, although 
reviews of her work left some room for debate about her precise relationship 
with the genre, arguably a more precise definition of genre would only lead to 
a more precise definition of F.  One way of defining the genre of her paintings 
is to look at the paintings themselves; we observe that her paintings do not 
contain figuration.  Another way is to look at the context and to note how her 
work is described by critics, curators, dealers and by herself.   
 
Taking Abts’ work as an example, we can see the way in which Carroll’s 
genre-specific approach is successful in eliminating troublesome counter 
examples.  Having seen that life and movement are positively valenced terms 
within reviews of her paintings, we consider whether they are generally 
positive features of artwork.  We see that there are many counter examples 
and so decide to refine our hypothesis to one that asserts that, in the case of 
paintings belonging to the genre of abstract art (leaving aside for a moment 
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any disputes about whether the work of Abts belongs in this genre), it is a 
positive thing for line to have life and movement.  Again, it would be possible 
to find counter-examples, but those counter-examples would certainly be 
fewer in number than under our earlier hypothesis.  That being so, it seems 
reasonable to imagine that by refining our assertion we might improve its 
predictive potential.  We might define in more detail the precise genre to which 
we intend to apply this assertion.  We might revise our terms ‘life’ and 
‘movement’ in ways that better reflected the positive aesthetic qualities we 
wished to identify in the work.  If we did so then, it could be argued, we might 
end up by defining a feature of that genre which is invariably positive.  Those 
exceptions to the rule would be so vanishingly small that we might reasonably 
prefer to reconsider whether they should be included in the genre, rather than 
further revise our criteria. 
 
The problem with the argument made above is the one pointed out by Hook in 
the introductory chapter: even if we could show that there were no counter 
examples to contradict the criteria we formulated, there is no guarantee that 
one will not occur in the future; someone may produce an abstract painting 
that we judge to be excellent, that not only lacks the quality we identify as 
positive, but would be marred by its presence.   The only way in which we 
could guarantee that our criteria always applied would be if we defined the 
genre in terms of the positive quality: to define, for instance, abstract painting 
as non-figurative art that showed life and movement in its formal composition.  
To do that would be to introduce a fatal circularity into the formula. 
 
Moreover, applying Carroll’s notion of genre becomes still more problematic 
when we consider a work like Steve McQueen’s Deadpan.  If we were to try to 
apply Carroll’s approach to features in McQueen’s work then we would need 
to identify the terms in his syllogism: 
 
1a) Deadpan contains MF 
1b) Deadpan is an example of G 
1c) Given the purpose of G, examples of G that contain MF, all 
other things being equal, are good (pro tanto). 
2 Therefore Deadpan is good (pro tanto). 
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Clearly a central issue, if we are to put Carroll’s syllogism to use, is that of 
identifying genre, indeed identification of genre has to be the starting point.  
Unless we identify G, we cannot identify F, as F is defined in the premise (1c) 
as a good-making feature of G.  So, in order to know what features of 
Deadpan to pay attention to, we need to know what genre it belongs to.  As 
we did in the case of Abts, we might start our enquiry by looking at the work 
itself. 
 
Deadpan is a black and white silent film which consists, in its entirety, of a 
slapstick comedy pratfall, or at least a remake of a sight gag from a slapstick 
comedy.  The stunt can certainly be considered a successful pratfall, as it re-
creates the most famous scene from what is considered by critics to be one of 
the best silent comedy films of the era.  This, of course, did not lead critics to 
consider the work a slapstick comedy, or to judge it by those standards; other 
aspects of the work made it clear it did not belong to the genre.  The scene 
itself was de-contextualised, taken from its original context as part of a 
narrative and instead shown as a four minute loop.  Whatever its source 
material, from the way it is structured and edited it is clear that the genre of 
Deadpan is not slapstick comedy. 
 
The context in which the film was presented also provides evidence that might 
help us identify the genre.  The film was being shown, not in a cinema, but in 
an art gallery, projected floor to ceiling in an otherwise empty room.  It was 
being shown as part of McQueen’s Turner Prize shortlist exhibition.  The 
immediate context identifies Deadpan as piece of contemporary art.  We can 
also look at the wider context and examine the statements of commentators 
and of the artist himself.  The Tate Gallery notes for the shortlist exhibition of 
1999 describe McQueen as a filmmaker and video artist.  Several 
commentators also consider it relevant to describe McQueen in terms of his 
race; Andrew Gellatly168 discusses Deadpan in the context of black art.  The 
piece itself is variously described by critics as a short film or a film installation.  
 
168 Freize Issue 46 May 1999 
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So, it is obviously more appropriate to evaluate Deadpan as a contemporary 
art film installation than it is to evaluate it as a slapstick comedy and, indeed, 
all reviews of the piece do just that.  What is not clear is how, having classified 
the piece in that way, we can then use that definition to identify F.  The 
problem here is that the classifications employed by critics and commentators 
do not amount to a definition of genre.  To say that Deadpan is a film, or to 
say that it is an installation, is to identify only its medium; the classification 
does not imply any particular sets of aims or conventions.  The third part of 
the premise (1c) demands that we consider the ‘purpose’ of G; a work of art 
that is made using the medium of film installation may have many different 
purposes and those purposes are not defined by the medium.  
 
Defining Deadpan as ‘black art’ may be more fruitful in generating the kinds of 
purposes demanded in the premise (1c).  We might argue that, among the 
purposes of black art, would be aims such as raising awareness of issues of 
race or challenging stereotypes.  However, socially committed artwork by 
black artists comes in many forms and such artists adopt a wide variety of 
styles or artistic approaches, and indeed work within a number of clearly 
identifiable genres; black art is identifiable in relation to its subject matter and 
its authorial perspective rather than by its conformity to the conventions of a 
genre.  To regard black art as in any way constituting a generic definition 
would be to make a category error that was both inaccurate and insulting.  
 
We are left with classifying Deadpan as ‘contemporary art’.  On the face of it 
this does not look like a particularly useful approach, as contemporary art is 
itself a term whose definition is not straightforward.  The term is not simply an 
indication of when the work was produced; an artwork produced decades ago 
might be labelled contemporary art, while an artwork produced this week 
might not.  Contemporary art is certainly a label that is most intelligible when 
considered as an institutional definition, and one way we might go about 
describing it could be to say that it is the kind of art that can be seen in the 
Turner Prize exhibitions.  However, a set of artworks that includes Deadpan, 
Tracey Emin’s bed and the paintings of Tomma Abts does not present much 
in the way of obvious common features. 
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While arguing in favour of as what he sees as a return to genre-based 
criticism, Carroll acknowledges the challenge that is presented by 
contemporary art: 
 
Yet perhaps the only serious art is avant-garde art, and of course 
there is a great deal of avant-garde art, art of the new, which may 
attempt to defy utterly any categorisation. But, entre nous, it does 
not. There are clearly genres and traditions in the originality game, 
such as those of transgression and reflexivity. It is true that one 
frequently cannot tell what category a work of visual art belongs to 
simply by looking, but there is no reason not to use contextual and 
institutional clues to facilitate classification. Such information is 
perfectly legitimate when it comes to categorising artworks. 
Moreover, most avant-garde art can be sorted into movements, 
such as Cubism, Photorealism, Pop Art, Minimalism, 
Postmodernism, and so on.169 
 
Carroll acknowledges the difficulty presented by contemporary practice, and 
offers an approach which attempts to reconcile a genre-based critical 
procedure with the apparent resistance of avant-garde artists to operating 
within the rules of established genres.  Carroll rightly points to the importance 
of contextual information in categorising artworks.  He argues that, despite the 
rapid change, innovation and repudiation of past styles that characterises 
contemporary art, it is still possible for critics to categorise this new work in 
ways that will provide a foundation for a critical practice that is based on 
reasoned argument and supported by a plentiful supply of contextual 
evidence: 
 
The institution of the art world in which avant-garde art operates 
also swells with information about emerging categories of art, even 
as they exfoliate before our very eyes. There are interviews, 
manifestos, artist’s statements, curatorial statements, grant 
applications, and lectures/ demonstrations, not to mention a 
constant circuit of conversations (a.k.a. incessant gossip) between 
artists and artists, artists and critics and curators, critics and critics, 
curators and curators, and all of the permutations thereof and 
more.170 
 
169 Carroll p95 
170 Carroll p185-186 
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From this source material, Carroll argues, it is possible to establish the values 
and interests connected with the new emergent categories of contemporary 
art.  In this regard he emphasises the role of the critic: 
 
The informed critic, covering the experimental beat, usually has a 
general grasp of the contours of the emanent avant-garde forms 
and their subtending aspirations as those forms unfold before us. 
Perhaps needless to say, one of the major functions of such critics 
is to keep the interested audience apprised of the appearance of 
new artforms, genres, styles and movements and to explain their 
points and purposes in a way that assists the laity in understanding 
them.171 
 
Carroll casts the critic as one who is, in effect, writing the first draft of art 
history and he cites the example of Michael Fried documenting the emergent 
category of Minimalism.  He also acknowledges that work might be classified 
as belonging to more than one genre, but is confident that the ‘plural category’ 
critic will be able to deal with art works that operate within two sets of 
conventions.  
 
The picture Carroll paints, of a bewildering variety of new forms in a constant 
state of creation and mutation, does indeed place the critic in a heroic role, 
making sense of this apparent chaos for the benefit of the public.  However, in 
the case of Deadpan, I’m not sure this rings true.  The short film as art object 
has been around since at least the 1920s, installation art has been around for 
over half a century, and the use of moving image in gallery artworks has been 
very common indeed since the development of cheaper video technology in 
the 1970s.  
 
What Carroll is talking about when he describes the ‘constant circuit of 
conversations’ of the contemporary art world is not a discourse that defines 
discrete genres but a broader context in which different interconnecting 
traditions are in play.  That is not to downplay the importance of context; each 
one of the contexts noted by reviewers provides a useful perspective on 
Deadpan.  It is useful to consider the work as an art installation, as a short art 
171 Carroll p186 
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film, or to consider the relevance of it being a work that is both by and 
featuring a black artist.  Each of these contextual frameworks provides points 
of comparison and contrast with the work of other artists.  What they do not 
provide, however, are sets of conventions against which we could measure 
the success of the artwork, or features that we could identify as guaranteeing 
the quality of the work. 
 
I have pointed out some problems attached to Carroll’s approach, in particular 
in his notion of genre.  I think that these problems weaken his argument in 
general, but in particular they call into question the usefulness of the idea of 
genre in evaluating art of the kinds that feature in the Turner Prize exhibitions, 
work that, as Carroll says, attempts to, ‘defy utterly any categorisation‘.  Yet I 
want to agree with Carroll about the importance of classification; the reviews 
of Abts, for example, show how much care the critics take to locate her work 
as precisely as possible in relation to modernist abstraction.  In the case of 
McQueen however, the attempt to place it within a meaningful genre does not 
seem to get us very far.  Classification is clearly important, but Carroll’s notion 
of genre and its ‘purposes‘ seems to be too blunt an instrument to capture 
much of contemporary art. 
 
One problem with Carroll’s notion of genre is that, although he accepts the 
emergence of new forms and the changing conventions of genres, there does 
not seem to be an obvious reason why this should be so.  If established 
genres have critical principles attached to them, and the best works in that 
genre are by definition those that conform to those critical principles, there 
would not seem to be any impetus or mechanism from within that artistic and 
critical nexus for artists to deviate from those principles, nor for those 
principles to vary over time.  I emphasise that I am referring to internal 
tendencies towards change and innovation.  Certainly, art changes in 
response to its changing historical context, but, if the evaluation of art centres 
around the kind of genre definitions Carroll suggests, then it seems likely the 
art world would tend to be far more resistant to change, being dragged along 
behind more rapid social and political changes.   
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Genre and Category 
 
Kendall Walton’s concept of artistic categories may offer a more fruitful and 
less rigid way of informing evaluation through classification.  In his essay 
‘Categories of Art’ he concurs with Sibley about the relationship between 
aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties of an artwork, arguing that ‘a work’s 
aesthetic properties depend on its non-aesthetic properties; the former are 
emergent or Gestalt properties based on the latter’.  However, for Walton, the 
aesthetic properties of an artwork are dependent on its being placed in the 
correct category, and its properties being viewed in the context of that 
category: 
 
I will argue however, that a work’s aesthetic properties depend not 
only on its non-aesthetic ones, but also on which of its non-
aesthetic properties are ‘standard’, which ‘variable’ and which 
‘contra-standard’. 172 
 
This may sound rather like Carroll’s notion of artworks being evaluated 
against the conventions of a genre, but there are some important differences.  
Walton’s categories may be definable in terms of identifiable common non-
aesthetic features, but those features do not carry the implication that their 
presence would, in themselves, substantiate positive or negative appraisals of 
the work.  Walton gives examples of ‘standard’, ‘variable’ and ‘contra-
standard’ features of painting: 
 
The flatness of a painting and the motionlessness of its markings 
are standard, and its particular shapes and colors are variable, 
relative to the category of painting. A protruding three-dimensional 
object or an electrically driven twitching of the canvas would be 
contra-standard relative to this category. The straight lines in stick-
figure drawings and squarish shapes in cubist paintings are 
standard with respect to those categories respectively, though they 
are variable with respect to the categories of drawing and 
painting.173 
 
172 Walton 1970 
173 Walton p340 
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The example of ‘squarish shapes in cubist paintings’ highlights an important 
aspect of Walton’s approach.  He notes that, within the category of painting, 
‘squarish shapes’ are variable, but within cubist painting they are a standard 
feature.  
 
This is a subtle and powerful aspect of Walton’s concept of category: the 
recognition that features of an artwork that might be considered standard, 
when viewed in one category, might be considered variable or contra-
standard when viewed in another.  He illustrates this with a thought 
experiment: 
 
Imagine a society which does not have an established medium of 
painting, but does produce a kind of work of art called guernicas. 
Guernicas are like versions of Picasso’s ‘Guernica’ done in various 
bas-relief dimensions. All of them are surfaces with the colors and 
shapes of Picasso’s ‘Guernica,’ but the surfaces are molded to 
protrude from the wall like relief maps of different kinds of terrain. 
Some guernicas have rolling surfaces, others are sharp and 
jagged, still others contain several relatively flat planes at various 
angles to each other, and so forth. Picasso’s ‘Guernica’ would be 
counted as a guernica in this society – a perfectly flat one – rather 
than as a painting. Its flatness is variable and the figures on its 
surface are standard relative to the category of guernicas. Thus the 
flatness, which is standard for us, would be variable for members of 
the other society (if they should come across ‘Guernica’) and the 
figures on the surface, which are variable for us, would be standard 
for them. This would make for a profound difference between our 
aesthetic reaction to ‘Guernica’ and theirs. It seems violent, 
dynamic, vital, disturbing to us. But I imagine it would strike them 
as cold, stark, life- less, or serene and restful, or perhaps bland, 
dull, boring – but in any case not violent, dynamic, and vital. We do 
not pay attention to or take note of Guernica’s flatness; this is a 
feature we take for granted in paintings, as it were. But for the other 
society this is ‘Guernica’’s most striking and noteworthy 
characteristic – what is expressive about it.174  
 
Walton’s imagined guernicas illustrate an important aspect of his approach: 
that it recognises that artworks can and do exist in a plurality of categories; 
indeed the number of categories is potentially limitless.  Walton argues that 
the aesthetic properties of the work are dependent on what is standard, 
174 Walton p347 
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variable or contra-standard to a particular person at a particular moment.  This 
concept of categories points to a solution to the problem of defining M, with 
respect to the use of shadowed depth in the paintings of Tomma Abts.  As 
Walton points out, it is not the size of feature or the number of features that 
necessarily marks them out for our attention: 
 
A very small coloured area of an otherwise entirely black and white 
drawing would be very disconcerting. But if enough additional 
colour is added to it we will see it as a coloured rather than a black 
and white drawing and the shock will vanish…175 
 
We can see the way in which looking at standard, variable and contra-
standard features would work in the case of Tomma Abts.  To summarise 
crudely the views of two of the critics, Schwabsky sees the paintings as 
relating to a certain strand of European modernist abstraction; Collings, on the 
other hand, views the paintings as a post-modernist appropriation.  Both focus 
on the use of shadowed depth as a contra-standard feature of the work.  
Collings disapproves and takes this as a sign that the work is not in earnest.  
Schwabsky, on the other hand, approves of this deviation from the principle of 
flatness championed in the heyday of Abstract Expressionism by critics such 
as Clement Greenberg.  He admires the way the Abts’ paintings pit 
themselves against ‘the 'allover' of Greenbergian abstraction, just as depicted 
shadows violate the tenets of the modernism with which the paintings might 
otherwise seem to keep faith.’176 
 
As Carroll’s syllogism makes clear, for him a genre is an established 
classification that has identifiable purposes (he gives the example that the 
purpose of a thriller is to thrill) and conventions, from which he argues we can 
derive critical principles.  Carroll’s genres seem to work like the different 
classes in a dog show; tastes may change over time; judges may retire and 
be replaced but the criteria for judging each class of dog can, at least 
theoretically, be known in advance.  Carroll does concede that some works 
may involve a splicing of genres, but it is clear from the examples he offers 
175 Walton p347 
176 Schwabsky 
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that he considers these to be exceptions.  Walton’s approach, on the other 
hand, recognises that artworks exist in multiple categories and, by paying 
attention to the variable and contra–standard features of those categories, our 
understanding of the artwork can be much more finely tuned.  
 
Walton’s recognition of the multiple category provides an account of the 
mechanism of change within recognised categories of artwork.  For example, 
if an artwork that contains a contra-standard feature is nonetheless accepted 
as belonging to a certain category of artwork, then the gestalt of that category 
is thereby changed.  If other artworks copy that contra-standard feature and 
are also accepted into the category, then, over time, that feature may be 
considered as a variable feature rather than as contra-standard.  Carroll’s 
notion of genre on the other hand is one in which there are certain features 
that we can know in advance are always guaranteed to be positive.  If that is 
so, then it follows that, within the genre, those features will always be positive, 
no matter how far into the future we project.  Under those circumstances, it is 
hard to see how or why, despite the passage of time, those genres would 
change substantially in the future, and it is equally hard to account for the 
substantial changes that have happened in the past. 
 
Walton’s approach provides an account of the creation of new categories of 
art through innovative and avant-garde practice.  He cites the creation of the 
first twelve-tone works by Schoenberg as an example of artistic innovation, 
but it is an example that also underlines one key aspect of his approach: that 
it is not relativistic.  For Walton, although there are many categories, the ideal 
critic will see the work in the correct one.  He makes the point that perhaps 
only Schoenberg’s close colleagues Berg and Webern would have been 
capable of hearing them in the correct category, that is as twelve tone works.  
Others might have found them baffling and chaotic.  Nevertheless, Walton 
argues, even if there had been no one but the composer himself who would 
have been able to hear them as twelve-tone music, that would have been the 
correct category for appraising their aesthetic properties.  
 
There is an apparent contradiction in Walton’s approach here.  Unlike Carroll, 
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who sees no problem in classifying artworks on the basis of contextual 
information, Walton insists that the category of a work of art must be 
perceptually distinguishable.  Yet Walton also insists that only a listener who 
was capable of hearing Schoenberg’s first twelve-tone works in the correct 
category, as twelve-tone works, would be able to perceive the aesthetic 
qualities of the work.  Yet, as Walton has pointed out, a listener in the 1920s 
would have been unable to correctly categorise Schoenberg’s music, unless 
they undertook contextual research, perhaps by gaining access to the 
discussions of the composer with Berg and Webern, within which discourse 
his compositional theory developed.  However, that research undertaken, the 
fact that a certain Schoenberg composition fell into the category of twelve-
tone music would then be perceptually distinguishable to the listener.  It is 
important to understand that Walton’s insistence on categories of art being 
perceptually distinguishable does not imply that contextual research is in any 
way illegitimate.  Rather, it implies the opposite; the category of an artwork is 
only perceptually distinguishable when the viewer has the clearest 
understanding of its artistic context. 
 
This insistence that not all categories within which an artwork might be viewed 
are equally correct, directs attention to the role of the critic.  In order to be able 
to fully appreciate the aesthetic qualities of an artwork, one needs to view it in 
the correct category.  As Walton points out: 
 
We are likely to regard, for example, cubist paintings, serial music 
or Chinese music as formless, incoherent or disturbing on our first 
contact with these forms, largely because, I would suggest, we 
would not be perceiving the works as cubist paintings, serial music 
or Chinese music.177 
 
The more knowledge and experience of a category one has, therefore, the 
more one is able to identify the variable and contra-standard features. As a 
result of that greater knowledge and experience we may appreciate qualities 
were did not previously perceive. We might also downgrade our evaluation of 
works that once seemed striking, but now seem merely generic.  Walton’s 
177 Walton p349 
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approach, unlike Carroll’s, recognises that excellence may sometimes consist, 
not in conforming to generic standards, but in deviating from them. 
 
One viewer might simply see a Tomma Abts painting as an example of 
‘modern art’, while a viewer with more experience of contemporary art might 
see it as an abstract painting.  The critics located it in categories that related 
to modernist and post-modernist practice.  We might also consider the 
category ‘the paintings of Tomma Abts’, within which a reviewer identified a 
splash of bright colour as a contra-standard feature.  Although Walton gives 
guidelines for identifying the correct category within which to place an artwork, 
the example of Schoenberg shows that he does not see this as simply slotting 
the artwork into a pre-existent genre.  Walton’s approach has categories 
emerging from the properties of the artworks themselves.  As Bruce Laitz puts 
it: 
 
Artworks have properties, and for any property or set of properties 
they possess, there is a corresponding category to which a work 
thus belongs in virtue of it, regardless of whether we have a name 
for that category, use it, or care about it.178 
 
If Walton is right, then the core role of the critic is to identify as precisely as 
possible the correct category in which to view the artwork, even if that 
category is not a pre-existent genre with a defined set of purposes and 
conventions.  
 
Andrew Gellatly’s review of Deadpan shows a strong concern with locating 
and defining the correct category within which to view the work: 
 
Steve McQueen’s compulsive four minute film Deadpan (1997) 
makes a case for how multi-layered, fascinating and complex a 
short film can be. 
He may be inviting us to give in to a temptation to privilege the 
social and documentary role of black art, but is also presenting us 
with a gag and a compelling study in purgatory more economical 
than Nauman’s Clown Torture (1986). An establishing shot near the 
beginning of the film reveals that McQueen’s boots have no laces, 
178 Laetz 2010  
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as though he is in detention overnight with the possibility of suicide 
taken away. Deadpan may look like someone compulsively 
revisiting a trauma, but McQueen doesn’t look like the usual 
performance artist - standing like a tall and stoic prisoner 
surrounded by collapsing walls, he is too massive and unblinking, 
while the flickering, repetitive optical experience is dense, chest-
tightening and fleshy. 
McQueen is establishing a thoughtful language of film, built from 
the most discreet and historical elements, which hang awkwardly 
between elaborations of Structuralist film theory and the polemic of 
Henry Louis Gates Jr. 179 
 
Gellatly identifies a number of important contexts. By making the comparison 
to Bruce Nauman’s piece Clown Torture, he invites us to consider Deadpan in 
the context of video installation art.  Gellatly also suggests that Deadpan can 
be seen as an attempt to forge a new category or artistic approach, informed 
by Structuralist critical theory, and describing McQueen as being engaged in 
‘establishing a thoughtful language of film’.  He also refers to performance art 
and indicates that McQueen’s demeanour in his performance would be 
contra-standard in this category.  His allusion to black art alerts us to the 
possibility that this work may have a ‘social and documentary’ purpose, citing 
the work of black cultural critic Henry Louis Gates Jr as a reference.  I 
objected earlier to defining black art as a genre and I will return to that issue in 
a moment, but it seems reasonable to describe it as a recognisable category 
of art, and it is not surprising that most reviewers discussed Deadpan in the 
context of ethnicity.  This aspect of Deadpan would clearly be an important 
element in defining the correct category within which to view the work.  Many 
reports noted that McQueen was the first black artist to take the Prize since it 
was won by painter Chris Ofili in 1998.  Ofili was also an artist whose ethnicity 
was seen as central to his work.  
 
In Art Monthly, Dave Beech reviewed the exhibition that led to Ofili’s 
nomination.  His review centres on Ofili’s identity as a black artist.  He 
contrasts Ofili’s paintings with that of earlier black artists who have used 
newer and less conventional means: 
 
179 Gellatly 1999 
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Being a black artist is not simply a matter of happening to be black 
and choosing to be an artist. It is an exacting task which calls for 
inventiveness and guile. In art you have to struggle to be black. In 
fact, in art you have to struggle to be anything. Critical 
postmodernists subverted and resisted racism in art by establishing 
alternative forms of attention, often through the use of 
unconventional forms such as performance, video and installation. 
Chris Ofili makes beautiful paintings. Far from being a failure to live 
up to the works and arguments of the likes of Rasheed Araeen, 
however, Ofili's paintings continue the struggle to be a black artist 
from the perspective of a younger generation.180 
 
Niru Ratnam in the New Left Review also sees black art and black popular 
culture as the key context of Ofili’s work, underpinning the subject matter, 
techniques and materials used in the work.  He also notes the extra 
information that had been provided in order to give viewers of the paintings 
greater awareness of that context: 
 
Ofili has made his ethnicity the subject of his work. The elephant 
dung might be the most celebrated signifier of his cultural 
background in his work, but it is far from the only one. Almost 
everything in his paintings, from his use of magazine cut-outs to his 
more controversial appropriation of the dots used by cave-painters 
in the Matapos Hills in Zimbabwe, refers back to Ofili’s ethnicity. 
The exhibition catalogue for his Serpentine show even had an 
extended glossary at the back explaining such phenomena as hip-
hop, the Wu-Tang Clan and the Notting Hill Carnival to those 
gallery-goers less than familiar with the contemporary black British 
scene.181 
 
Beech takes care to locate Ofili’s work as precisely as possible within black 
art, by reference to his methodology and the iconography he includes in his 
paintings.  Beech points out the range of references in the paintings and 
emphasises Ofili’s work as speaking through those references rather than 
simply quoting them; for Beech the work is an articulation of Ofili’s identity as 
a black artist rather than an attempt to conform to a set of pre-determined 
ideas about what black art should be: 
 
… Ofili's work is populated by stereotypes. He has even presented 
himself, in interviews and other publicity, as a stereotypical black 
180 Dave Beech ‘Chris Ofili’  Art Monthly no217 31-3 June 1998 
181 Niru Ratnam ‘Chris Ofili and the Limits of Hybridity’  New Left Review I/235 May-June 1999 
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man in the blaxploitation style. Ofili is not a retro artist but, like the 
hip hop culture he loves, his work is littered with samples and 
name-checks from the glorious era of civil rights and blaxploitation. 
In fact, his paintings invite a truly diverse company of images and 
references into their patterned networks. This does not turn them 
into ideal spaces of liberal tolerance where 'kitsch hangs out with 
sophistication' (to quote from the catalogue). It is never this black 
and white. Nor is the openness in Ofili's work the result of the 
tendentious critical conjunctions beloved of postmodernists. He is 
no appropriationist. Rather, he is fluent in these cultures -- in 
everything from the Last Poets to William Blake, from Shaft to 
Picabia. His diversity is therefore something closer to multi-lingual 
resourcefulness. What makes Ofili's work exemplary is the grace - 
and sheer enjoyment - with which he combines and identifies 
himself with these heritages. There is no overarching measure of 
what is worthwhile for this project, no pc guidelines or 
postmodernist agendas. 182 
 
Both in the case of Chris Ofili and in the case of Steve McQueen, there is 
broad agreement among the critics that it is important to view the work in the 
context of black art.  But black art is not a genre; as I have argued previously, 
while different examples of black art might have common purposes in terms of 
political and social agenda, they do not share a common set of conventions of 
the kind one might associate with slapstick comedy or crime fiction.   
Moreover, they work in entirely different media; McQueen creates film 
installations and Ofili paints pictures.  Carroll himself, in rejecting Beardsley’s 
proposed General Canons, has dismissed the idea that it would be possible to 
use the same criteria to appraise works in such very different disciplines.   
 
Clearly the reviewers see black art as a highly significant context within which 
to appraise the work, of both Chris Ofili and Steve McQueen, notwithstanding 
the obvious fact that they are working in entirely different disciplines, using 
different media and adopting very different artistic approaches.  The category 
of black art embraces a range of different disciplines, including visual arts, 
film, theatre, dance, literature and music.  It is entirely legitimate for critics to 
consider the work of the painter Ofili and the filmmaker McQueen in the 
context of black art, just as we might consider examples of 19th century 
literature, painting and music in the context of romanticism.  But it is important 
182 Dave Beech ‘Chris Ofili’ Art Monthly no217 31-3 June1998 
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to note that what brings these two artists together into the same contextual 
framework is not how their work is made, nor how it looks, nor their adherence 
to a common set of conventions, but what their work is about. 
 
  
107
5.  But What Does it Mean? 
 
While generally in sympathy with Carroll’s wish to establish an argument for 
criticism as a reason-based activity, I have criticised his solution to the 
problem of critical reasons on a number of grounds.  I have agreed with Sibley 
regarding the reversibility of positively valenced terms.  I have argued that 
Carroll has smuggled terms involving evaluative judgement into the premise of 
an argument that purportedly contains only simple factual description.  I have 
also suggested that his conception of genre is too rigid to afford the critic an 
evaluative framework for art works that are not compliantly generic.  
 
However, one recurring criticism has been that Carroll has underplayed the 
importance of meaning within those isolated elements that he wishes to claim 
are invariably ‘good-making’ features of a work within a specified genre.  In 
both the example of suggested narrative in contemporary dance and the 
example of pratfalls in slapstick comedy, I have argued that Carroll fails to 
take account of the importance of the perceived meaning of that element 
when viewed in the context of the work as a whole.  Having said that, Carroll’s 
position is far removed from formalism and he acknowledges this in 
comments throughout On Criticism.  In particular he describes the ideal critic, 
or as he calls it a ‘critic-in-full’: 
 
A good critic should be a master of the history and categories of the 
artform about which she has elected to specialize. She should be 
an art critic, narrowly construed. However that is not enough. She 
should be also a cultural critic.  For the arts are not hermetically 
sealed enterprises.  The arts are among the major conduits for the 
ideas, beliefs and feelings that form the warp and woof183 of a living 
culture.  This is as much a part of the function of the arts as is the 
solution of the problems that beset the individual practices of the 
arts.184  
 
While Carroll is sceptical about any project to formulate general principles for 
art, he is sanguine here about asserting the social purpose of the arts in 
general and this is a theme he touches upon throughout the book.  If one of 
183 What in the UK we call the weft 
184 Carroll p196 
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the things we find valuable about the arts in general is their ability to 
communicate ideas, beliefs and feelings, ‘the warp and woof of a living 
culture’, then we might expect to see that function of signification evaluated 
within the reviews of individual art works.  This brings us into the area of 
discussing what bearing the meaning of a work has (or should have) on the 
critic’s evaluation of the work. 
 
We first need to make clear what we mean by meaning. I would like to start by 
differentiating meaning from message.  We have already seen instances 
where it is clear that the critic’s evaluation is based in part on their reading of 
what the work means.  For example, in reviews that praised the work of Chris 
Ofili we have seen critics link that appraisal to the artist’s perceived success in 
articulating the black experience and challenging stereotypical images of 
ethnicity.  But although, through analysis of the pictorial references, the critic 
is able to interpret a certain Ofili painting as being concerned with certain 
issues of culture, politics and identity, that is not the same as saying that the 
painting has a message.  
 
However, in Ofili’s Turner Prize exhibition, there was an example of one of his 
paintings that clearly had a message. In his review of the exhibition, Dan 
Glaister made the distinction between meaning and message clear.  Glaister 
sees Ofili as an artist who eschews explicit messages in his work: 
 
unlike an earlier generation of black artists in Britain, he is not 
interested in the polemics of political correctness, preferring 
beguilement and a self-consciously over-the-top exoticism to 
outright political statement. 
 
However, turning to one of the most discussed of Ofili’s paintings that 
year, Glaister made it clear that No Woman No Cry was the exception to 
that general rule: 
 
Nevertheless, his painting No Woman No Cry (the title of which is 
taken from the Bob Marley song) in the Turner Prize show is a 
portrait of a woman shedding tears, and in each tear is a tiny 
portrait of black murder victim Stephen Lawrence. The painting is 
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dedicated to Lawrence's mother. The words 'No Woman No Cry' 
are picked-out in coloured pins stuck into the balls of dung at the 
painting's feet.185 
 
Glaister made it clear that in the case of No Woman No Cry, Ofili’s painting 
had a clear message.  However, he makes it equally clear that the idea of a 
message does not fit well with the majority of Ofili’s work.  Certainly, his work 
is about something and the reviewers discuss the iconographic cultural 
references within the paintings, but it would be wrong to say of the majority of 
his paintings that they have a message any more than the paintings of 
Tomma Abts have a message.  Nevertheless, the critics still discuss his work 
(and the work of Abts) in one way or another, in terms of its meaning, its 
significance, of what the paintings are saying. 
 
To think of the meaning of the artwork purely in terms of a message is to risk 
opening up a binary opposition between form and content that I will argue is 
unwarranted.  In On Criticism, Carroll points out that it is quite possible to 
separate our judgements about the aesthetic value of an art work and our 
agreement or otherwise with the message of that art work.  He cites Mel 
Gibson’s film The Passion of the Christ and Eisenstein’s The Old and the New 
as examples: 
 
Though I am both an atheist with respect to the Christ and an anti-
Stalinist with respect to Soviet collectivisation, I can acknowledge 
that both films possess artistic value. That the films are at odds 
ideologically with each other as well as at odds with my political 
convictions indicates that my evaluations are based on something 
other than politics.186 
 
However, to say that one’s judgement of an art work is not determined by 
one’s agreement with the message of the art work is not to say that meaning 
in the artwork is therefore irrelevant to evaluation.  To differentiate between 
the message of a work and what I am calling the meaning in a work is not a 
straightforward task and will involve taking an apparent detour through a very 
broad brush sketch of earlier modes of art criticism. 
185 Glaister 1998 
186 On Criticism p38 
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There was a time when the art reviewer typically dealt with questions of form 
and content in discrete categories.  The Victorian art critic reviewing the 
entries to the annual Royal Academy Summer Exhibition, would often spend 
the main part of any review discussing what the scenes depicted, praising 
messages therein that encouraged moral behaviour, religious devotion or 
national pride and deploring those that smacked of vulgarity or decadence.  
Only after the critic had discussed those issues might the style of depiction 
and formal elements of the work then be summed up in a few words.  
 
The above is, of course, generalisation and I will mention one notable 
exception in the final chapter.  But, in the same way that I make that very 
rough characterisation of 19th century art reviewing, I make similarly broad 
characterisation of 20th century modernist critical practice as being animated 
by the opposite tendency: to regard the ostensible subject of a painting as 
merely a pretext for the creation and manipulation of form.  However, by the 
end of the century, formalist approaches had ceased to be dominant and 
critical theory and critical practice, informed by sociological thought, focussed 
once more on the interpretation of the meanings of artworks, albeit in a 
radically different way that paid attention as much to their unwitting 
testimonies as to their subject matter.  Writing in 2000, Carroll187 noted a 
renewed interest in aesthetics and characterised it as a corrective to this 
interpretative approach to criticism, as that approach had once acted as a 
corrective to formalism, and it is tempting to see this as a kind of tug-of-war 
between those who wish to concentrate on form and those who wish to 
concentrate on content.  But, in fact, these positions are quite distinct; the 
concept of the meaning of a painting would be very different to a modern critic 
engaged in semiotic analysis than it would have been to an art critic of the 
Victorian era.  
 
If the last few decades have been marked out by this critical bias towards 
interpretation, that tendency has mirrored, he argues, tendencies in art 
practice that have also elevated meaning over aesthetics: 
187 Carroll 2000  
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 From conceptual art, with its anti-aesthetic animus, to the enigmatic 
word/image configurations of so much recent installation art, 
today’s artworld seems obsessed with messages, often messages 
of a stridently political cast.188 
 
We can see evidence of the legacy of this contest of critical approaches in 
Carroll’s recent writings on aesthetics.  In Art and the Domain of the Aesthetic, 
he discusses aesthetic experience and rejects the notion that it exists in a 
single essential form.  He instead argues for an ‘enumerative’ approach, 
which recognises different modes of aesthetic experience and he then goes 
on to list various such modes.  He acknowledges that his list of modes reflects 
that assumption of separability of ‘form’ and ‘content’, noting: 
 
I have not included the interpretation of meaning on my list 
because the tradition is somewhat in conflict on this matter: some 
regard meaning as an antipode of aesthetic experience, while 
others include it.189 
 
Carroll does not align himself here with those who ‘regard meaning as an 
antipode of aesthetic experience’, but his ambivalence on this point suggests 
that, while he may be open to the possibility of bolting meaning onto his set of 
modes of aesthetic experience, he surely does not see as it central or 
essential.  In the next sections I want to the look at two ways in which 
meaning and aesthetic experience can be seen as closely bound together, 
two points where form and content meet.  In the first, drawing on Susanne 
Langer’s concept of symbolic transformation, I will look at ways that form 
could be said to generate meaning.  In the second, I will look at ways in which 
knowledge changes our aesthetic response to form.  
 
Abstraction and Symbolism 
 
In his review of Tomma Abts, Adrian Searle asks the question, ‘What is Abts 
painting, and what do her paintings allude to?’  This is a perfectly reasonable 
question.  If you said that you were writing a novel, I might ask, “what is it 
188 Carroll 2000 p191 
189 Carroll 2000 p207 
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about?’  In the same way, if you said you had painted a picture, I might ask, 
“what is it of?” 
 
In the case of Tomma Abts it would be difficult to answer that question.  
Tomma Abts’ pieces are paintings but it does not follow that they are pictures.  
They do not depict or appear to represent external objects.  Until the arrival of 
modernist abstraction in the twentieth century, a standard feature (to use 
Walton’s term) of a painting was that it was a picture of something.  Modernist 
practice, and the critical commentaries that accompanied its development, 
drew attention away from the representational function of paintings and 
towards their existence as objects in their own right. 
 
If Abts’ paintings are to be considered as objects in their own right, if Rachel 
Campbell-Johnson is right in saying that they are ‘based on nothing in the real 
world’, then that prompts the question, to what extent it is reasonable to claim 
that they are meaningful, that they say something.  If we use the word abstract 
simply to mean non-figurative then Abts paintings are abstract, they do not 
include any recognisable objects, only arrangements of form and colour. 
 
However, it is clear from the reviews that, even if the paintings are not 
picturing external objects, the forms and colours in her paintings provoke 
associations not only with other works of art, but with a wide variety of 
everyday visual experiences.  Abts herself argues that no painting is ever 
entirely abstract.190  The wealth of metaphors used by the reviewers testifies 
to the range of connections between the arrangements of form and colour, 
and things in ‘the real world’.  There was agreement between reviewers, for 
example, that darker shaded areas within the paintings produced the effect of 
shadow and that those implied shadows created the effect of shallow three-
dimensional space. 
 
Moreover, we have seen agreement amongst the reviewers that, 
notwithstanding their abstract nature, the paintings convey a quality of 
190 Cumming, Observer Sunday 17 November 2013  
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reticence.  The critics mention a number of formal and contextual elements 
that contribute to that sense of reticence.  They point to the use of muted 
colours, the evidence of meticulous working and reworking of surfaces, and 
those elements are contrasted with the bright colour and free flowing 
improvisational quality typical of abstract expressionist painting, such as the 
drip paintings of Jackson Pollock. 
 
If the critics agree in characterising Tomma Abts’ paintings as reticent, they 
interpret that reticence in different ways, as reserve, or as coldness or timidity.  
We may differ when forming an opinion of a person in the same way.  We 
meet someone in company and we notice that she says little and sits on the 
sidelines.  Her behaviour might variously be interpreted as self-contained and 
composed, shy, haughty and so on.  If we wanted to make a judgement about 
which was the correct interpretation we would consider a number of factors, 
both in terms of our direct sensory impressions, and in terms of contextual 
factors. 
 
Certainly we would also want to consider the context.  If we know the person, 
we might compare her behaviour with how she behaves on other occasions.  
We might also consider her role and status within the company.  We might 
know of particular sets of circumstances that might make her feel superior to 
the rest of the group or, alternatively, feel unsure of herself.  In the same way, 
the critics examined the context of Abts’ paintings and drew conclusions from 
that evidence. 
 
However, the other way we might try to make a judgement about the reticence 
of a person is by direct and careful observation.  A simple verbal descriptive 
account of someone saying little and sitting on the sidelines would not be 
enough to decide whether the cause was reserve or disdainfulness.  To gain 
more insight we might observe nuances of body language and voice.  Subtle 
and fleeting facial expressions might give clues to nervousness or hostility.  
However, to describe verbally how a particular expression of the eye or 
movement of the head conveyed some inner nature would be difficult to 
achieve unless one resorted to metaphor.  One of the traditional skills of the 
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artist, still highly valued in photography, is that of being able to capture in a 
single image some fleeting expression that seems to capture an inner 
character that might take a novel to convey in words.  The notion that verbal 
language might be less well fitted to the task of conveying certain aspects of 
human experience than other means, such as music or visual art, is at the 
heart of Susanne Langer’s approach to this question.  
 
A central starting point for Langer is the observation that a defining 
characteristic of our species is that we are intensely interested in creating and 
interpreting symbols.  That characteristic has played its part in our success 
and survival as a species, its reach and sophistication extended by the 
discursive symbolic systems of language and mathematics.  Creating and 
interpreting symbols is a fundamental human need and is a constant activity in 
the conscious, but also the unconscious mind; we see faces in the clouds, 
heroes in the constellations, our fate in tea leaves. 
 
Langer distinguishes two forms of symbolism: discursive symbolism, which 
includes language and mathematics; and what she calls presentational 
symbolism.  It is important to understand that Langer’s concept of the 
discursive symbolism of language and mathematics is strongly influenced by 
logical positivism and, in particular, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (she introduces 
the idea of symbolic transformation in Philosophy in a New Key, first published 
1942, before the publication of Philosophical Investigations).  It is within that 
context that she notes that the activity of the mind, beyond that which can be 
contained within sets of propositions, is sometimes dismissed as ‘mere’ 
feeling or sensations; she notes Carnap’s description of language, which does 
not meet these rigorous new standards, as a kind of expressive noise-making 
(in which category he places both phrases such as ‘Oh ah’ and lyric 
poetry).191  But Langer argues that mental activity that cannot find expression 
through discursive symbolism does so by other means: 
 
What discursive symbolism —language in its literal use —does for 
our awareness of things about us and our own relation to them, the 
191 Langer 1942 p84 
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arts do for our awareness of subjective reality, feeling and emotion; 
they give inward experiences form and thus make them 
conceivable. The only way we can really envisage vital movement, 
the stirring and growth and passage of emotion, and ultimately the 
whole direct sense of human life, is in artistic terms.192 
 
Langer points to the function of presentational symbolism as a means to 
convey those (often vital) aspects of human experience that cannot be fully 
conveyed as a set of linguistic propositions.  If we take, as an example, a 
person who has suffered bereavement, his situation can be described using 
all the language tools that have been developed within the disciplines of 
medicine, psychology and the social sciences, but to express the lived 
experience of bereavement requires something more.  Poetry and metaphor 
are the means by which language attempts to convey the experience of living 
with bereavement, but, equally, it finds expression through music and the 
visual arts.  For Langer, the arts (and ritual) are the means to express 
‘whereof we cannot speak.’ Langer proposes that the way in which the arts do 
this is through presentational symbolism, which she argues is systematic but 
non-discursive.  Her clearest and most persuasive example of systematic non-
discursive symbolism is music and her discussion of music occupies a central 
place in Philosophy in a New Key. 
 
The model of music might be a good starting place in trying to understand 
how the paintings of Tomma Abts might convey reticence.  Music can be both 
abstract and systematic; it is not unusual to speak loosely about ‘the language 
of music’.  Deryck Cooke’s193 book of that name provides a meticulous 
analysis of the way in which specific harmonic and melodic forms within 
western tonal music convey particular emotional colours.  Moreover, any film 
composer knows that it is possible to affect the emotions of an audience by 
using established techniques to manipulate parameters such as dynamics 
harmony and rhythm.  The success of these techniques does not require the 
audience to consciously read and de-code the music.  We do not need to say 
to ourselves ‘here the theme recurs in a minor key – that denotes impending 
tragedy’.  We recognise the emotional import of the music at a subliminal 
192 Susanne K. Langer Problems of Art (New York: Scribners) 1957 p74 
193 The Language of Music 1952 
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level; it is quite possible for a filmgoer to be affected by the music soundtrack 
while knowing nothing at all about music theory.  
 
Tomma Abts was one of the artists featured in a recent exhibition at the Tate, 
Painting Now: Five Contemporary Artists.  Laura Cumming’s review of the 
exhibition included the claim,  ‘Abts is inventing a new pictorial language 
entirely of her own’.194  Langer would be clear that she is not; the 
presentational symbolism of the visual arts does not work in the same way as 
a language: 
 
Since we have no words, there can be no dictionary of meanings 
for lines, shadings, or other elements of pictorial techniques. We 
may well pick out some line, say a certain curve, in a picture, which 
serves to represent one nameable item; but in another place the 
same curve would have an entirely different meaning. It has no 
fixed meaning apart from its context. Also there is no complex of 
other elements that is equivalent to it at all times, as ‘2 + 2’ is 
equivalent to ‘4’. Non-discursive symbols cannot be defined in 
terms of others, as discursive symbols can.195 
 
But although presentational symbolism lacks the degree of stability of 
meaning enjoyed by language, it nonetheless operates within a shared visual 
culture.  If the non-discursive symbolism of muted colour conveys a quality of 
reticence in the paintings of Tomma Abts, it does so by virtue of the 
interconnection of two contexts: the specific context of the painting itself, and 
the wider context of a visual culture that is shared by those who view it.  
 
The first of these two contexts is the specific context in which the use of colour 
occurs.  The critics classify Tomma Abts’ paintings in terms of their 
relationship to modernist abstraction, which invites us to make comparisons to 
the paintings of Pollock, Kandinsky, Rothko and Mondrian, which are notable 
for their use of intense colour.  The use of colour in Abts’ paintings is 
undoubtedly muted in comparison to those paintings.  In another context, for 
example, fifteenth century Japanese landscape paintings, many of the colours 
that she uses in her paintings would seem excessively bright.  The critics 
194 Observer 17 November 2013 
195 Langer 1942 p95 
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identify the colours as muted because they see the paintings within the 
context of an art tradition noted for its bold use of colour. 
 
The second and wider context is the culture of the viewer, in which not only is 
there general agreement about which colours are correctly described as loud 
or brash, and which are correctly described as subdued or muted, there is 
also general recognition about what those terms mean when applied to 
human character and to psychological states.  The terms loud or muted are 
terms whose first order meanings are to do with sound; that are themselves 
faded metaphors when used either with respect to colour, as they are with 
respect to character, but, for example, in a mainstream commercial film we 
would instantly recognise the stereotype of the extrovert in a loud shirt, or the 
introvert dressed in quiet subdued tones.  In fact, I will argue that the 
connection is so fully assimilated into our way of seeing the world, that we 
read characters in that way even when we do not consciously recognise the 
way in which colour is influencing our view, in exactly the way we take 
subliminal cues from film music.  The association between colour and 
characterisation is deeply embedded; our fashion and marketing industries 
rely upon that fact.  
 
What Cumming calls a pictorial language would not satisfy the standards 
Langer sets for language, but Cumming’s comment indicates her view that 
some systematic process of signification is being developed within the body of 
work.  The way in which that system of signification works may, to an extent, 
be inter-subjective (as evidenced by the critics’ agreement over the quality of 
‘reticence’), but it is not capable of being ‘translated’ into a set of discursive 
formulations.  Nor can the elements that may have been used to signify a 
quality like reticence, for example, Abts use of muted colour, be isolated and 
used in the same way in a different context.  Many such elements may work 
within the painting but for Langer the artwork itself in its entirety is a single 
indivisible symbol. 
 
On the final page of On Criticism, Carroll argues for the value of the arts on 
the grounds that they transmit the ‘ideas, beliefs and feelings that form the 
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warp and woof of a living culture’.  However, despite recognising its value for 
the arts as a whole, that capacity for transmitting ideas, beliefs and feelings 
does not figure strongly in his discussion of the evaluation of individual 
artworks. Carroll’s use of the metaphor of the ‘warp and woof of a living 
culture’ echoes the language of Susanne Langer.  In Langer’s metaphor, 
those two interwoven sets of strands are identified as, on the one hand, that 
part of human existence that can be understood in discursive form as a set of 
propositions, and on the other, symbolism in all of its forms, including the non-
discursive symbolism that is characteristic of the arts: 
 
The modern mind is an incredible complex of impressions and 
transformations; and its product is a fabric of meanings that would 
make the most elaborate dream of the most ambitious tapestry-
weaver look like a mat. The warp of that fabric consists of what we 
call “data”, the signs to which experience has conditioned us to 
attend, and upon which we act often without any conscious 
ideation. The woof is symbolism. Out of signs and symbols we 
weave our tissue of “reality”. 196 
 
It is Langer’s notion of symbolism197 as being woven into one’s lived reality by 
which she calls into question persistent dichotomies within art critical 
traditions: between the aesthetic and the semiotic, the perceptual and the 
cognitive, form and content, interpretation and evaluation. 
 
Beauty and Rubbish 
 
Langer suggests ways in which even abstract visual forms such as those 
described in reviews of the paintings of Tomma Abts can signify meaning to 
the viewer in the same way as abstract musical forms communicate states of 
emotion to the listener.  In this section, I will look at another point where 
questions of meaning and aesthetic quality are bound together, by examining 
the way in which the meaning or significance of an object affects direct 
aesthetic judgement.  The particular aesthetic quality we will consider is one 
196 Langer p280  
197 It should be noted that Langer does use the terms sign and symbol in the exactly same way the 
terms are commonly used in modern semiotics. 
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that some writers198 would say has been scandalously neglected in the 
discussion so far: the quality of beauty. 
 
Writers like Roger Scruton199 and Anthony O’Hear200 have argued that art 
took a wrong turning in the twentieth century, losing sight of its central 
purpose in its retreat from, or rejection of, beauty.  The biologist Steven 
Pinker201 has made similar claims based on what he sees as the evolutionary 
function of human aesthetic sensitivity.  For those who regret the decentring of 
beauty from visual art, the Turner Prize is often seen as the apotheosis of this 
tendency, and one factor that has particularly caused champions of beauty to 
despair has been the tendency of nominated artists to use detritus in their 
work.  Emin and Ofili we have already mentioned but quite a number of Turner 
Prize artists have used rubbish to produce their work, including Rebecca 
Warren, Tony Cragg, Mike Nelson and Tomoko Takahashi. 
 
In ‘Aesthetic Judgements’, Sibley considered the question of whether rubbish 
can be beautiful, taking as his starting point a thought experiment from a book 
by the art critic Eric Newton: 
 
A meadow of lush grass generously interspersed with buttercups 
and ox-eye daisies usually strikes one as beautiful. But what if on 
entering the meadow one were to discover that the buttercups were 
empty Gold Flake packets and the daisies torn up scraps of paper? 
One would protest to oneself in vain that litter and wild flowers can 
be equally pleasing to the eye, but despite one's attempts to 
preserve one's aesthetic judgments intact, one's attitude to the 
meadow would alter and the alteration could only be expressed in 
terms of disappointment.202  
  
Sibley considers a number of factors that might account for this.  One possible 
cause of Newton’s problem is that the knowledge of the source of the colour in 
the meadow has made him ‘switch off aesthetically’203, because of the 
associations of disgust that come with the knowledge that what he was seeing 
 
199 Beauty 2009 
200 Prospects for Beauty. 2001 
201 The Blank Slate 2002 
202 Newton p54 
203 Sibley p184 
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was litter and not flowers.  He gives the example of someone who had a 
morbid fear of snakes being unable to notice the beauty of the animal’s 
markings.  However, Sibley does not, in the end, believe that disgust has 
blocked Newton’s aesthetic response to the colours; on the contrary, he sees 
Newton’s second response, of disappointment after learning the true source of 
the meadow’s colours, as every bit as much an aesthetic response as his 
initial judgement of beauty. 
 
Sibley extends the thought experiment to eliminate the possibility that a 
feeling of disgust caused by the unsavoury presence of litter has caused 
Newton to ‘switch off aesthetically’.  He imagines that, rather than litter, the 
source of the colours in the meadow were artificial flowers made of plastic or 
silk.  Newton, he argues, would feel much the same sense of disappointment: 
that, although the ‘visual beauty’ might be unchanged, one would suffer the 
loss of the associations of growth, life and nature connected with some ‘norm 
or ideal of meadow-beauty’204.  He does not accept that to experience beauty 
is to experience a purely visual phenomenon.  The associations connected 
with those visual experiences, the play of the imagination that they provoke, 
are also part of experiencing beauty: 
 
If judgements of beauty springing from these sources seem too far 
ranging to fall within some narrowly circumscribed category of 
aesthetic judgements, appreciations responses and rejoicings, I do 
not know into what obvious broader category they fall. To outlaw 
them by some restrictive stipulation or decision would itself demand 
reasons and arguments.205 
 
Sibley gently mocks Newton’s apparent confusion on this point (‘Can we throw 
light on his hesitations, puzzlements and conflicts?’206) but, in fact, when 
Newton returns to the thought experiment later in his book, the conclusion he 
reaches is not far removed from Sibley’s position: 
 
It follows that 'association' plays its part in our sense of beauty, not 
only on the outer levels of a work of art, but on every level. What 
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has already been said about associational beauty in Nature still 
applies. The green field patterned with yellow and white spots is 
more beautiful if the spots are buttercups and daisies than if they 
are empty cigarette packets and torn-up newspaper. But it is only in 
the light of our pleasant memories of flowers and our painful 
memories of litter that the meadow becomes more or less 
beautiful.207 
 
Of course Newton’s problem of the meadow concerns not the evaluation of a 
landscape painting, but the aesthetic appreciation of landscape.  Scruton has 
argued that, ‘our sense of the beauty of an object is always dependent on a 
conception of that object.’208  He uses the example of features that would be 
regarded as beautiful in a horse, but would be regarded as ugly in a man.  
Sibley goes some way towards agreeing with Scruton about beauty being an 
attributive quality in such cases, although he does not agree this must 
universally apply in all circumstances.  Nonetheless, as Sibley points out, the 
problem of the meadow underlines the point that, where we do have 
knowledge about the object in our view, the meaningful aspects of that 
experience are inescapably relevant to our evaluation of its aesthetic qualities.  
This opens up important questions about the nature of the relationship 
between perception and cognition in aesthetic appreciation.  We can illustrate 
the issue by extending Newton’s thought experiment still further; suppose that, 
when looking at the flowers in the meadow, we discovered not that they were 
in fact litter, but that they were a very rare species of wildflower, perhaps the 
last surviving examples of their kind.  We might feel that our appreciation of 
their beauty was made more intense by that knowledge (this question 
parallels the longstanding philosophical debate about the value of fake 
artworks that I will not enter into here) and a number of Turner Prize works 
seem to have been designed to test that balance between perception and 
cognition.  
 
Simon Starling’s Shedboatshed is an example of an artwork that presents an 
everyday object, a wooden shed, not normally seen as a candidate for artistic 
appreciation.  It is the story of the shed that makes it remarkable.  For 
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Rachael Campbell-Johnson, that contextual knowledge is enough to imbue 
the shed with the power to provoke a play of imagination in the mind of the 
viewer:  
 
Who stepping into Simon Starling’s Shedboatshed, cannot relate to 
that dream of sailing off into the sunset, or to its flip side, retirement 
to the allotment shed? The ramshackle structure that greets you as 
you enter the galleries stands as a metaphor for art itself; a refuge 
for imagination and dreams.209 
 
Adrian Searle was not so convinced.  For him the story of the shed, the 
associations of ideas that its journey might provoke, failed to counterweight 
the banality of the object itself: 
 
That Simon Starling has won the Turner prize has a sort of dull 
inevitability about it. His work was in its way the least satisfying 
installation in the show, mostly because his art is less about the 
things in the gallery than about how these objects came to be there 
in the first place. … The stories behind these objects are absurdist, 
Quixotic errands. Reading about his journeys, and how his works 
evolve, is more satisfying than the things he makes, whose status 
is largely as evidence.210 
 
Searle’s comment differentiates Starling’s art from the objects in the gallery.  
The art is actually the work of making the piece rather than the physical 
outcome of that work.  This is an important distinction that echoes 
Collingwood’s idea of the artwork as an ideal object.  If the artwork, 
Shedboatshed is a process rather than an object, then what the critic must 
pay attention to is the evidence of that process as provided by the artist.  That 
would include not only the shed itself, but also Starling’s photographic record 
of each stage of the shed’s journey and the contextual information about the 
shed’s origin and transformations.  These objects connect the viewer to the 
artwork in the way that holy relics connect the faithful to the life of a saint.  
Searle acknowledges that the ‘artwork’ as a whole offers some satisfaction, 
but it does not, for him, imbue his encounter with the object itself with any 
greater intensity.  To relate Searle’s response to my extended version of 
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Newton’s problem of the meadow, the knowledge that the wildflowers are rare 
and endangered may increase our intellectual interest in them, or even 
heighten our emotional response to them, but need not necessarily make 
them appear more beautiful. 
 
Searle has another critique of Shedboatshed, one that he might apply more 
generally to artworks that depend so heavily on context.  It is that, in the 
nature of this kind of work, the carefully selected contextual information 
provided by the artist is only one contextual framework, another is the 
institutional context of the art world and the two frameworks may not always 
harmonise: 
 
Back-story is everything in Simon Starling's work, and his 
Shedboatshed (Mobile Architecture No 2) has another story the 
artist doesn't tell us. Eventually bought by the Kunstmuseum in 
Basel, Shedboatshed was presumably dismantled in Switzerland, 
its parts numbered, padded, crated and then transported to Tate 
Britain in a big truck, where the piece was put back together again. 
Much care, presumably, was taken not to disturb the desiccated 
scraps of ivy clinging to its exterior wall, and in the placement of the 
odds and ends that lie about in its dim interior. But this story, of the 
passage of an artwork, stays untold.211 
 
If the ‘back story’ of the shed, as many reviewers felt, was about sustainability 
and adaptability, a makeshift vessel on a quixotic journey, then the story of 
Shedboatshed as a Turner Prize exhibit is a different one, and one that has 
been effectively edited out of the installation.  For Searle, his knowledge of 
this hidden back story works to undermine the sense of authenticity and the 
earnestness of intent that might otherwise have been a positive feature of the 
artwork, in the same way as Newton’s appreciation of the meadow’s colour is 
undermined by the knowledge that he is seeing litter and not flowers. 
 
There are two important things to note about Newton’s thought experiment.  
Firstly, it is worth re-iterating that it does not involve the appreciation of beauty 
in art, but the appreciation of beauty in nature.  The presence of litter in a 
meadow may offend aesthetically, but we may also be offended by the sight 
211 Searle 18 October 2005  
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for other reasons, as evidence of the despoiling of the natural environment, or 
of the antisocial behaviour of some of our fellow citizens.  Secondly, Sibley 
does not say that empty cigarette packets and torn-up newspaper cannot be 
considered beautiful, only that they do not add to the beauty of a meadow.  In 
fact, he gives many examples of cases in which artists have made use of a 
material not normally considered a candidate for aesthetic appreciation and 
placed it a different context: 
 
People often say beauty can be found in the most unlikely things if 
one has eyes to see it. Often, they say, the artist sees, and helps 
us see, beauty we ordinarily miss, so broadening our potentialities 
for appreciation. Rembrandt’s painted side of beef draws attention 
to its rich and varied colouration.  Ruskin said somewhere that 
Turner could open our eyes to beauty, presumably of line, colour, 
iridescence etc. in rotting vegetation, rubbish, garbage. Modern 
artists have forced us to notice beauties of coloration, texture, 
shape in rusting metal and battered tin cans by painting them, 
incorporating them in abstract sculptures or simply exhibiting 
them.212  
 
One artist who makes her work by exhibiting rubbish is Tomoko Takahashi.  
Her large scale installations are typically composed of obsolete products and 
discarded waste.  Many reviewers saw her work as primarily polemic in 
nature, and discussed it in terms of its meanings or messages, rather than 
discussing it in terms of its beauty.  Those reviewers whose tendency was to 
see the Turner Prize as emblematic of a regrettable retreat from traditional 
aesthetic values were predictably critical or dismissive of the work; Brian 
Sewell said of it "It looks like she has robbed a gang of bag ladies and 
emptied the contents of the bags all over the floor."213 
 
If those reviewers whose tendency is to look for beauty in artwork were 
disappointed by Takahashi, those whose tendency is to look for ideological 
content found much to write about.  Paul Mitchell reviewing her Turner Prize 
show Learning How to Drive on the website of the International Committee of 
the Fourth International introduced the artist thus: 
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She has lived through the economic rise and stagnation of Japan 
and the development of its obsessive consumerism and human 
alienation. She explores how consumer objects that are replaced 
as soon as new models are marketed can live again and how 
individualism relies on social activity.214 
 
Although ostensibly (according to the title, but also the artist herself) 
Takahashi’s Turner Prize installation was inspired by her attempt to pass her 
driving test, Mitchell saw a wider political meaning to the work: 
 
Discarded maps, signs, lights and maintenance tools are piled high. 
Here and there you spot a police driver's manual or a heap of 
children's model car racing track. You gradually begin to realise 
how an apparently simple activity is a really quite a complex social 
one.215 
 
Julian Stallabrass, who included Takahashi’s work in his overview of 
contemporary political art, connected her work with the ideas of curator and 
theorist Nicholas Bourriaud, who developed the label of "relational aesthetics" 
to describe art which acts to ameliorate the social rifts caused by capitalism. 
 
Socialism Today noted the element of the work challenging the 
institutional limits of the gallery space itself (a frequent feature of 
installation art that we will look at more closely in the next chapter): 
 
Evidently, she was taken aback by the amount of rules governing 
museums: health and safety rules on the circulation of visitors, fire 
regulations, and so on. So traffic signs giving directions are 
incorporated in the design. A young child's school uniforms are 
present, alongside an old security guard's uniform: lifelong rules 
and regulations.216  
 
This reading of Takahashi’s installation, as offering a challenge to the 
space that hosts it, may have been informed by awareness of the artist’s 
wider body of work.  Andrew Graham-Dixon referred in his review to one 
of the Takahashi’s earlier pieces: 
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1997 also saw the creation of Company Deal, a work in which 
Takahashi was allowed to flood a London marketing consultancy’s 
office with six weeks’ worth of its own, accumulated waste, mouldy 
pizza boxes and all – difficult not to see that as some kind of 
statement about market-led, consumer-capitalist society217 
 
Nicci Gerrard also interprets Takahashi’s work as a critique of consumer 
capitalism.  She describes the artist’s work as: 
 
making a puritanical point about our high-speed, hi-tech age: all 
these things are useless and worthless, though they still function. 
How quickly objects lose their value; what a litter of goods we leave 
in our postmodern wake.218 
 
However, if the arrangements of rubbish that make up Takahashi’s 
installations are simply meant to confront us with the appalling wastefulness of 
consumer capitalism, then one might assume that these heaps of debris might 
be intended to arouse feelings of disgust.  But the reviews suggest that this is 
not so straightforward.  Virginia Button, for example, says of Takahashi, ‘She 
transforms reclaimed rubbish and detritus into crazy, complex and beautiful 
arrangements.’219  Nicci Gerrard agrees with that judgement of beauty, 
describing the accumulated objects that make up a Takahashi installation as 
‘weirdly beautiful in their dereliction’.220 
 
Graham-Dixon too suggests that there is more to Tomoko Takahashi’s work 
than the political dimension.  He uses statements made by the artist herself as 
evidence to argue that her installations are shaped by her intense interest in 
the aesthetics of her work: 
 
Takahashi has tended to play down any suggestion of polemical 
intent, describing herself as a creator of “designer disorder” and 
comparing her intricate arrangements of obsolete tat to “abstract 
paintings or broken sentences.” Her work is also, she has said, 
“very much like a landscape: a friend of mine says like a 
gardener.”221   
217 Graham-Dixon  November 1999 
218 Gerrard January 1999 
219 Button p128 
220 Gerrard January 1999 
221 Graham-Dixon November 1999 
127
He suggests that Takahashi’s work shows the influence of Dadaist, Kurt 
Schwitters, who, in the mid-twentieth century, developed an individual style, 
which he called Merz.  His Merz work mixed painting with collage, using items 
one would normally discard, such as used bus tickets and fragments of 
newsprint.  Schwitters’ work, often political in its references, showed careful 
consideration of the formal concerns of colour, line, shape and composition.   
 
Of course there is no necessary contradiction involved in an artist having a 
desire to pursue a political agenda in her work and at the same time being 
intensely concerned with the aesthetic qualities of the work.  But Andrew 
Graham-Dixon points to an aspect of Takahashi’s work that brings together 
the ideological and the aesthetic, not as two parallel agendas operating within 
the work, but as a single unified whole.  He refers to the fact that Takahashi’s 
work often challenges the institution that hosts it.  He describes the process 
by which the artist created her installation in the New Neurotic Realism at the 
Saatchi Gallery, which was the exhibition that led to Takahashi’s Turner Prize 
nomination.  His account highlights a clash of aesthetic values between the 
artist and the environment within which she was operating, the huge exhibition 
space that had been created in London by wealthy art collector Charles 
Saatchi: 
 
She lived in the gallery while she was making the piece, sleeping 
on a camp bed set up like an island in her sea of waste, overstock 
and broken bargain-basement consumer durables. “I didn’t like the 
atmosphere there,” she said later. “It’s so abstract, clean and 
proper – a white cube that’s so well done it’s surreal. I was working 
counter to the space, trying to humanise it.” Blatantly at odds with 
the architecture, Max Clifford’s spare and dauntingly huge suite of 
interconnecting galleries, her work seemed to have invaded than 
simply occupied the space. It looked like the assertion of a messy 
truth. The world according to Takahashi is not neatness, order and 
purity but chaos, spillage, overflow.222 
 
Graham-Dixon’s review explores the connections between aesthetic and 
political values.  By bringing her detritus into the antiseptic space of the 
classic modernist white cube exhibition space, he suggests, the artist is 
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inviting the audience to appreciate the aesthetics of the chaotic and marginal 
that would normally be edited out of the safe ordered environment of the 
modern art gallery.  When Graham-Dixon describes Takahashi’s work as ‘the 
assertion of a messy truth’, the unspoken corollary is that it asserts that messy 
truth in contrast to the neat and orderly fiction of the exhibition space.  The 
artist herself has said, “Everything has its own life and I want to make things 
more themselves, to liberate them from imposed rules. Teetering on the edge 
between order and chaos, that's the exciting point—living is like that.”223  The 
aesthetic challenge and the critical edge offered by her work are not seen as 
separate agendas, but as different sides of the same coin. 
 
Graham-Dixon’s review of Takahashi’s work deals with form and content as 
inseparable; aesthetics and ideology are unified in the ‘the assertion of a 
messy truth’.  This is not exceptional; across a range of reviews we can see 
other critics attempting to address questions about the significance of the 
work, at least partly, through formal analysis.  The issue is one that is of 
concern to the reviewers; we have seen Starling criticised for what was seen 
as a tokenistic approach to form.  We have seen some fretting over what Abts’ 
abstract forms might be saying, and the attempt to read her paintings in terms 
of a dialogue with the concepts of twentieth century modernism. 
 
What is clear is that questions of meaning tend to be found at the very heart of 
many critical reviews, not only when the critic is involved in interpretation, but 
also in support of evaluative statements.  The evidence that both critics and 
the art-going public place meaning at the centre of their evaluative 
judgements can be seen throughout the commentaries.  This can be seen 
most starkly in attacks on the Prize, both from outside the art world and within.  
Along with critiques about the flight from beauty, lack of craft skills, and the 
scandals concerning accusations of indecency or immorality levelled at Turner 
Prize art works, a frequently heard complaint is the one that the Stuckist, 
Charles Thompson levelled at Tomma Abts’ paintings; that the work was 
meaningless. 
223 Mitchell 
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 Form and Content 
 
At the start of this chapter I made some very sweeping generalisations about 
the developments in art criticism over the past two centuries.  To summarise 
even more brutally, I argued then that the Victorian critic tended to focus on 
meaning at the expense of any discussion of form while the tendency of mid-
twentieth century critical practice was to regard the formal aspects of the work 
as paramount and its subject as a mere pretext.  I would argue that, on the 
evidence of reviews of the Turner Prize, critical practice in the twenty-first 
century is characterised by the attempt, not just to balance those two aspects, 
but to engage with them in a unified way.  
 
Clearly, the critical tendencies of the past have, to a great extent, been 
affected by the kind of artworks that were being produced at the time; 
narrative paintings invite responses that are different from those we might 
have to abstract expressionist paintings.  But it is also a two way process; the 
formalist approach developed by critics like Clive Bell and then Clement 
Greenberg, mirrored developing abstraction within art practice but it also 
underpinned and promoted that tendency. 
 
To make amends for my generalisations about art critical practice I will look at 
a notable exception.  The Stuckist manifesto dramatises what they see as a 
corruption of artistic standards with the statement, ‘The only artist who 
wouldn't be in danger of winning The Turner Prize is Turner.’224  The use of 
Turner’s name has provided a battleground for critics and supporters of the 
Prize.  While critics of the Prize use J M W Turner as an emblem of the 
aesthetic excellence they see as missing from contemporary art, supporters of 
the Prize point out how innovative and sometimes controversial Turner’s work 
was considered to be in his own time.  It was the wish to defend Turner 
against his critics and to explain the new approaches he was bringing to 
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painting that led to the writing, over a twenty year period, of the five volumes 
of Modern Painters by the art critic John Ruskin. 
Ruskin does not conform to my caricature of the Victorian art critic.  The fourth 
volume of Modern Painters provides a paradigm example of the critic dealing 
with form and meaning in a unified way.  It also provides an excellent 
illustration of Sibley’s notion of the critic as teacher and persuader.  Ruskin 
makes a detailed comparison between two depictions of windmills, one by the 
noted contemporary picturesque painter Clarkson Stanfield, the other by 
Turner.  In each case the windmill is a detail within a larger landscape 
painting.  Ruskin’s comparison notes the more obvious aesthetic appeal of 
Stanfield’s style of painting: 
 
At first sight I dare say the reader may like Stanfield's best; and 
there is, indeed, a great deal more in it to attract liking. Its roof is 
nearly as interesting in its ruggedness as a piece of the stony peak 
of a mountain, with a châlet built on its side; and it is exquisitely 
varied in swell and curve. Turner's roof, on the contrary, is a plain, 
ugly gable,—a windmill roof, and nothing more.225 
 
As the comparison proceeds on to a detailed discussion of different parts of 
the windmills, Ruskin again points to the greater initial visual appeal of 
Stansfield’s depiction, but a new note has entered the discussion: 
 
Stanfield's sails are twisted into most effective wrecks, as beautiful 
as pine bridges over Alpine streams; only they do not look as if they 
had ever been serviceable windmill sails; they are bent about in 
cross and awkward ways, as if they were warped or cramped; and 
their timbers look heavier than necessary. Turner's sails have no 
beauty about them like that of Alpine bridges; but they have the 
exact switchy sway of the sail that is always straining against the 
wind; and the timbers form clearly the lightest possible framework 
for the canvas,—thus showing the essence of windmill sail. 
 
The windmill sails, as Turner depicts them ‘have no beauty about them’ but 
Ruskin is beginning to suggest that they have more reality.  Again, Ruskin 
praises Stansfield for the beauty of the clay walls he has depicted, but the 
critique is becoming more explicit: 
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 Then the clay wall of Stanfield's mill is as beautiful as a piece of 
chalk cliff, all worn into furrows by the rain, coated with mosses, 
and rooted to the ground by a heap of crumbled stone, 
embroidered with grass and creeping plants. But this is not a 
serviceable state for a windmill to be in. 
 
Ruskin points out that for a windmill to be of any use it must be able to turn to 
face the wind and that Stansfield’s picturesque depiction is of a windmill that 
would be incapable of doing so.  He contrasts that depiction with that of 
Turner:  
 
Now observe how completely Turner has chosen his mill so as to 
mark this great fact of windmill nature; how high he has set it; how 
slenderly he has supported it; how he has built it all of wood; how 
he has bent the lower planks so as to give the idea of the building 
lapping over the pivot on which it rests inside; and how, finally, he 
has insisted on the great leverage of the beam behind it, while 
Stanfield's lever looks more like a prop than a thing to turn the roof 
with. And he has done all this fearlessly, though none of these 
elements of form are pleasant ones in themselves, but tend, on the 
whole, to give a somewhat mean and spider-like look to the 
principal feature in his picture; and then, finally, because he could 
not get the windmill dissected, and show us the real heart and 
centre of the whole, behold, he has put a pair of old millstones, 
lying outside, at the bottom of it. These—the first cause and motive 
of all the fabric—laid at its foundation; and beside them the cart 
which is to fulfil the end of the fabric's being, and take home the 
sacks of flour.226 
 
Turner has not sought to prettify the windmill; his depiction shows its true 
purpose and function.  It is important to note that, in Modern Painters, Ruskin 
is trying to defend Turner against the charge that his paintings were not 
visually realistic, that they distorted reality. Ruskin argues that Turner is happy 
to sacrifice superficial picturesque beauty in order to achieve a more truthful 
rendition of his subject and he points to a higher aesthetic satisfaction than 
can be gained from Stansfield’s rustic fantasy.  
 
But Ruskin’s assertion of the greater ‘truth to nature’ represented by Turner’s 
work is not limited to the assertion that Turner’s depiction of the windmill is 
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more visually accurate than that of Stansfield.  He points out the way in which 
Turner uses pictorial means to represent not only an accurate visual 
representation, but also one that offers the viewer an insight into the function, 
purpose, processes and inner workings of what he depicts.  But Ruskin goes 
further still and asks us to consider not just the style of depiction, but what he 
calls the spirit in which it is depicted.  Stansfield’s approach, he argues, has a 
distinct lack of empathy about it: 
 
Observe, that though all this ruin has befallen Stanfield's mill, 
Stanfield is not in the least sorry for it. On the contrary, he is 
delighted, and evidently thinks it the most fortunate thing possible. 
The owner is ruined, doubtless, or dead; but his mill forms an 
admirable object in our view of Brittany.227 
 
By contrast, Ruskin argues, Turner’s depiction of the windmill shows an 
understanding of the social and material reality of the human lives that were 
dependent on it:  
 
Not so Turner. His mill is still serviceable; but, for all that, he feels 
somewhat pensive about it. It is a poor property, and evidently the 
owner of it has enough to do to get his own bread out from between 
its stones. Moreover, there is a dim type of all melancholy human 
labour in it, - catching the freewinds, and setting them to turn 
grindstones. … Turning round a couple of stones, for the mere 
pulverization of human food, is not noble work for the winds. So, 
also, of all low labour to which one sets human souls. It is better 
than no labour; and, in a still higher degree, better than destructive 
wandering of imagination; but yet, that grinding in the darkness, for 
mere food's sake, must be melancholy work enough for many a 
living creature. All men have felt it so; and this grinding at the mill, 
whether it be breeze or soul that is set to it, we cannot much rejoice 
in. Turner has no joy of his mill.228  
 
Ruskin’s analysis of Turner’s windmill points to the specificity of its depiction 
of a particular structure and its allusions to the reality of the lives connected 
with it, but it also points to the universal resonances provoked by the visual 
metaphor of the grindstones.  If Stansfield has sacrificed truth to mere 
prettiness, Turner is praised for suggesting a real existence for the windmill, 
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offering a faithful depiction both of its mechanical functionality and the social 
reality of the labour that took place within it.  Ruskin praises the technical skill 
with which Turner has depicted the motif, but in the end it is the sympathetic 
honesty of the depiction that separates Turner from Stansfield. 
 
I do not offer this powerful instance of form and meaning being discussed in a 
unified way as a rebuke to modern critics. On the contrary, I offer it as an 
example, exceptional in its time, of Ruskin attempting to do what most modern 
critics attempt to do. Ruskin’s close analysis was ultimately intended to justify 
his positive appraisal of aspects of Turner’s work that some critics viewed 
negatively.  Ruskin draws attention to the meaning of Turner’s work in order to 
point out its aesthetic qualities and he points to the fine detail of the formal 
aspects of the work in order to elucidate the meaning.  In doing so he sought 
not only to direct his readers’ attention to positive features of the work, but 
also to induce them to reconsider some of their ideas about beauty and truth 
in painting.  For Ruskin, the form and content of Turner’s painting cannot be 
understood in isolation from each other.  
 
There is a risk that those who are already convinced that meaning is relevant 
to evaluation may feel that, in this chapter, I have been needlessly labouring a 
point, while those of the opposite view may see my arguments as sketchy and 
far too brief to be convincing.  Either way, we need to account for a disparity.  
In the reviews of artists like Ofili, Takahashi and Starling, critics routinely 
address questions about meaning and significance of the work in a way that 
places those issues at the centre of their evaluative judgements.  In the 
account of evaluation that is offered by Carroll, questions of meaning seem to 
be peripheral at best.  We can explain this disparity in one of two ways. Either 
Carroll is neglecting the question of meaning in his approach to evaluation, or 
the reviewers are at fault for being distracted from their central evaluative role.  
Those who are not persuaded by the arguments I have made or the examples 
I have given, and who believe that questions of meaning are irrelevant to 
evaluation, will see this disparity as evidence of poor critical practice.  
However, that is not a conclusion I would support. The critical focus on 
meaning is demanded by the nature of the work that they are reviewing.  I 
134
have offered the example of Ruskin as a model of evaluative analysis that 
takes account of meaning, but reviews of the work of Chris Ofili, Tomoko 
Takahashi and Simon Starling show that critics of our own time are also 
sensitive to the meaningful aspects of the artworks they review.  All three 
artists produce work that the critics identify as having messages, meanings 
and references that relate to real and vital human issues outside the walls of 
the art gallery.  That does not mean that their critical evaluations of those 
works are dependent on the degree of political agreement between the artist 
and the reviewer; the critics do not discuss the work in those terms.  What it 
does mean is that the critics show an awareness that, in order to make a fair 
and valid appraisal of the artistic quality of the work, it is necessary to have an 
awareness of what it signifies. 
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6.  Martin Creed:  Ideas in an Empty Room 
 
One of the challenges faced by professional art critics is that they must review 
art exhibitions of many different kinds, art from different periods or 
movements, art using a range of different media.  One of the skills of the critic 
is to address each different kind of art in an appropriate way.  The reviews of 
the non-figurative paintings of Tomma Abts paid close attention to the formal 
qualities of her work.  Reviews of Chris Ofili’s paintings made much of the 
pictorial references, the connotations or associations of ideas suggested by 
the images he depicts.  
 
This chapter is devoted to an analysis of the critical and curatorial 
commentaries on the installation created by Martin Creed for the 2001 Turner 
Prize shortlist exhibition.  Creed was awarded the Prize that year, but the work 
that he showed in that exhibition presented a particular challenge to the 
critics.  In the gallery space that had been assigned to him, Creed exhibited a 
single piece entitled Work No.227 The Lights Going On and Off.  The work 
consisted of the lights of the empty gallery space cycling between on and off 
every five seconds.  Neither a formalist approach to criticism nor a decoding 
of pictorial references could gain much of a foothold on such a piece.  The 
challenge for the critics was to review work whose formal qualities were so 
meagre at the same time as its subject matter was so elusive.   
 
There is no exhibition by a shortlisted artist that generated a set of reviews in 
which the frustration felt by critics was more evident.  They were divided in 
their evaluations of the piece and, more than a decade after it was exhibited in 
the Turner Prize exhibition, it still divides critical opinion.  Waldemar 
Januszczak is scathing in his criticism: 
 
One of the reasons I stopped attending student shows at 
Goldsmiths College is that I could not face seeing another blank 
wall presented as a radical exhibit by yet another copycat 
conceptualist. The worst winner of all time of the Turner prize was 
the tedious Martin Creed, in 2001, who showed us an empty room 
in which a light bulb went on and off, and that was all. It wasn’t just 
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the non-spectacle that was so irritating. Just as annoying was the 
thought that Creed had so many predecessors.229 
 
Januszczak’s dismissal of the piece is comprehensive and takes in the artist, 
the group of artists with which he is seen as being aligned, the art school 
many of them attended and earlier artists who may have inspired them. 
Daniel Barnes on the other hand argues that Creed’s installation had a lasting 
significance: 
 
The lights going on and off is a good place to start if we want to 
understand how Creed’s genius might escape us and why his work 
is so important. To my mind, this completely empty room with 
florescent strip lights that flicker on and off is a great work of art; 
indeed, I am willing to risk hyperbole and say it was the first truly 
great artwork of the twenty-first century.230 
 
Although Barnes and Januszczak come to completely opposite views about 
the value of Creed’s piece, they have one thing in common.  Both verdicts are 
made by reference to context.  Januszczak’s dismissal of Work No.227 The 
Lights Going On and Off is categorical in the literal sense.  Barnes’ verdict is, 
as we will see, very much influenced by the fact that Creed’s installation is a 
turn-of the-century artwork. 
 
These two very different recent evaluations of Creed’s empty room illustrate 
the profound divergences of opinion this piece provoked.  It seems likely that 
one factor causing this sharp divergence in evaluations was the difficulty 
faced by reviewers in discussing a piece that refused to allow them to use 
many of their customary critical tools.  It is not surprising, given the paucity of 
formal characteristics and signifiers to report on, that the approach reviewers 
took was to concentrate on placing Creed’s piece in context.  However, 
Virginia Button points out that this itself is not necessarily a straightforward 
task, arguing that, ‘Creed’s diverse output defies categorisation within 
traditional genres of artistic production.’231 
229 Januszczak 18 June 2012 
230 Barnes Sepember 2011 
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As we look at how the reviewers approached the classification of The Lights 
Going On and Off as an artwork, it is important to bear in mind that it is not an 
entirely straightforward matter even to classify it as an entity.  This is not to 
open up a larger debate about the ontology of artworks in general, but to 
consider the specific differences between The Lights Going On and Off and 
other artworks we have discussed.  The piece is not an object, in the way that 
Abts’ paintings or Emin’s bed are objects. It is stretching normal usage 
considerably even to call it an artifact, in the way that we might call 
McQueen’s Deadpan an artifact.  In many ways the piece has more in 
common with a performance than it has with an art object; it might indeed be 
considered performance art were it not for the absence of a performer. Some 
but not all of these ontological questions are characteristic of work that falls 
into the category of conceptual art, and that is certainly a label that has often 
been applied to Creed’s work.  Reviews of The Lights Going On and Off cite 
conceptual art as one of a number of reference points rather than locating the 
artist squarely within it.  The Tate’s exhibition notes described the artist as 
‘coming out of the tradition of minimal and conceptual art’232 and it is the 
critics’ references to those two categories of art that we will look at first. 
 
Alex Coles’ review of the exhibition for which Creed was nominated discusses 
the work entirely within the context of conceptual art.  The review of Creed’s 
show is discussed in parallel with a review of an exhibition of British 
conceptual art, which was running in London at the same time.  Although 
Coles identifies Creed’s work as conceptualist, he also implies a more 
tangential relationship, saying, ‘Creed appropriates some of the key 
methodologies of conceptual art and gives them an incisive twist.’233  His 
review compares Creed’s work favourably with that of earlier British 
conceptual artists, which he characterises as ‘either too coolly intellectual or 
mind-numbingly silly.’   By contrast he sees Creed as engaged with real 
issues and working with serious intent.  Coles places Creed’s work, not in the 
context of British art, but of European and American strands of conceptualism 
that Coles sees as having more critical drive: ‘Creed suggests a possible path 
232 Turner Prize Tate 2001 
233 Coles 2000 
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by which contemporary British conceptual art can proceed free of the burden 
of its local precedents’. 
 
As Coles’ review makes clear, there is conceptual art and there is conceptual 
art.  The term is one that has been coined relatively recently and although, as 
is the case with most artistic classifications, there are competing definitions of 
the term, the definition on the Tate’s own website is one with most critics 
would agree.  It defines conceptual art as describing, ‘artworks in which the 
concept (or idea) behind the artwork is more important than traditional 
aesthetic and material concerns’234.  Some conceptual artworks involve some 
physical making on the part of their authors; if Emin’s My Bed is an example 
of conceptual art, then it is one that has required the touch of the artist’s hand.  
Simon Starling’s Shedboatshed is a conceptual piece in which the materials 
have been worked upon intensely by the artist.  But other conceptual artworks 
can exist in the form of sets of instructions that need only to be followed in 
order to instantiate the work. 
 
Creed’s piece has that conceptualist characteristic, the ability to be written 
down like the score of a piece of music.  A collector who purchases The Lights 
Going On and Off receives a set of instructions on to how to recreate the 
piece and, most importantly, the ownership rights over the piece that thereby 
authorise the purchaser to exhibit it as ‘Work No.227 The Lights Going On 
and Off by Martin Creed’.  Button connects this aspect of Creed’s work with 
recurring themes of authorship and value that have been associated with 
conceptualism.  She makes a connection between The Lights Going On and 
Off and the influence of the conceptualist Fluxus Movement of the 1960s and 
1970s and then goes on to say, ‘the concerns of Conceptualist artists in the 
same period is evident in Creed’s work: he continues the enquiry into the 
notion of authorship, the role of the artist and the value of the art object…’.235  
We might also reference here R.G. Collingwood’s236 notion of the artwork as a 
mental object. Creed’s enquiry into these issues also has a practical 
234 Tate website www.tate.org.uk, Glossary of art terms 
235 Button p176 
236 Outlines of a Philosophy of Art 1925 
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professional purpose; it is only through this process of certification and by 
virtue of the laws on intellectual property that he is able to sell his work.  In 
2010, The Lights Going On and Off was valued at £110,000 and three 
editions or versions of the work exist. 
 
This multiple existence of the work troubles Adrian Searle, who makes brave, 
if rather equivocal attempt at formal analysis, and throws up the questions 
about the identity of the piece in its different stagings: 
 
Martin Creed's single work at Tate Britain, Work Number 227: The 
Lights Going On and Off (it is exactly as the title describes it), is 
dated 2000, but is actually no different in concept from a work of 
the same title, designated Work Number 127, that was first 
presented at the Cubitt Gallery in London in 1995. 
Or is it different? Up in the middle of each truncated pyramid 
skylight are fluorescent strips hidden behind translucent sheets. 
Around the edge of these cowls are lighting tracks holding six 
spotlights per unit. The spotlights come on - suddenly. The hidden 
fluorescents power up a nanosecond later. It's bright for a bit, then 
the lights go off in a fast, even fade - an effect achieved through 
pure electromechanics rather than the artist's tinkering. You think 
about the semi-darkness for a bit, then the lights come on again. 
Creed's work is different every time it is shown, in each new venue, 
each with its own lighting fixtures and conditions. But do we care? It 
gives a critic sleepless nights.237 
 
The question of what aspects of the work merited the critic’s attention may 
have been the cause of Searle’s insomnia.  It is not clear to Searle himself 
whether or not his detailed description of the way that the spotlights and 
fluorescent tubes power up and fade out is actually relevant to an analysis of 
the work, or whether the details he describes are as they are for merely 
fortuitous reasons.  Charlotte Mullins, the former editor of Art Review also 
expresses unease about the artist’s recycling of a previous work in her review 
of the exhibition in The Independent: 
 
Creed's work at Tate Britain, Work #227: the lights going on and 
off, was first made for an artist-run alternative gallery space six 
years ago, and has since been recreated in a commercial New 
237 Searle November 2001 
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York gallery, and now Tate Britain. That's how Creed works – he 
has the idea, numbers it, then adds it to his repertoire.238 
 
The numbered titles draw the reviewers’ attention to another category in which 
we can place Work #227: the lights going on and off.  The prefix is an 
indication and a reminder that this piece falls into the larger body of work that 
is comprised of all the numbered pieces on Creed’s list.  These pieces have 
characteristics in common; for example, their titles tend to be a more or less 
complete description of the work as in the case of Work No. 79, Some Blu-
Tack kneaded, rolled into a ball, and depressed against a wall, (1993) and 
Work No. 88 A sheet of A4 paper crumpled into a ball (1995).  It is also true 
that these pieces are artworks that can be reproduced by the artist relatively 
easily by acting out the instruction that gives the work its title.  We will 
consider again this aspect of the work, and its reproducibility in different 
environments, when we look at how the commentators discuss the work within 
the context of installation art.  
 
Coles locates Creed’s particular strain of conceptual art as one which is 
informed by influences that have come from outside what he regards as a 
parochial British scene: 
 
Creed (a London-based artist) feasts on the tactics from a global 
banquet of conceptual practices besides those particular to the 
British fold. By making the audience aware of his discrimination, he 
in turn obliquely reminds them of the different standards of work 
produced by the reception of the respective strands of conceptual 
art.239  
 
Several reviewers relate the piece, and Creed’s work in general, to one 
particular strand of conceptual art, that of the Arte Povera movement.  The 
movement, which formed in the late 1960s around the Italian critic and curator 
Germano Celant, is a form of conceptualism whose practice involves the use 
of everyday materials rather than those connected with traditional art practice, 
often using cheap, foraged or discarded material to construct artworks. In Ned 
Denny’s review, a direct antecedent to the Creed’s piece is cited. In 1966 
238 Mullins 2001 
239 Coles 2000 
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Alighiero Boetti, an artist connected with Arte Povera, created Yearly Lamp, 
which is set to light up briefly only once every year.  
 
Charlotte Mullins also cites Yearly Lamp in her review, but she goes on to 
make the wider connection between Creed’s work and Arte Povera: 
 
Creed has a lot in common with Boetti and his fellow Arte Povera 
artists: a knowing wit, an interest in common materials, a 
subversion of Minimalism, a leaning towards subtle intervention 
rather than sensational statement.240 
 
Mullins points to the Arte Povera artists’ use of cheap everyday materials, 
which is indeed a feature of their practice that is shared by Creed, as 
evidenced by his work with paper and Blu-tak.  Mullins also talks about a 
‘subversion of minimalism’, implying that, although Creed’s work is extremely 
minimalistic in its means, it is not in sympathy with the minimalist project.  This 
interpretation is compatible with the contextual framework she has referenced; 
the Arte Povera movement was to a great extent seen as a reaction to (and a 
critique of) the aesthetic of minimalism that then dominated the contemporary 
art scene, particularly in the United States.  
 
There is an aspect of the cultural critique offered by Arte Povera that 
reviewers also connect with Creed: its tendency to act as an irritant in 
disrupting and challenging the art institutions in which the work is exhibited.  
Coles had reviewed Creed’s show four years earlier and he emphasised this 
agenda of disruption and irritancy, which he identifies as being at work in a 
precursor to Work #227: the lights going on and off: 
 
The equally intrusive Work No. 160, 1996, included in the recent 
"Life/Live" exhibition at the Musée d'Art Moderne de la Ville de 
Paris, consists of a light turning on and off at 30-second intervals (a 
tactic once used by the Surrealists). Creed thus addresses both 
viewer and artist, in effect stating that if they refuse to question the 
legitimating function of the gallery and continue to produce/receive 
neutral "content," then he will either disrupt the conventions 
determining the hanging of exhibitions, or impede disinterested 
240 Mullins 2001 
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participation by literally blocking the works' visibility. 241 
 
As well as referencing the disruptive tactics of the Surrealist movement, Coles 
cites two politically radical cultural critics as relevant ideological context:  
 
Creed clearly sympathizes with a long line of practitioners who 
have attempted to deconstruct the notion of hierarchy in philosophy 
and the arts. A sort of illegitimate godchild of Walter Benjamin and 
architect Bernard Tschumi, the artist carries out dissemination at 
the level of practical effects, through occlusion, outgrowths, and 
irritancy.242 
 
Anne Colin’s review also identifies this element of questioning institutional 
structures as an aim of Work #227: the lights going on and off, although she 
does not think that Creed has achieved his objective:  
 
Creed's art is about redefining the space of the museum, and 
thereby raising the question of authorial ownership and the artistic 
value of the banal. … A would-be radical challenge to the art 
space, then. Would-be but not really. Once again, the Turner Prize 
has failed in its mission. 243 
 
Searle agrees that, if the work is to be judged solely on the basis of the 
challenge it offers to the Tate as an institution, Work #227: the lights going on 
and off fails to deliver in that respect: 
 
This is not so much a radical gesture as one of those artworks 
which institutions tend to love. Rather than "challenging" the 
institution, this piece reaffirms the museum's self-image as 
courtesan and midwife to the supposedly radical gesture. And there 
is nothing terribly radical about it. Works like this have a long 
history, an impeccable pedigree going back a century.244 
 
There are clearly disagreements between reviewer as to the success or 
otherwise of the installation as a piece of conceptual art.  In placing Creed’s 
work in the context of conceptual art, but more precisely in the context of 
Arte Povera, the reviewers provide a framework within which Work #227: 
241 Coles 1997 
242 Coles 1997 
243 Colin, March 2002 
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the lights going on and off can be read as a politically engaged work that 
seeks to mount a critique of the art world from within the walls of one of its 
leading institutions.  In doing so, they provide a basis upon which the 
success or otherwise of the work can be discussed.  However, reviews also 
referenced Creed’s work in the context of Minimalism, an art movement 
that, on the face of it, has very little in common aesthetically or ideologically 
with Arte Povera.  Minimalist artworks typically refuse all attempts to 
connect them with anything beyond the object itself and the space in which 
it is installed.  Minimalism can be seen as an attempt to achieve purely 
abstract form; the minimalist artwork does not seek to represent any 
subject.  The viewer’s attention is directed towards the material reality of the 
object itself, rather than towards any external reality, physical or social. 
 
Coles, however, sees conceptual art, not in opposition to minimalism, but as 
the next stage in a coherent line of progression from high modernism: 
 
The increasing shift of modern critical thought from "work to 
frame"—from the work of art as an inner discipline (Modernist art), 
to an engagement with the architecture that frames that discipline 
in museums and galleries (Minimal art), to an interrogation of the 
legitimating ideological framework of all such institutions 
(Conceptual art)—is a remarkably logical one..245 
 
Although Charlotte Mullins described Work #227: the lights going on and off 
as a subversion of minimalism, others have placed the work in a less 
ambiguous relationship with the Minimalism.  Sophia Phoca describes the 
installation as ‘solipsistically minimalist’.246  The New York Museum of Modern 
Art, which owns an edition of the work, compares it to the silent sound piece 
4'33" by minimalist composer John Cage.  
 
Daniel Barnes provides an art historical parallel, making a comparison 
between Creed and Michael Craig-Martin.  This comparison throws up some 
interesting parallels.  Craig-Martin is an artist whose work is usually classified 
as conceptual.  He is best known for his 1973 piece An Oak Tree, which 
245 Coles 1997 
246 Phoca 2002 
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consists of a glass of water on a high glass bathroom shelf.  The work, like 
many works of Arte Povera is constructed out of out of everyday objects, but 
its simple stripped down geometrical forms give it some of the qualities we 
would expect to see in a minimalist piece.  Barnes argues that the impact of 
An Oak Tree lay in it providing a stark contrast to the art of ‘bold statements 
and brash interrogations of artistic materiality’ that were dominant at the time.  
Barnes evaluation of Work #227: the lights going on and off as ‘the first truly 
great artwork of the twenty-first century’ is made on the basis of arguing that 
the austerity of means that characterised the work acted as a corrective to the 
excesses of late twentieth century art, in the same way that An Oak Tree 
acted as a rebuke to the excesses of the nineteen sixties:   
 
If Hirst and Emin shocked in the way that, say, Warhol did with bold 
statements and brash interrogations of artistic materiality, then 
Creed shocked as Michael Craig-Martin did with An Oak Tree– with 
minimalism. 
 
Minimalism was, of course, not (at that time) new; it had an 
illustrious precedent in art from Malevitch and Mondrian through to 
Carl Andre and Donald Judd, not to mention in the architecture of 
Le Corbusier and the Bauhaus. In 2001, timing was key to the 
effect, since the artworld was flooded with outrageous work, so 
Creed surprised us with much less than we had come to expect 
from our contemporary artists.247 
 
Whether or not he considers Creed a minimalist artist, Barnes regards Work 
#227: the lights going on and off as a minimalist statement.  He comments 
that,  ‘Creed proves that subtlety and simplicity are the keys to creating art 
that inspires primal delight in our experience of the dreary world.’  Searle 
agreed that the key to Creed’s success was due in part to the timeliness of the 
statement made by Work #227: the lights going on and off, but he argues that 
timeliness is not enough to guarantee a work’s enduring value: 
 
Creed's Lights Going On and Off will be remembered as much for 
winning as for its particular qualities, its time and place. A greater 
richness has to do with works slipping out of their time and 
circumstances, and having a longer, more complicated life. That is 
247 Barnes 2011 
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really how much time a work takes, otherwise it is nothing more 
than a footnote to the radical gesture.  
 
Moreover Searle is not convinced by the minimalist brevity of Creed’s 
statement.  While the Tate’s Turner Prize catalogue said of Creed’s 
installation, ‘the economy of means of Work No. 227 exemplifies Creed’s 
attempts to make work with minimal physical intervention,’248 when Searle 
returned to the piece after the prize was awarded to Creed, his review 
includes an implied critique: 
 
Doing the minimum possible to achieve the desired result is 
frequently regarded as a sign of clarity of thought - economy 
equals elegance, and simplicity virtue. We also crave complexity. 
Richness, of course, is not necessarily at odds with simplicity.249 
 
For Searle, the extreme minimalism of Work #227: the lights going on and off 
fails to satisfy that desire for richness and complexity.  But the stark simplicity 
of the work did provide another institutional challenge; that is a challenge to 
the process in which the institution describes and presents its exhibits to the 
public.  The installation is shorn of any of the kind of formal features that 
would give purchase to curatorial description.  The Turner Prize 2000 
Exhibition notes describe the work thus: ‘In exploiting the existing light fittings 
of the gallery space, Creed creates a new and unexpected effect.’250  If 
describing the action of lights turning off and on as a new and unexpected 
effect seems a little extravagant, it is surpassed by the New York Museum of 
Modern Art catalogue description of their edition of the piece: 
 
Creed controls the fundamental conditions of visibility within the 
gallery and redirects our attention to the walls that normally act as 
support and background for art objects. He treats the gallery as a 
medium to be molded, manipulating the existing lighting to create a 
new effect.251 
 
It is possible to sympathise with those whose job it was to provide a 
gloss for Creed’s work, but it is also possible at the same time to 
248 Turner Prize Catalogue 2001 
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sympathise with Matthew Collings’ complaint about the ‘sales-hype’ 
language of some museum information cards and exhibition catalogues.  
Collings renewed his attack on the Tate’s curatorial language in his 
coverage of the Turner Prize that year saying that it was, ‘absolutely 
impossible for someone untrained to read the voodoo aura stuff, or write 
the vacuous prose they put in the press release’.252 
 
However, the language used in the Museum of Modern Art catalogue 
description also emphasizes the use of the gallery as a medium, the use of 
the existing light fittings and the directing of the viewer’s attention to the site in 
which it is installed.  The catalogue also refers to the work as an installation.  
The term installation has expectations attached to it that go beyond simply 
being a description of the medium, as the Museum’s website description of 
installation art reveals: 
 
The everyday meaning of installation refers to the hanging of 
pictures or the arrangement of objects in an exhibition. The less 
generic, more recent meaning of installation is a site-specific 
artwork. In this sense, the installation is created especially for a 
particular gallery space or outdoor site, and it comprises not just a 
group of discrete art objects to be viewed as individual works but 
an entire ensemble or environment. Installations provide viewers 
with the experience of being surrounded by art, as in a mural-
decorated public space or an art-enriched cathedral. 
 
Considered within the category of installation art, Work #227: the lights going 
on and off sets up an expectation on the part of the reviewers of some 
element of site-specificity in the work.  Charlotte Mullins read the piece as 
being about the physical space and the consciousness of the viewer: ‘It's 
designed to make you question the space you stand in and to be aware of 
yourself in the room.’253  When the jury awarded the Prize to Creed they 
praised the work’s, ‘sensitivity to the site’254. 
 
252 Collings November 2001 
253 Mullins December 2001 
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However several reviewers were sceptical about how site-specific, or even 
site-sensitive the installation actually was.  After the Prize was announced 
Adrian Searle again noted that the piece had effectively been run before and 
suggested that the staging in the Tate worked less well than the original 
location. 
 
Even people who don't much like Martin Creed's contribution to this 
year's Turner Prize will remember the frustrating enigma of 
standing in an otherwise empty space with the lights going on and 
off. They will recall being there. This, surely, is one of art's jobs: to 
make us aware of where we are, where we have been. But in the 
context of the Turner Prize , it only works theatrically its resonances 
are reduced in Tate Britain. The enigma, if you like, becomes a 
gag.  
 
…This was my biggest doubt about Creed's decision to show this 
variant of a piece he first made at Cubitt Gallery in London in 1995. 
Here, as with so much art of the past century, context is everything. 
Standing in a darkened basement in King's Cross is rather different 
from being plunged into darkness at Tate Britain.255 
 
The phrase ‘plunged into darkness’ echoes exactly the words of the exhibition 
notes, but Charlotte Mullins felt that even that phrase overstated the case: 
 
The problem is, it just doesn't work. The gallery is, in part, naturally 
lit, so unless you arrive at night, the effect is not that dramatic. The 
gallery is in the centre of the show, so it operates more like a giant 
corridor between one work and the next rather than a work in its 
own right.256 
 
Searle’s disappointment is heightened by the fact that when the nominees 
were first announced in May, he had welcomed Creed’s inclusion on the list, 
describing his work as ‘oddly moving and disarming’.257  Reviewing the 
shortlist exhibition in November, Searle pondered the artist’s reason for 
choosing to exhibit this particular work, and speculated, ‘maybe Creed 
believes that this is a rigorous and brave thing to have done: getting back to a 
kind of stripped-down statement.’258  When the jury awarded Creed the Prize 
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the following month it seemed that, if Searle was right about what motivated 
the artist’s choice of work, then it had paid off.  Giving the jury’s reasons for 
choosing Creed, the Tate press release said that they ‘admired his audacity in 
presenting a single work in the exhibition’.259 
 
In questioning the reason for Creed’s choice of submission, Searle points to 
another significant category within which Work #227: the lights going on and 
off could be placed; it was a Turner Prize artwork.  In fact when the Prize was 
awarded to Creed, Searle conceded, ‘You might say this work is also a 
consummate Turner prize artwork, in its play on the sense of expectation.’260  
The expectations of the audience, the critics and the jury may have been of 
work that was less obscure and had more general appeal.  Phoca points out 
that Martin Creed was actually selected out of the list of artists put forward by 
the general public.  That nomination followed in the wake of Creed’s very 
popular publicly commissioned piece Work No.203: EVERYTHING IS GOING 
TO BE ALRIGHT which consisted of the words ‘EVERYTHING IS GOING TO 
BE ALRIGHT’ (all upper case) spelled out in large neon letters.  The neon 
sign was temporarily installed on the portico of a disused Georgian public 
building in Hackney, East London in 1999. 
 
However, as Lynn Barber discovered during her stint as juror, the way that the 
Prize is judged creates some ambiguity about the relationship between the 
exhibitions mounted by the shortlisted artist, and the decision of the jury: 
 
… the shows the jurors nominate are not the same shows the 
public sees at the Tate. The four shortlisted artists have to cobble 
together a new show (rather quickly) for the Tate, and some 
produce a good show and some don't. This is not supposed to 
influence the judges but it would be odd if it didn't. Many insiders 
believe that the reason the Chapman Brothers lost to Grayson 
Perry in 2003 was because their Tate show was disappointing. On 
the other hand, the public inevitably only judge the artists by the 
shows they put on at the Tate and are rightly baffled when, say, 
Martin Creed's light bulb walks away with the prize.261 
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Barber sees Creed as a case in which the artist was awarded the Prize 
despite his shortlist exhibition, not because of it.  Virginia Button noted that 
there was a mixed reaction to the choice of work: 
For those opposed to conceptual art, it provided a classic example 
of the emperor’s new clothes, while many supporters of the artist 
felt it was the wrong work to show in a Turner Prize exhibition.262 
 
Searle was one of those who expressed his disappointment at what he sees 
as a wrongheaded selection for the Turner Prize exhibition, describing 
Creed’s installation as ‘a singularly ungenerous use of an opportunity’.263  It is 
clear from her review that Charlotte Mullins, although far from being an 
opponent of conceptual art, was nevertheless one of those whose thoughts 
turned to the story of the emperor’s new clothes: 
 
Earlier this year, in these pages, I described Martin Creed as being 
the emperor from the emperor's new clothes, riding through the 
streets of the art world, parading his works of art made from next-
to-nothing. In the past few months, however, I have been forced to 
revise my opinion of him. For in reality, he's not the Emperor, but 
the Emperor's tailor, making works of nothingness and convincing 
others – curators, directors, writers – that they are the future of art. 
264 
 
So Creed’s choice of work was a controversial one and there are 
different interpretations of that choice implied in the reviews.  Searle 
wonders if it was sheer audacity on the part of the artist.  When Creed 
carried off the Prize, Searle offered some grudging admiration of the 
tactic: 
 
"I could have done that," may be a typical response to Creed's 
work…..The only response to "I could have done that" is "But you 
didn't". Did you have the gall, the nous, the ambition, the cheek? 
 
For Mullins, Creed’s installation confirmed her suspicion that Creed is in 
some sense an artistic charlatan.  This was not for her an example of the 
cheeky artist taking advantage of a public platform to thumb his nose at 
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a great institution, rather it was Creed seducing and bamboozling that 
institution into seeing a work of art that was not really there. 
 
Barnes however sees the choice as a timely one, providing a corrective 
response to the kind of art that had dominated Turner Prize exhibitions in the 
preceding years.  His review casts contemporary art as a kind of conversation 
within which Work #227: the lights going on and off stands as a statement.  
The metaphor of conversation carries through into language that is auditory 
rather than visual.  He describes the installation as a, ‘quiet, understated work 
that does not shout or scream’ and regrets the fact that in his view, ‘Creed 
does not, in short, shout loudly enough, so his voice gets lost in the crowd’. 
He describes the work as, ‘an antidote to the poisonous noise of 
contemporary art’265.  Barnes’ review places Creed’s installation in the specific 
category of contemporary British art and identifies those features of the work 
that run counter to prevailing fashion as the reason for its excellence.  He 
uses the metaphor of conversation to underline aspects of Work #227: the 
lights going on and off, that, in his view, represents a critique of the artistic 
tendencies that were dominant at that point in time. 
 
If Barnes is right in characterizing Work #227: the lights going on and off as a 
statement, then that raises the two part question of what kind of statement it 
could be and what it is saying.  There seems to be some agreement between 
commentators on aspects of the first part of the question, or at least on what 
tone or register the work adopts.  The term that crops up most frequently is 
wit. 
 
The Museum of Modern Art says of the piece, ‘Creed's witty, sensorial work 
subverts the normal spatial and temporal parameters of viewing 
experience’266.  The Turner Prize jury praised it for its wit.  Sophia Phoca says 
of the piece, ‘The ‘so-what’ effect is witty and refreshingly un-ironic.’267  Even 
those less than convinced by Creed’s piece seem to concede that quality to 
265 Barnes 2011 
266 MOMA 
267 Phoca 2001 
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the piece: Charlotte Mullins described it as possessing, ‘a knowing wit’.268  
That description of a positive quality acknowledged by a number of writers 
raises a further question, because wit is a quality that cannot exist without a 
subject; one cannot simply be witty one must be witty about something.  The 
adjective witty takes us back to the observation that the language Barnes 
uses to characterise the work is the kind of language that is more likely to be 
used to describe a contribution to a conversation rather than an object in a 
room. So, if Work #227: the lights going on and off is witty, as most 
commentators seem to agree, what is it witty about? 
 
For Mullins, that answer is straightforward; the artist is a trickster whose wit is 
literally at the expense of the art world institutions who are willing to buy his 
empty room.  But for the other commentators it is not quite so easy a matter to 
define the object of Creed’s wit.  Phoca describes the work as witty, and also 
‘un-ironic’; this again is a term that seems to demand that there is a subject.  
But, although Phoca is happy to note the wit and lack of irony in Work #227: 
the lights going on and off, when she begins to discuss what the work is 
about, she is far from certain: 
 
this piece collapses in on itself in an endless series of negations. 
All expectations placed on the work are undermined. While some 
critics invested the work with insights into the role of art, its 
boundaries and its relationships with daily life, it could so easily 
be read as all that and a lot more – and also negate it all.269 
 
When Searle discussed what the piece might be saying, he seemed to be 
weary of the efforts to interpret the piece: 
 
You could say that this work has something to say about the 
visibility of the artwork, about presence and absence (and about 
something and nothing) - that there is no light without shadows. 
But I would much rather you didn't say anything remotely like 
that.270 
 
268 Mullins 2001 
269 Phoca 2002 
270 Searle November 2001 
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The idea that the piece might be in some way self-negating, or might be 
signifying self-negation is a feature of a number of reviews.  In the Times, 
Rachel Campbell-Johnson also noted the piece’s resistance to stable 
interpretation, saying that, ‘his flickering Installation may mean everything or it 
may mean nothing.’271  
 
One of the possible answers to the question is indeed that Work #227: the 
lights going on and off is in fact meaningless.  There is little in the way of clues 
to the meaning of this specific work to be found in the comments of the artist 
himself.  However, several reviewers look for the significance of the work by 
placing it in the context of Creed’s overall body of work, whose significance is 
indicated by the presence of the prefix in its title.  Jonathan Jones sees this as 
the vital context: 
 
Is this numbering some quest for order, some attempt to give his 
art the qualities of a musical score? Perhaps, but what it really does 
is absolve him from defining his art or even calling it "art": what he 
has created is a special category of things in the world created by 
Martin Creed. What connects them is him, and that makes his 
entire output an epic act of slow, subtle confession. 272 
 
Jones argues that Creed’s work is widely misunderstood, ‘often either 
dismissed as empty gestures or praised with big cold words like Minimalism’.  
In contrast, he characterises Creed’s body of work as a kind of 
autobiographical project, a chronological, non-hierarchical list that simply 
documents what Creed was thinking about at the point when each work was 
added.  For Jones, the meaning of the work is only baffling when viewed in 
isolation, viewed as a moment in his larger body of work it connects with 
universal human concerns: 
 
The experience is both moving and self-conscious: thought-
provoking and boring. You can't help feeling a bit like a caricature 
of a modern art lover, standing there appreciating … nothing. Other 
visitors poke their heads round the door, decide it's an empty room 
and head off for the Rossettis. Yet it's a simple universal metaphor. 
The secret of Creed's art is that it speaks of ordinary things like 
271 Campbell-Johnson  December 2001 
272 Jones January 2014 
153
love and loss. When someone dies the lights go off. That's what it's 
like.273 
 
So Jones’ argument suggests that Work #227: the lights going on and off 
could be seen not as a single statement, but more as a clause within the 
longer statement formed by the totality of the works on Creed’s list.  Other 
reviewers also find relationships between items on Creed’s inventory.  Ian 
McMillan mentions Creed’s Work # 161: the exclamation 'oh no' which 
consists of the words 'oh no' being exclaimed.  McMillan, relating it to another 
item on Creed’s list asks, ‘Is this the sigh after the cheer of Everything Is 
Going To be Alright?’274 
 
Work # 16: the exclamation 'oh no'  underlines the ambiguity involved in 
thinking of Creed’s work as embodying any kind of statement.  Unlike Work 
#227: the lights going on and off, it involves the use of words, indeed it entirely 
consists of words.  But the words ‘oh no’ resist any stable meaning.  In fact, 
they (no doubt fortuitously) echo the phrase ‘oh ah’ cited by the logical 
positivist Rudolf Carnap275 as an example of non-linguistic words that were 
mere expressive noise-making. 
 
Reviewers made use of Creed’s other text based works as reference points to 
the significance of Work #227: the lights going on and off.  Welcoming Creed’s 
nomination when the Turner Prize shortlist was announced, Searle made 
reference to two of the artist’s most well-known and popular neon text-based 
pieces:  
 
'Everything is going to be alright', it said, a blue neon enjoinder to 
keep your chin up in a grim corner of the East End. He also had a 
work emblazoned across the frontage of Tate Britain: 'The whole 
world + the work = the whole world'.276 
 
Searle’s second example Work # 143: the whole world + the work = the whole 
world was referred to in a number of articles and by a number of reviewers, 
273 Jones January 2014 
274 MacMillan 2000 
275 quoted in Langer 1942 
276 Searle May 2001 
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not only because it was one of Creed’s best known pieces, but also because it 
seems to offer some indication of creed’s artistic objectives.  McMillan takes 
the text to be a manifesto for the work that Creed produces: 
Creed has talked often of wanting to make us, as viewers, aware of 
the world around us and of using his work to draw attention to it. At 
the same time he wants to add to the world only what is necessary 
to achieve this effect. It's like a schematic game in which the more 
he can achieve by the littlest of means the purer the result, and it's 
embodied in the manifesto-like wall text of Work # 143: the whole 
world + the work = the whole world.277 
 
However, if the Work # 143: the whole world + the work = the whole world is a 
manifesto, then it is an ambiguous one that presents an apparent paradox, 
not only by ostensibly arguing that A + B = A, but by announcing its own 
insignificance in foot-high neon writing installed on the front of the Tate 
museum.  
 
McMillan identifies the economy of means in Creed’s work as a significant 
feature and Work # 143 as the artist’s statement of intent to create art while 
adding as little as possible to the world.  Several reviewers connect that 
agenda to Work #227: the lights going on and off.  It is an artwork without any 
physical presence at all; the viewer sees nothing but an empty room.  Nothing 
has been added to the gallery space and in one sense something is 
periodically taken away, the normal lighting conditions of the museum.  The 
only material presence contained within the artwork is the electronic timer 
controlling the lighting, and that is hidden from the viewer. 
 
The ambiguity of the statement embodied in Work # 143: the whole world + 
the work = the whole world, leads to different reviewers taking slightly different 
slants on Creed’s artistic aims.  It is possible to solve Creed’s equation in this 
way: if the whole world + the work = the whole world, then the work = 0.  But 
equally it is possible to read it as saying that the world on one side of the 
equation and the world on the other side are not the same, once the work 
exists as part of the whole world then the world is changed by the existence of 
the work.  Like a Zen koan the statement simultaneously suggests two 
277 MacMillan 2000 
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opposite meanings; that art adds nothing to the world and that the creation of 
the artwork changes the world by virtue of being an integral part of it.  Barnes 
argues that Work #227: the lights going on and off is successful in provoking 
the viewer into thinking differently not only about art but about whole world: 
 
Sometimes art leads us to look at things differently, but most of the 
time – in Western art, at least – it only really makes us look at art 
differently by challenging us to think about what art is and what its 
value is. Creed, however, produces art that enables us to look at 
the world differently by offering works that are fully integrated with 
the world.278 
 
The critical responses to Work #227: the lights going on and off are very 
varied in terms of both evaluation and interpretation.  Different critics referred 
to different contextual frameworks in order to try to make sense of the piece, 
or to explain it, but it was generally regarded as an example of conceptual art.  
However, viewing the piece within each of the different categories highlighted 
different aspects of the work.  The conceptual art category invites us to 
consider it in terms of the ideological agenda of Arte Povera.  Placing it within 
the category of minimalist art highlights its self-referential nature, what Phoca 
refers to as its solipsistic quality.  Jones places Work #227: the lights going on 
and off within the category implied in the title, the sum total of Creed’s 
numbered artworks. In doing so he invites us to consider the piece as one 
statement in a longer discourse on art and its relationship with the rest of the 
world.  Other critics saw the piece in the category of Turner Prize artworks 
and, as such, a witty comment, perhaps even a joke, at the expense of the 
Tate, confronting the jury with an empty room and daring them to not award 
him the Prize.  Even though it contains no physical object, Creed’s empty 
room is crowded with categories and contexts. 
 
Critics whose normal practice is to refer in their reviews to the formal 
characteristics of the work that they are reviewing found that the usual 
language of art criticism, the language of the object, its properties and its 
form, was not an appropriate vehicle.  The language that they instead turn to 
278 Barnes 2011 
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is the kind of language that we more often use about an utterance; the piece 
was quiet and witty or it blew a vulgar raspberry.  Coles talks about the piece 
addressing the viewer, several reviewers talk about it as a challenge, Jones 
describes it as a confession.  For Barnes the work is a statement, one that 
seeks to refute the statements that have come before it, and even Searle, 
despite his doubts about the work’s lasting value, agrees that whatever value 
it has, comes it being a timely from intervention.  
 
In the case of Work #227: the lights going on and off, the idea that critics 
might arrive at their evaluative judgements by measuring its properties against 
a set of generic criteria is far-fetched.  That is not how critics judged the work.  
The language of their reviews suggest that, rather than discussing Creed’s 
installation as if it were being judged against a strict set of rules, they 
discussed it as one would discuss a contribution to a conversation.  A 
conversation has rules of a sort: we expect that contributions will be relevant 
and of interest.  But those quasi-rules are set by those who are themselves 
involved in the conversation.  Viewed in that light, Creed’s contribution to that 
conversation was a gnomic one and different critics interpreted it in very 
different ways.  Some saw it as a profound comment, some as a witty remark 
and some as a puerile joke, but each of the reviewers based their evaluations 
on the perceived quality of Creed’s contribution to that wider conversation. 
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7.  Ideal Critics and the Uses of Reason.  
 
Carroll and Sibley each in their own way describe the ideal critic.  In the 
reviews of Turner Prize exhibitions, we can see art criticism as it is actually 
practised in our own time.  Sibley would recognize the way in which the critics 
make use of metaphor to draw attention to the aesthetic qualities they 
perceive in the work.  Carroll would approve of one characteristic: the critics 
put evaluation at the heart of what they do.  But to what extent would he be 
satisfied that, when giving their evaluations, the critics have arrived at them by 
exercising their reason and are not simply airing their personal preferences? 
 
In On Criticism, Carroll set himself the challenge of establishing evaluation as 
the central purpose of criticism.  As part of that mission he sought to counter 
the argument of those who would downgrade the importance of evaluations 
on the grounds that they are merely expressions of personal preference.  His 
means of doing so was to argue that genre-based criteria could be applied in 
the evaluation of artworks, so enabling him to claim that art criticism is an 
activity rooted in the use of reason.  For Carroll, the ideal critic is one who can 
support her evaluations with reasoning that is objectively verifiable.  Carroll 
makes a good case for the centrality of critical evaluation but, regarding his 
secondary argument, I have pointed out a number of difficulties that I will 
summarise here. 
 
Classifying Art 
 
One problem is his concept of genre.  I have argued that Carroll’s notion of 
genre is somewhat like a dog show, in which different breeds are entered into 
different classes of competition and are judged according to the criteria of the 
appropriate class.  Just as it would be wrong to apply the same artistic criteria 
to both a Dutch still life and a horror movie, so it would be wrong to judge a 
Jack Russell by the standards appropriate for a Great Dane.    
 
There are several problems attached to this kind of approach.  The first is the 
inflexibility of this model; there seems to be no reason why the rules of the 
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genre should ever change, why new genres should come into existence.  If 
professional artistic success is dependent on working to meet the 
expectations of a genre, then it is surprising that artists do not put more time 
and effort into gaining expertise within that genre than they do.  Instead, many 
seem to be trying to resist the generic classifications that would be their only 
sure way of establishing the value of their work.  
 
The second problem is whether or not the different classes in the dog show 
have criteria that judges can actually use to measure the dogs against.  For 
Carroll’s argument, a crucial question is how narrowly or broadly we define the 
term genre.  It might be argued that I am doing an injustice to Carroll’s 
argument by comparing his concept of genre to classes in a dog show.  It is 
true that, in Carroll’s argument, genre is not always so narrowly defined.  His 
generic classifications appear to cover a very wide range of ways of grouping 
artworks, from true genres to art movements, styles and periods.  Examples 
he gives of generic classifications include contemporary dance, religious 
painting, still life, cubism, satire, film-noir, costume drama, horror film and 
comedy.  While some of these classifications come complete with well-defined 
sets of conventions, others do not.  Correctly classifying two works of art as 
divergent as J M W Turner’s The Grand Canal, Venice (1835) and Chris Ofili’s 
Afro Sunrise (2003) as landscape paintings might throw up some interesting 
comparisons, but it does not help to generate any obviously useful critical 
principles by which they might both be evaluated. 
 
Martin Creed’s Work No.227 The Lights Going On and Off and Simon 
Starling’s Shedboatshed were both identified by many critics as examples of 
conceptual art, as they share one of the standard features of conceptualism, 
the privileging of concept over form.  Furthermore, some critics narrowed 
down their contextual classification of both Creed and Starling, noting that 
they share the Arte Povera characteristic of rejecting the use of traditional art 
materials.  But beyond that, Work No.227 The Lights Going On and Off and 
Shedboatshed have little in common.  In the case of Shedboatshed, the critics 
saw a large physical object that had been shaped by the artist’s hand.  They 
were provided with the back-story and were thereby able to make clear 
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interpretations of the work and to discuss what it was saying about mass 
production, consumer culture, the environment and so on.  In the case of 
Creed’s installation, none of that was true; the critics saw no object, no touch 
of the artist’s hand, no back-story or explanatory text. Many found the piece to 
be enigmatic or self-negating.  The mere fact that these pieces are classified 
as conceptual art or Arte Povera would not offer any obvious guidelines for 
judging whether Starling’s work is better than Creed’s or vice versa. 
 
That brings us to the third problem, which is that, when we start to apply the 
dog show model to contemporary art, there seem to be a lot of happy 
mongrels who do not to want to compete in any of the established classes.  
Carroll recognizes that some work may fall in multiple classifications, but 
implies that it is the exception rather than the rule and paints it as a useful, 
interesting and bracing challenge for the critic.  He also acknowledges the 
special problems in classifying contemporary and avant-garde art, but argues 
that those initial classification issues are to be expected as a natural part of a 
cyclical process of change and development.  However, I would argue that 
one test of a theory of art criticism is that it should provide some tools that are 
useful in the practice of art criticism.  A model of critical evaluation that is not 
useful for evaluating current practice is inadequate with respect to the needs, 
not only of reviewers of the Turner Prize, but also of most critics in all fields of 
the arts.  It is the nature of the critic’s role to engage with the works of her own 
age, no matter what discipline is their specialty.  Also, I would question the 
novelty of the kinds of contemporary work that are problematic for Carroll’s 
system of generic evaluation.  Nearly a century after Duchamp’s Fountain, we 
still do not, as Jonathan Jones pointed out, have a set of criteria that explains 
why one ready-made is better than another. 
 
In addition to these three areas of difficulty, where, in general, the issue puts 
into question the usefulness of Carroll’s approach, there is also reason to 
doubt Carroll’s claim that, by applying genre specific criteria, it is possible to 
make deductions about the quality of an artwork merely from the objectively 
verifiable presence of some particular element. 
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But, as Sibley points out, we cannot infer aesthetic qualities from non-
aesthetic properties; there can always be a counter example and insisting on 
genre specific criteria does not overcome that objection.  However, suppose 
we were to moderate Carroll’s claim in order to overcome that objection.  
Rather than claiming that (within the context of a genre) we can infer aesthetic 
qualities in an artwork from its non-aesthetic properties, we might argue that it 
is possible to infer the positive effect within an artwork of certain positive 
aesthetic properties.  
 
Even this more limited claim is not supportable however.  If we notice that 
critics agree that life and movement is a positive feature of the paintings of 
Tomma Abts, then we might try to generalize that observation and infer that 
life and movement is always a positive feature of artworks in general.  Having 
seen that there are counter examples (we have pointed out Anthony Gormley 
as evidence to the contrary), we might retreat to a genre-specific claim, that 
life and movement are positive features of abstract painting, and in that case it 
might be very much more difficult (but not impossible) to find counter 
examples.  However, even if we were to drastically narrow the classification 
down to ‘the paintings of Tomma Abts’ there would still be a problem.  It might 
well be that we can show that every Tomma Abts painting in existence 
benefits from life and movement as positive features, but we cannot 
guarantee that at some point in the future, next week, next month or next 
year, she might not produce a painting whose positive aesthetic qualities were 
silence and stillness and in which any sense of movement or life would be a 
negative factor. 
 
One of the reasons that the formula Carroll proposes fails to solve the 
problem is that he neglects the importance of meaning.  If artwork of a 
particular kind is generally made better by feature F, then, for Carroll, the only 
important question is the presence or absence of good-making feature F in 
that kind of artwork.  He is not concerned with what F might signify, or its 
relationship to other elements and features of the artwork.  But, without 
knowing the significance of F within the context of the work as a whole, we 
cannot know whether F contributes positively to the piece.  If McQueen’s 
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slapstick stunt in Deadpan were simply edited into a slapstick comedy film, it 
would not be a positive addition.  
 
I have suggested that Kendall Walton’s idea of categories of art has more 
potential value in the evaluation of artworks than Carroll’s notion of genres.  
Walton’s approach recognises that all artworks exist in multiple categories.  
Some of these categories are what we might call categories of ignorance.  As 
we become more knowledgeable about a category and experience more work 
that falls within it, we are more able to appreciate it.  Walton uses the example 
of Chinese music or serialist composition that, until we have gained 
experience of the category, may sound like a baffling noise.  We gain a richer 
understanding of the paintings of Tomma Abts if we view them in the context 
of twentieth century modernist abstraction than if we simply see them as 
‘modern art’. 
 
On the other hand, there are clearly other categories that are not simply 
cancelled when we acquire greater knowledge and experience.  For example, 
if we take Chris Ofili’s Afro Sunset, we might appreciate the painting more fully 
if we were steeped in knowledge of the work produced by artists involved with, 
or influenced by, the British black arts movement.  However, that would not 
make the category of landscape painting cease to be relevant to our appraisal 
of the work, nor would it reduce its relevance in any way. 
 
Walton argues that, although a single artwork can be seen in the context of 
many different categories, for every artwork there is one correct category, and 
that the artwork can only be appreciated in full when viewed in that correct 
category.  The people who live in his imaginary society are unable to perceive 
the qualities that we might see in Picasso’s Guernica, because to them it 
looks like a particularly dull example of their own standard artwork, the 
‘guernica’. But if the ‘guernica’ is the wrong category in which to place 
Picasso’s Guernica, that leaves the question of what category would be the 
correct one.  Walton refers to Guernica as a cubist painting, which indeed it is.  
But we might also consider history painting, propagandist art, landscape 
painting, war art, and possibly a number of other classifications as candidates 
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for being the correct category in which to view the painting.  My interpretation 
of the idea of the correct category may go further than Walton intended.  It 
arises from a question; what would the correct category for an artwork look 
like? 
 
My answer would be that it would not necessarily look like a genre in Carroll’s 
sense of the term.  In order to be complete, the correct category in which to 
appreciate an artwork would need to be constructed of all the relevant 
elements of all the relevant categories within which the artwork can 
reasonably be viewed.  The correct category to appreciate Afro Sunset would 
be one that incorporated the relevant contexts of black British art, landscape 
painting and whatever other contexts competent critics thought were relevant 
to the painting.  It is not necessary for that correct category to have a name, 
and I do not see any reason why the correct category for an artwork should 
not, in certain cases, be unique to that artwork. 
 
Uses of Reason 
 
Walton’s notion of an artistic category is a subtler and more flexible concept 
than Carroll’s genre and seems better adapted to accommodate the 
contextual complexity of many Turner Prize artworks.  It focuses the viewer on 
the variable and contra-standard features of the work, providing a useful 
framework for analysis and interpretation.  However, it does not have the 
advantage claimed by Carroll for his approach; it does not provide a 
theoretical basis for the objective grounding of evaluative judgements.  If we 
are not ready to accept Carroll’s approach, must we therefore abandon the 
idea that the critical evaluation of artwork involves the exercise of reason?  
I would argue that we do not need to abandon that idea and that the critics 
have not abandoned the exercise of reason in their practice.  In attempting to 
bridge the gap between non-aesthetic properties and aesthetic qualities, 
Carroll is aiming for a standard of objective verifiability that is not necessary 
for the defence of reason-based criticism.  If we rule out criticism as a reason-
based activity on the grounds that we cannot develop critical principles, then 
we rule out of order many other areas of scholarship.  The hard sciences 
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would be fairly safe; their core business is to develop laws that are based on 
empirical evidence and that can be tested for the accuracy of their predictive 
power.  But other academic disciplines could be in trouble.  There has been a 
parallel debate within moral philosophy about whether it is possible or 
necessary to identify general moral principles, and, as Carroll himself points 
out, moral particularists hold that the making of objective ethical judgements is 
not dependent on the existence of a set of moral principles.  Jonathan Dancy, 
for example, argues that the belief that moral judgements require moral 
principles is a mistake.279  If the test of a reason-based activity is that it is 
possible to formulate laws that are accurately predictive, then the history 
department may be out in the cold, possibly with the economics department 
not far behind it.  I am happy to concede that there is no way of objectively 
determining whether or not the lines in the paintings of Tomma Abts possess 
the qualities of life and movement. 
 
It is not necessary to insist on that scientific standard of proof.  Carroll’s On 
Criticism exemplifies the way in which debate over critical reasons has 
focused on one issue, the perceived need to be able offer objectively 
verifiable reasons in support of our aesthetic judgements.  There are multiple 
ways in which the critics reviewing the Turner Prize exercise reason in arriving 
at and supporting their evaluative judgements.  The four uses of reason within 
critical evaluation that are outlined here are ones that are plainly evident in the 
reviews: identifying non-generalisable relationships, classification, 
interpretation and collective evaluation. 
 
The first is the identification of those features of a specific work that contribute 
to the effect perceived by the critic.  As Sibley280 points out, while it is not 
possible to generalise such relationships into a rule, it is perfectly reasonable 
for a critic to say, for example, that the reticent quality that she sees in the 
painting is due in part to its muted colours.  She is not claiming that the muted 
colours will necessarily have that effect in a different painting, she is saying 
279 Dancy Ethics without principles OUP 2004 
280 Sibley p9 
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that, as they are used in this particular painting, they have that particular 
effect.  
 
Now, at this point, it might be objected that we are back to relying entirely on 
the subjective impression of the critic.  However, I will argue that, when the 
critic makes such an observation, she does so in the knowledge that the 
connection between muted colour and reticence is so widely accepted within 
our culture, that it is not necessary to provide evidence to support the claim.  
Were it necessary to provide evidence to show the connection, then it could 
be found not only in the study of art history, but in marketing, fashion, and 
other areas of commercial activity that make use of survey-based research 
and other methods developed within the social sciences.  It is not necessary 
to do so.  A connection between muted colour and reserve is so accepted 
within our culture that we do not even need to think about it.  If we were asked 
to dress in a reserved and sober manner for a particular occasion, we would 
not arrive wearing brightly coloured clothing.  The metaphor is deeply 
embedded in the language; we talk of wearing a loud shirt or painting a room 
in quiet colours.  When the critic says that muted colours contribute to a 
perceived sense of reticence or reserve, she is indicating a relationship is 
amply supported by evidence.  That evidence is not presented within the 
review and the supporting argument not made, precisely because that 
relationship is so fully assimilated a part of our visual culture that it seems 
obvious. 
 
The second use of reason evident in the reviews is in the work of 
classification.  Although Carroll’s approach to classification did not provide 
useful evaluative tools in the case of the Turner Prize, the reviews do show 
how important classification is to reviewers when they are making and 
justifying their appraisals.  Great effort was made by reviewers to identify 
relevant contexts as precisely as possible.  Critics used a range of methods, 
including many identified by Walton, in order to do this.  These included 
identifying standard and variable features, making comparisons with known 
categories and researching contextual information.  The direct observations of 
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the art objects were informed by the academic disciplines of art history and 
cultural theory. 
 
The third use of reason is the analytical and evidence based reasoning 
undertaken by critics in the area of interpretation.  As I have pointed out, in the 
reviews, issues of meaning and value are not kept in separate compartments.  
Eric Newton and Frank Sibley jointly provide the example of the meadow, 
which illustrates how closely entwined are meaningful and aesthetic qualities.  
The dominance of the Turner Prize by conceptual art has inevitably put 
meaning at the centre of many reviews, but I would argue that meaning and 
value are no less linked in the abstract paintings of Tomma Abts. 
 
The fourth use of reason that I want to identify is one that I have referred to as 
collective evaluation.  This is a use that it is possible to evidence from 
individual reviews, but which I will discuss instead by reference to the reviews 
en masse in the next section. 
 
Evaluation as a Collective Endeavour 
 
Dickie’s institutional definition of art is effectively the working definition I have 
used for this study.  His approach to defining art helpfully underlines an 
important fact: that whatever else art is, it is a social phenomenon.  The 
evaluation of art is often imagined as a solitary activity; I stand before the 
artwork and make my judgement.  The perennial question at issue is whether 
my judgement is purely subjective, or whether it can be said to be in any 
sense objective.  However, when we look at the process of evaluation as it 
takes place during the annual Turner Prize, we can see it far more as a 
collective enterprise, involving curators, news journalists, the art market and 
the general public.  Above all though, when we think about the evaluation of 
artworks, we think about the role of the critic. 
 
We read reviews for a range of different reasons.  The common assumption is 
that we read a review of an exhibition in order to decide whether or not to go 
and see it.  But we may also read a review of an exhibition that we know we 
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will not be able to visit, and do so out of interest or to keep up with the latest 
developments in some particular area of artistic practice.  We may also read 
reviews of an exhibition that we have already visited; we might want to know if 
the critic’s evaluation tallies with our own, or whether she can shed light on 
some aspect of the exhibition that has puzzled us.  Occasionally we might 
even change our minds about what we have seen, because of what we have 
read in a particularly persuasive review.  
 
When we go to exhibitions, we often do so with friends or members of our 
families and we discuss what we have seen.  We may talk with other people 
who have seen the same exhibition on a different occasion, and compare 
notes with them.  While attending the exhibition, we will learn more about the 
work we are seeing, by reading the information provided by curators, or by 
talking with museum staff.  I would argue that these activities, the reading of 
reviews and the discussions that take place about the work we have seen, 
more truly represent the way in which most people engage with art, than does 
the image of the solitary viewer, silently arriving at a judgment.   Clearly, when 
we discuss art exhibits, or read about them, we are inclined to give more 
weight to the views of those whom we consider to have most knowledge and 
expertise in the area.  We look to the critics for guidance, but we do not simply 
accept their views and adopt them ourselves.  We may be persuaded by the 
critic, or we may not.  We may form a view about the bias of certain critics and 
adjust our opinion of their evaluation accordingly, or we may decide, after 
reading many reviews, that one particular critic is particularly insightful and 
value her views over those of other critics. 
 
In the introduction to this study, I gave a caveat about the degree of 
agreement between the critics on a work of art.  I acknowledged that one 
could not be sure whether different critics had used similar language because 
they had independently come to the same conclusions, or whether they had 
been consciously or unconsciously influenced by each other.  Clearly, the fact 
that this cannot be known for certain would weaken any claim I wished to 
make about the inter-subjectivity of the aesthetic qualities they identify.  
However, if we consider the evaluation as a collective process, then the 
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question is not so troubling.  Indeed, we should consider a degree of 
interaction, or even influence, between critics to be a positive element in the 
social evaluation of art. 
 
In taking this position, what I am in a sense endorsing is an idea of collective 
evaluation that goes back to one implied by David Hume’s description of the 
ideal critic:   
 
Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, 
perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone 
entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, 
wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and 
beauty.281 
 
For Hume it is the joint verdict of expert critics that guarantees that aesthetic 
judgements are not purely subjective.  The implication of his phrase ‘joint 
verdict,’ is that Hume would prefer unanimity, but I would argue that in order to 
establish a collective evaluation a degree of dissent and debate is not 
necessarily a bad thing.  
 
An objection might be raised to this argument, namely that the idea of a joint 
verdict does not sit well with the examples of the extreme divergence of the 
views of competent critics we have seen in commentaries on the Turner Prize.  
The diametrically opposing opinions held by Waldemar Januszczak and 
Daniel Barnes on the work of Martin Creed is an example.  In such a case, 
where the range of views fell across a very wide spectrum, any attempt to 
arrive at a joint verdict might amount to nothing more than a crude averaging 
out of unresolved differences. 
 
It would be possible to resort to using Carroll’s defence here and to say that 
such divergent views are simply due to the exceptional nature of 
contemporary and avant garde practice.  But I do not take that position as I 
think it is untenable, not only because it is vulnerable to the objection I raised 
281 Hume Of the Standard of Taste 
168
to Carroll’s position, but also because there are many examples of present 
day critics having divergent views about the art of the past. 
 
A reasonable response to any important situation in which we are receiving 
conflicting expert opinion, is to accept our own responsibility to make a 
judgement based on our own evaluation of the best evidence that we can get.  
That might include detailed analysis and evaluation of arguments put by 
experts and a consideration of their relative credentials and track records.  It 
might also involve direct observation of the evidence to gain ones own first-
hand experience or the commissioning of further enquiries.  This would be a 
reasonable response to take in many contexts, from formulating government 
policy to tackling an outbreak of dry rot.  It is also a reasonable response with 
respect to the evaluation of artworks. 
  
The notion of collective evaluation does not imply that we should average out 
the views of critics where they diverge widely, nor does imply that we rely on 
the wisdom of crowds and accept the most popular view, nor the most 
consensual view.  Instead, it implies that we should acknowledge the 
divergence and seek to resolve the issue using the kinds of methods I have 
outlined above.  The case of J M W Turner and John Ruskin provides an 
example that takes advantage of the benefits of hindsight.  There were widely 
diverging critical views of Turner’s work in his own time and after his death.  
The extended, detailed and closely argued defence of Turner, mounted by 
Ruskin in his popular and influential series of books Modern Painters, 
contributed over time to a shift towards a more strongly positive consensus on 
the value of his work. 
 
In the case of J M W Turner, we have the advantage of being able to see that 
Ruskin’s positive evaluation of his work has at least stood the test of time.  We 
do not have that luxury in the case of the Turner Prize reviews, but if we 
consider the expertise, knowledge and earnest intent evident within them, 
there are good reasons to think that, in the British press, the practice of art 
criticism is in good shape.  However, that does not mean that the task of 
evaluating artworks should be left in the hands of the critics.  The Turner 
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Prize, and the commentaries that surround it, provide an opportunity to see 
the process of collective evaluation at the point where it is most visible. 
 
Approached in this light, the evaluation of artworks is not a matter of judging 
them against a set of agreed criteria, nor is it simply the subjective view of the 
individual, nor is it a matter where we can just accept the word of an expert.  It 
is an active, ongoing, collaborative, inter-disciplinary process that is open to 
anyone who wishes to participate.  I have suggested that, in some cases, it is 
more useful to think about an artwork not as an object, but as a contribution to 
a conversation.  The Turner Prize is the event in which it can most clearly be 
seen that the conversation does not only involve artists, but also includes 
critics, journalists, curators and the general public. 
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